

JUNE

COMMENTARY

The Great Powers and Israel—

What U.S. Support Means

The Role Britain Hopes to Play

Who Can Translate Yiddish?

Our New German Policy and the DP's

Martin Buber and Christian Thought

Gentile and Jew

All-Out War on the Production Front?

By the River—A Poem

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From the American Scene—

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The Study of Man—

Destiny in the Nursery

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COMMENTARY

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COMMENTARY

WHAT U.S. SUPPORT MEANS

Behind Washington's New Decisiveness

HAL LEHRMAN

THIS inquiry, aimed at assessing the present tendencies of United States policy on Palestine, began only one brief week-end after the Friday of President Truman's thunderbolt recognition of Israel. Permanent officialdom in Washington was still rocking under the blow. The Security

WHEN President Truman recognized the new state of Israel, observers of American policy on Palestine—as well as American delegates to the United Nations—had reason to feel somewhat bewildered. Did this new reversal of American policy represent a complete swing of the pendulum back to its original pro-partition views? Or was it a temporary tactic—and to what end? Or did it mean that at last a sharply-defined American policy had been forged in Washington? In an attempt to get an objective and authoritative answer to these questions, we asked HAL LEHRMAN to go to Washington and make an on-the-spot inquiry. A previous investigation by Mr. Lehrman—"Partition in Washington: An Inquiry" in the March COMMENTARY—written at another critical juncture in the Palestine situation, had its analysis confirmed by events, and has been widely praised as a noteworthy contribution to an understanding of American Palestine policy. Mr. Lehrman has written widely on the Near East and Europe for COMMENTARY and other periodicals. His recent book, *Russia's Europe* (Appleton-Century), analyzes the postwar destinies of the Soviet-dominated countries of Europe. He was born in New York in 1911 and attended Cornell University.

Council had just commenced juggling the hot Palestine problem again after catching it from a despondent, frustrated, and departed General Assembly. It was a moment when anything might happen, and nobody in Lake Success or Washington, however highly placed, could safely predict what it would be.

Nevertheless, certain persons who competently reflect the attitudes and intentions of various branches of the government showed this reporter their usual generous courtesy—in exchange for his usual guarantee of confidence. From these conversations there emerged two salient conclusions: that the White House had regained its initiative in policy-making on Palestine; that, so far as official United States policy was concerned, the newly-born state of Israel was in the Middle East to stay.

I am aware of the perils of prophecy—especially about Palestine and American behavior thereon. Washington had wavered before, and could waver again. Moreover, the United States was not performing in a vacuum but needed to obtain consent from at least six of the ten other Security Council members, each of which entertained its own peculiar definition of peace in the Middle East. Finally, it was conceivable that swift developments on battlefields in Lake Success and Palestine might render this article

out-of-date or obvious (or downright silly) before it achieved print. But I think it legitimate, if perhaps only for the record, to note here what seemed to be American policy as ascertainable at the given moment, and what results were likely to ensue from that policy.

IT APPEARED, then, that in the middle of May the United States had entered a new and aggressive period of decision concerning Palestine. In this phase, all American calculations for the Middle East would take into account the fact that a Jewish state existed, and would strive to avoid action (or lack of action) that might jeopardize that state's survival. If the mood of May endured, and if the United States held resolutely to its freshly-charted course, the following was promised:

1. The United States, while careful to leave the way open as long as possible for Arab conciliation, would push determinedly for effective UN action to end the Holy Land war.

2. If the Arab armies persisted in the field, the United States would demand Security Council denunciation of the "breach of the peace" and "aggression."

3. If the UN could be thus galvanized into finding and stigmatizing the aggressors, the United States would call for all economic sanctions possible under the UN mechanism.

4. The United States would urge and support Security Council endorsement of arms for Israel and an arms embargo for the Arabs.

5. Should such action fail of adoption in a hesitant Security Council, the United States would at least lift its own arms embargo on the Middle East if it fell short of retaining the embargo exclusively against the Arabs.

6. The United States would back an Israeli petition for UN membership.

7. The United States would lend full assistance and facilities for transportation of immigrants from the DP camps in the American zones of Austria and Germany

across American-controlled territory toward Israel, also possibly helping to make shipping available for the Mediterranean crossing.

8. The Marshall Plan being restricted to European countries, Israel would technically be ineligible for ERP aid. However, the United States would consider an independent loan to counteract the effects of Britain's exclusion of Palestine from the sterling bloc and to assist the young state in its first efforts toward economic stability. In this connection, the Provisional Government of Israel was already drawing up estimates to be used in applying for an American loan.

TO THE world at large, to the American people, to the UN, and, more especially, to Britain and the Arabs, the Truman administration's policy on Palestine in recent months has seemed a monument of contradiction. The Arabs in particular, when United States delegate Philip C. Jessup arose with an apologetic air in the General Assembly to announce our recognition of Israel, were choked with what was evidently, for once, a genuine feeling of outrage and despair. The tears of wrath in the eyes of Lebanese delegate Charles Malik were real. He was surely thinking that the United States had first steamrolled partition through the Assembly, then gratifyingly tabled partition in favor of trusteeship, then dropped trusteeship in favor of a mere truce, during which a "stand-still" would maintain the status quo without damage to the rights and claims of all disputants. And now here was the United States doublecrossing the Arabs and flouting the solemn assurances of its own spokesmen by acknowledging a Jewish state where none existed, by giving the Jews the ripe fruit of partition when all the time the impression had been fostered that partition was withered and dead.

But in the twilight illumination beneath which diplomacy habitually operates, one can easily confuse shadow and substance. Plain words have occult meanings, and what

seems so need not be necessarily so. In Washington I was given a "clarification."

This clarification rested on two assumptions, which, in their literal meaning, were undeniable: the United States, as a member of the UN, had to act in concert with its fellow-members; the prime duty of the UN, as affirmed and reiterated in the Charter, was to maintain peace. Accordingly, it could be demonstrated that the United States had been consistent from beginning to end, earnestly toiling inside the UN to restore tranquillity to the Holy Land. The demonstration went as follows:

Washington had supported partition, with the proviso of economic collaboration between the two independent segments of Palestine, on the strength of Unscop's recommendation that such a device was most likely to achieve lasting peace. When the Palestine Commission subsequently reported that partition could be implemented only by force, we had to take note of this deplorable fact. Nevertheless, we invited the Security Council to explore means of implementation under the Charter. This failed.

We then moved for consultation among the big powers, trying to bring the contending parties together. From March 5 to 15 we labored for a four-way settlement among the Arabs, the Jewish Agency, the British mandatory, and the Palestine Commission. This also failed.

Thereafter we could have sat still, allowing the crisis to degenerate into carnage. But it was our cardinal desire to continue exploring all channels toward peace. The President at this juncture (in defiance of domestic political consequences) courageously instructed our delegation to call for a temporary trusteeship and truce without jeopardizing the rights of any group. As Truman and Marshall both pointed out, this was not abandonment of partition but merely its postponement, to afford a cooling-off period after which the moderates on both sides might draw together. Our proposals were endorsed by the Security Council, but when a special session of the Assembly

convened to produce a practical plan—*any* plan—none was forthcoming.

Meanwhile we did what we could for peace. We strove to win Arab-Jewish acceptance of a general truce. When this collapsed, we tried to get at least a "cease-fire" agreement, down to the last possible moment before expiration of the mandate. On the final day, May 15, we obtained Assembly creation of the post of mediator.

With the mandate's lapse, and the UN's failure to establish a comparable authority, an intolerable vacuum was created. Our loyal efforts for peace had been futile. We had now to consider, in the further interests of peace, what responsible elements were available with which we might negotiate. The state of Israel, duly proclaimed, presented itself as an accomplished fact. Swift United States recognition of that state, in the absence of any other authority in the area, was logical, consistent, and imperative.

FOR any outside observer willing to accept the above theses, all the apparent confusions of Washington's performance fell neatly into a pattern of model consistency. Among other things, the theses explained why an all-Palestine trusteeship, on which the United States had once banked so heavily, was permitted to fade away.

Trusteeship had been reckoned as the last hope of the Western democracies for maintaining peace and international authority in Palestine without the participation of Soviet troops—a consideration which, while unmentioned in the UN Charter, was of signal interest to certain UN members. The "Allied and Associated Powers," which had jointly wrested Palestine and the remainder of Araby from the expiring Ottoman Empire in World War I, might have legally stepped in after the mandate with a UN trusteeship of their own exclusive membership, and left Soviet Russia sitting outside the gate. To be effective, however, trusteeship required either the consent of the inhabitants, which they seemed reluctant to grant, or a military force to persuade their consent.

This latter requirement of an international police was trusteeship's fatal flaw. Without an enforcement plan, the delegations to the General Assembly were not going to let themselves be seduced into supporting another fiasco like partition. But enforcement ran counter to official American purposes on two fronts. Trusteeship threatened to burden the United States with sole responsibility for its application, when the United States wanted only to act as *one* of many UN members—and trusteeship meant possible war, when the United States wanted only peace.

In the first place, who was going to bell the cat? The Belgians, the Brazilians, and similar small-power reservoirs for police recruitment awaited the great powers' lead. The French awaited the British lead. But the Labor government was vehemently committed to exodus from Palestine. Public opinion back home demanded that the British casualty lists be closed. It would have been political suicide for Whitehall to propose that troops were going to stay after all—unless the United States came in too, and first. So the British awaited the American lead. But the United States feared that if it committed itself on the number of men, machines, and ships it was prepared to offer, it would be invited to proceed alone.

In the second place, Washington regarded American use of force in a Palestine trusteeship as unthinkable—because it would mean using bayonets against the Jews. According to assertions which I have no means of checking, the Arabs might have been brought to accept trusteeship. What was needed for trusteeship's adoption was persuasion of the Jews—and, notably, of the Jews in the United States! An attempt at such persuasion was never made, because it was politically impossible, and because passion had carried off the masses of American Jewry. Even Hadassah, I was told, had run wild for partition. How could the Jews in Palestine then be expected not to resist the forces of trusteeship? How could American soldiers be ordered to fire on Jews?

And how, finally, could the United States preserve peace by bringing war?

The trusteeship plan, therefore, died still-born. The best that the United States would venture, in an informal working paper, was a pro rata contribution to a UN force composed of several powers—*provided that a truce were first accepted by Jews and Arabs*. In other words, we would supply our strictly limited share to the international police only if a police were not necessary! Neither the British, the French, nor anyone else offered any concrete facts and figures about military quotas. The problem never even entered the realm of practical discussion. The trusteeship idea was allowed to perish of inanition.

SUCH, at any rate, was the story given this writer in highly authoritative quarters to explain the twists and turns of United States policy between the November partition of Palestine and the May recognition of Israel. Which does not mean that there was universal rejoicing over recognition, particularly in those important sections of Washington where Middle Eastern policy had latterly been regarded as geared to the requirements of oil, strategy, and Arab friendship.

Quite the contrary. Only a few hours before Israel's recognition, there had been experimental talk about possible sanctions against the truce-resisting Jews. Mention had been made of an embargo on funds to Palestine and cancellation of tax-exempt privileges for the United Jewish Appeal—even including the Joint Distribution Committee! It is understatement to say that the President's decision to recognize Israel came as a shock to those policy advisors who were thinking such thoughts. (The fact was, however, that Warren Austin, at least, had been notified in advance.) Why was recognition so urgent, it was bitterly but sincerely asked, when we could have just as easily continued to negotiate with the *de facto* Jewish Agency? Had we ever found it so essential to recognize Transjordan? How could our word be respected in the

Middle East when we made it the football of domestic politics? How could we retain a glimmer of Arab cordiality after guaranteeing fair play and then thrusting the prize of recognition into the hands of the Jews?

Those who put such questions saw for the future a totally new orientation of our policy toward the Arab world. Henceforth we would be compelled to re-evaluate the entire concept of our national interests there. We would have to cut loose from old moorings, change old friends for new, reserve for Israel a special and favored place. As a logical consequence of the unprecedented decision to recognize Israel, we would be required to label as aggression the first proof of Arab incursion into Israeli "territory." Sanctions against the Arabs must inexorably follow. If Senator Taft had already called for stern action, how could the administration fail to outbid him? How could we dare to withhold arms from the Jews, or supply them to the Arabs?

Such were the ineluctable implications of our new line, however great the risk. For risk there certainly would be. We could not, for instance, expect to furnish weapons to one side in a battle without being considered unneutral by the other. How long would it be before the Jewish minorities—800,000 persons—in the Arab states would feel the uncontrolled fury of a *jihad*? And, for that matter, how long could safety even of Americans in the Middle East be assured? The day after recognition, plans for evacuation of Americans were taken out for fresh study under a "top-secret" classification.

YET, despite the private outcry, there was a curious lack of basic distress in those official circles where normally the recognition might have been expected to evoke the deepest anguish. Intellectually, the reaction was sharp enough; but emotionally, somehow, one sensed a kind of resignation. In part, this sprang from shrewd appraisal of the public temper, as gauged by enthusiastic press and Congressional response to the White House move. Already

painfully under fire, potential critics of recognition would hesitate to expose themselves further. In part, too, such critics were silenced by Senator Vandenberg's support of the President, a token of extraordinary bi-partisan unanimity on a hot political issue in a pre-election period. But, in addition, one heard a certain note of relief that the Arabs, thanks to American intervention, might be kept from the full test of battle—and thereby spared the risk of damaged prestige.

It would seem that the Arab fighting man was not doing as well as had been anticipated. (This was before the Anglo-Abdullah Legion had unleashed its assault on Jerusalem.) Attention was wryly directed to the possibility that Zionist propaganda had exaggerated somewhat when it was protesting that the Arabs were receiving all the arms and the Jews none. Chagrin was also expressed over such embarrassing Arab "stupidities" as the Egyptian air raids on Tel Aviv. The main point, however, was that disquieting information had apparently reached Washington about the condition of the Arab armies—reports of poor discipline, bad planning, inefficient staff work, disorganized supply, bickering among the Arab allies. Could it be that, in a real showdown, the Arab "menace" would be completely exploded? The resulting loss of face for the present rulers in the Arab world might have incalculable consequences.

Such considerations disturbed wide areas in Washington, not because of any devotion to the Arab cause but because of a genuine concern for what these areas regarded as fundamental American interests in the Middle East. Our interests required stability of power in that vital region. But Farouk was racing up Southern Palestine less to succor his Arab brethren than to get there before Abdullah, and martial law had been declared in Egypt less to mobilize the nation than to clamp a grip on the seething Wafd party. If the Cairo government, which had been shaken by a mere constabulary strike, should meet ignominious defeat in Palestine, how many more hours would that

regime last? What about Iraq, where Sunnite and Shiite were eternally at dagger's point and the Kurds an omnipresent danger? And Syria, teetering on the brink of bankruptcy? Distant Turkey and Iran, one heard, were worried about a possible Arab military rebuff at Jewish hands. That was the clue. And if Turkey and Iran were worried, Russia might find fertile ground. Defeat might bring most of the feeble Arab potentates toppling in popular upheavals. Whatever their failings, these potentates were at least dependably anti-Soviet. What would the new regimes signify? At worst, "people's governments," the kind the Russians dote on. At best, uncertainty, insecurity, troubled waters, the kind the Russians love to fish in.

Seen from this angle, a pro-Jewish trend in American policy would not be an unmitigated disaster if it compelled a "cease-fire" in Palestine, leaving the door open for the Arab effendis to retire without loss of face—and without braving the verdict of all-out battle.

OVER in the vicinity of the White House, such reasoning agreeably matched the "new look" in Palestine policy. Everybody likes to believe himself consistent, and presidential circles are no exception. Truman, it was indicated, had never regarded Arab friendship of such burning importance to our interests that it had to be favored at the expense of the Jews—and Truman had certainly never backed down on partition. The Jews had always been considered a source of pro-American strength in the Middle East. Indeed, if a choice had to be made, the United States was likely to regard Israel as a sturdier pillar than the rest of the Middle East lumped together. But, of course, such desperate choices were not necessary. The problem was simply to labor in the UN for an equitable settlement of Arab-Jewish differences, and for peace.

On the morrow of Israel's recognition, the White House atmosphere was one of serenity and satisfaction. Blended with a cautious wait-and-see note was a new over-

tone of determination. Undoubtedly this was encouraged by the nationwide reception given the President's move.

The reception should have startled nobody. It was obvious that most of American Jewry would applaud. (According to cynics, this applause was the only reason for the recognition.) It was obvious that the rank and file of Congress would approve. (Again, according to the cynics, Congress was inspired by the knowledge that there is no Arab vote in American elections.) But the cheers also came from newspaper editors, newspaper readers, and average citizens who had been sorely discomfited and perplexed by an apparent deficiency of purpose or meaning in the administration's pre-recognition somersaults. Finally, there was the intensely dramatic value of the situation: a tiny, valiant republic arising in the face of foreign invasion, against heavy odds and a sea of troubles—and a great, faraway republic leaning forward to help the fledgling Israel stand erect. The spectacle had sure-fire appeal for the American "big brother" tradition of fair play and tenderness for the underdog.

If recognition surprised everybody, it certainly surprised the Russians too. It may even be said to have mortified them, as was clear from Andrei Gromyko's prompt announcement that the "unprincipled conduct" of the United States had put the UN in a "ludicrous situation." (This correspondent can recall a somewhat similar situation, differently handled, in Budapest in 1945, when a surprise American offer to recognize the provisional Hungarian government in exchange for a guarantee of free elections was banned from the controlled Hungarian press until the Soviets could rush forth with a proclamation recognizing the same government without guarantee of free elections.) Nobody in authority denied that a desire to beat the Russians to the punch was one factor in the precipitate haste of the Truman maneuver. However, it can be reliably stated that, in the larger context of the East-West struggle, American recognition of Israel was not merely negative

and against the Soviets but positive and for the democracies.

If a Jewish state was to be recognized at all, the administration felt it to be essential that the first government to do so should be a democracy and not a totalitarian power. Soviet Russia hardly deserved such a historic claim on the gratitude of the people of Israel. Further, so I was told, initial recognition by a democracy was necessary not only for Jews in Palestine, but even more for Jews in the United States. There had been enough talk that a Jewish state would be a Kremlin creature. If Moscow had been the first to welcome Israel to statehood, the fact could (and would) have been taken by many as proof of the charge. Those who instinctively equate "Jew" with "Red" would have been able to point a finger. In this light, United States recognition was a stout blow against congenital anti-Semitism, here and abroad.

And it rendered the further service of clarifying the position of the great majority of American Jewry. The Jewish state now became a *foreign* state, one which enjoyed the friendship and esteem of the United States. No longer need any Jew be torn between allegiance to his country and despair over that country's Palestine policy. Thanks to President Truman, American Jews could henceforth be as ebullient about Israel as the Irish here are about Ireland, without placing in question their fundamental loyalty to the United States.

THIS was the mood of Washington in mid-May of 1948, while the Egyptians were announcing their arrival on Palestinian soil and the Israeli were protesting numerous violations of their frontiers. The mood was matched by the new temper of United States spokesmen at Lake Success in the oratorical days which followed. When Senator Austin smote his fist on the table and summoned the Security Council to "help keep King Abdullah where he belongs," it was a far cry from the week before, when all United States representatives had been dancing on the point of a

needle. One even heard a high American official amiably discussing in private the hitherto incredible notion of forcing the Arabs into line by stopping *our* purchases of Middle Eastern oil!

This extravagant idea obviously depended on the collaboration of the other powers in a boycott of Arab oil—a commodity at which all the world was grasping and which Western Europe needed for its economic recovery under the Marshall Plan. And the entire new turn in United States policy was dependent, for its longevity and perseverance, on too many unmeasurable factors to permit confident prediction. An abundance of snags still lay in wait for the dreams of Israel. Could the UN, which had been powerless to put an inquiry commission across the Greek-Albanian border, create a machinery for sanctions against the whole Arab world? What about the British? Two minutes of conversation with any responsible Briton would show that the views of London and Washington were never farther and more angrily apart than on the morning after Israel's recognition. Less vociferously than the Arabs, but no less firmly, the British regarded recognition as black betrayal.

To understand the British, whether or not their complex reasoning was valid, it had to be remembered that the bombing of the King David, the hanging of the sergeants, the dwindling of Britain's imperial position, and a genuine sympathy for the Arabs all contributed to give the British a perspective which was sure to make the going rough for Israel. To them, Israel was a fiction and partition a dead letter. The UN's failure to substitute a new international regime for the mandate had allowed sovereignty to devolve back on the population of Palestine, the bulk of which was Arab. If Abdullah came to the rescue of the Arab majority, how could he be called an aggressor? Indeed, was not Irgun virtually the dominant element in Zionist military councils, and did not Irgun's ambitions in Transjordan also constitute aggression, to say nothing of the slaughter

of whole Arab villages? As for Abdullah, he was Britain's equal and sovereign ally, not a treaty vassal. Britain would need long reflection before venturing to interfere with him: "It will take a great deal to persuade us to annoy Abdullah, who is about the only stable factor left in the Middle East." This reticence might even include "non-interference" if the Arab Legion should cut itself a slice of the Jewish Negev, an admirable location for military bases.

Whatever the cost to Israel, such calculations were clearly pertinent to common Anglo-American strategic interests vis-à-vis the Soviets. If Britain remained obdurate, how far would the United States go in demanding justice for Israel at the expense of unity in the world alignment against totalitarianism? And, if Britain should be forced right up to the hurdle of the veto, would she yield or would she jump?

IT WAS evident that the current policy of the United States carried no hard guarantees. On the basis of past performance, scepticism was justifiable. Until now, there had always been a chasm between fair presidential words for a Jewish Palestine on the humanitarian level and State Department hostility on the international political and long-range military level. Now that the United States was at last confronted with the imperative of direct action, would the humanitarian trend shown by every president since Wilson triumph over *Realpolitik*? Or would one see a repetition of the Labor party's tragic passage—from ardent pro-Zionism when Labor was in opposition, to unrelenting anti-Zionism when Labor mounted to power and to the responsibility of confronting Russia in the Middle East and around the world?

For those, including many sober Jews, who took the long historical view, it even seemed that recognition of Israel might ultimately be a costly gift to the Jewish homeland. A state peacefully born of partition out of trusteeship would have had special status, entitled to military protection and economic aid from the UN. But Israel,

emerging in violence and contested legality, was now free and independent. Might it not thereby have forfeited its claim to special consideration? Could there not be a washing of the hands at the UN? Could not even the United States use the recognition as a device to hold the Jewish state at arm's length and avoid commitments which would have been unavoidable under UN sponsorship? Was Israel really ready for such "independence"? Flags and stamps alone do not make a sovereign nation. The problem of hostile neighbors and a desperate economy also needed to be solved.

And even if the United States stood momentarily firm, it was asked, and Israel weathered the immediate crisis, would the Jewish state be able to grow and prosper—not just until the November elections but beyond? The Arabs might be wheedled and bludgeoned into a truce, but could they be made to accept a lasting peace and cooperation? Would conditions be favorable to the building of that genuine Jewish homeland on which world Jewry had expended so much yearning and sacrifice? Or, as Hannah Arendt has incisively warned, might not the nascent homeland shrivel into a beleaguered fortress, its culture and economy stunted by the demands of perpetual war, its garrison degenerating into a military tribe, its spirit growing alien in the isolation of battle until a new people would take form in Israel without links to the world community from which Israel had sprung?

ALL these questions and riddles harassed the minds of thoughtful men amid Jewry's general jubilation over the new note of friendship in the voice of the United States. These doubts have been set down here not as arguments but as elements in a full and objective report on the prospects of Israel. All that could be said with assurance was that, for at least this present moment in history, the hope of forthright American support never looked brighter, and at a time when such support was more needed than ever before in the long struggle for a Palestine homeland.

THE ROLE BRITAIN HOPES TO PLAY

Self-Interest May Yet Dictate a Shift

RICHARD H. S. CROSSMAN

THE longer I live in the world of practical politics, the more wary I become of attributing rationalistic calculation to the actions of governments and politicians. Undoubtedly, there is a pattern of historical development, moving according to a complex of causes. But these causes, which can be seen so clearly in retrospect, are seldom the conscious motives of the politician, whether he works in the Kremlin, in Washington, or in London.

Britain's relations with Palestine illustrate with unusual sharpness this gap between historical cause and conscious motive. Looked at from outside, it is almost impossible to avoid attributing to Bevin a deliberate and well-thought-out plan, designed to defeat every effort to create a Jewish state. He looms in the Jewish mind today like a monstrous, anti-Semitic Machiavelli,

ON MAY 15 Britain ended its twenty-five-year mandate over Palestine in an atmosphere of bitterness and mutual recrimination. The Empire had "washed its hands" of the Jewish homeland—though obviously not of the Middle East. In view of the headlines of the moment, only the rashest prophet—it would seem—could see anything but a continuing perspective of indifference—or downright hostility. Here, however, one of England's best-informed authorities on Palestine suggests that we may be in for surprises. In any case, he indicates the permanent British needs that must continue to keep her interested in Palestine, and sketches the role which she may yet possibly play there. RICHARD H. S. CROSSMAN, a brilliant young Labor member of Parliament, was on the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into Palestine, and wrote the internationally discussed book, *Palestine Mission*, advocating partition and a Jewish state. He is also a member of the editorial board of the *New Statesman and Nation*. Mr. Crossman was born in England in 1907. He was graduated from New College, Oxford, where he later became a fellow and tutor.

complete master of himself and of the diplomacy and strategy of Great Britain. Moreover, the whole chain of events from 1945 until the end of the mandate seems to confirm this picture of his personality. Even the most cautious observer might be induced to remark, "Even if he didn't plan it this way, at least things have gone as though he did. And that comes to the same thing."

But does it? If I were asked to select one single reason for the whole tragedy of Anglo-Jewish relations, I would pick out and bracket together the lack of comprehension shown by the British government for the Jewish state of mind and by the Jews for the state of mind of the British government. Each has consistently over-estimated the rationality and perversity of the other. Both feel themselves the innocent victims of a wicked and carefully elaborated conspiracy. Bevin, with genuine self-righteousness, places the conspiracy's headquarters in the offices of Rabbi Silver, and has visions of a vast network uniting the capitalist Jews of America with the Communist Jews of the Eastern bloc. He is passionately and sincerely indignant because he believes that world Jewry has intrigued and plotted to frustrate his own perfectly reasonable solution of the problem on which he once staked his career. Americans, and particularly American Jews, find it hard to grasp the vital fact that the main motive which inspires the British Foreign Secretary is a sense of injured innocence. It is this which erupts from time to time in most uncalculated indiscretions, in spasmodic orders and counter-orders, and which is effectively preventing the formulation of any coherent British policy for the Middle East. Over-estimating the cunning and coolness of British diplomacy, Americans see a plan

where there is in reality an emotional and confused reaction to a situation over which Britain has lost control. The real criticism of Bevin is not that he is pro-Arab and anti-Zionist (though he is certainly both these things), but that he has never been able to understand either Jew or Arab, far less the relationship of the two. His pro-Arab feelings bear as little relation to Arab realities as his anti-Jewish feelings to the facts of Zionism. When he deals with Palestine, his powerful mind moves in a murky atmosphere of myth and resentment.

In all this he accurately reflects the mood of British public opinion. Like their Foreign Secretary, the British feel ill-used in relation to Palestine. Things have gone terribly wrong, and British Tommies have had to fight a filthy campaign, in "a country of which they have scarcely heard." To add insult to injury, Britain has been vilified by Americans, rooting from the sidelines but unwilling, when the test came, to impose the solution they themselves had pushed through the UN Assembly. There is no aspect of Ernest Bevin's foreign policy which has received stronger support from all parties and from all classes than his Palestine policy; and this support has been given not because of the particular things he has done—most Britons dimly realize that they cannot all have been right—but because, whatever the Foreign Secretary does with regard to Palestine, he does it representing a people which feels that it has been kicked in the face by a hostile world.

It will be observed that the British and Jewish psychology are more similar than might have been expected. Indeed, they are the two sides of a single emotional shield. In the tangle of historical causation, Englishman and Jew alike attributes to himself injured innocence and to the other the diabolism of the calculating schemer.

I REALIZE that most readers will regard the picture I have drawn as fantastic and absurd. After all, six million Englishmen were not killed in Nazi gas chambers, and their desperate survivors are not a people

without a country. It is Britain which willingly assumed the mandate and has since then permitted Palestine to slip into chaos and war. It is the Labor party, Mr. Bevin's own party, which, after supporting Zionism for twenty-five years, repudiated its solemn pledges and openly favored the Arabs in their struggle. Objectively, there is no resemblance whatsoever between the situation of the two peoples.

Of course there isn't. But we are dealing not with objective truth but with states of mind. However absurd it may sound to the outside world, Bevin speaks for Britain when he talks as though he were a simple fellow who has been the victim of a conspiracy. Moreover, that he and his countrymen feel and speak in this way is a fact as objective as the existence of oil in Iraq, and just as vital an element in the situation. Indeed, the British state of mind is the one fact that the Jews have most consistently underrated. Or rather, they have assumed that, because the British were wrong about Palestine, British feelings could be discounted.

Any appraisal of British policy in Palestine must start from this central point. To neglect the British state of mind, as personified in Bevin, and to concentrate on strategic and economic interests, is to distort the facts and make comprehension impossible. For the really striking characteristic of Bevin's policy during the past year has been its disregard of diplomatic and strategic interests: its complete failure to win Arab support, its disruption of Anglo-American relations, and, most ironical of all, its objective assistance to Soviet Russia. The Foreign Secretary has achieved nothing he rationally desires. Everything he most feared has been precipitated by his own actions.

This is not the history of a cool and calculating Machiavelli, but of an honest and confused mind, lashing out in unpredictable reaction against problems it cannot understand, the victim of emotions which have overmastered cool self-interest. Such things have happened before in British history. We have only to recall British reactions to American demands for independence and to those

of the Southern Irish and the South Africans. In every case the outside world has explained these tragedies in terms of "perfidious Albion," when in reality they were examples of that insular reaction to "incomprehensible foreigners" which from time to time violates the principles of sound imperialism, on which British foreign policy has been traditionally based.

WHAT are the underlying British interests in the Middle East which the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff have had to take into account in developing their Palestine policy? They can be summed up in two principles:

(1) The safeguarding of communications with Australia and New Zealand and the other Far Eastern portions of the British Commonwealth.

(2) The maintenance of ownership and control over the British oilfields around the Persian Gulf.

Ever since 1945 there has been a bitter controversy in Whitehall about the best method of realizing these two objectives of imperial policy. It is agreed on all sides that, in the event of war with Russia, the re-occupation of Egypt, some months before the fighting begins, will be essential to Anglo-American strategy. In any future war the Nile delta and the Suez area must once again become the main base of Middle Eastern operations. If, as is likely, the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal cannot be kept open for traffic, the trans-African air route and the Cape sea route must be used, as they were in the last war. Furthermore, air bases in Cyrenaica, Tripoli, and Crete will be required to deny the Mediterranean to the enemy. Lastly—even if the Russians were to over-run Northern Persia and part of Iraq—the Persian Gulf itself, including both the American oilfields in Saudi Arabia and the Anglo-Iranian oilfields, must be held at all costs.

It is at once apparent that in this strategic picture Palestine and the Mosul-Haifa pipeline have only a secondary value. The key points are Basra and Cairo. Palestine only

became important *after* the British decision in the winter of 1945 to negotiate a new treaty with Egypt, based on the premise that British troops would not remain in the country in peace time. This decision was forced on Britain by the violent temper of Egyptian nationalism. But so far, owing to the stumbling-block of the Sudan question and the decline of British prestige in the Middle East, no new treaty has been negotiated. The 1936 treaty is still in force.

The problem that faced the British Chiefs of Staff when in 1945 they began to regard Russia as a potential aggressor, was to find an alternative naval and military base near enough to Egypt to permit speedy re-entry if ever war should become likely. One group favored a retreat to the Sudan and Kenya. As a long-term policy this had much to commend it. But North-South communications were non-existent and would take many years to construct. What, then, were the other possibilities? There were only two: Cyrenaica and Palestine. The advantages of Palestine were (a) the port of Haifa, second only to Alexandria as a naval base, and (b) the suitability of the Northern Negev as a military base to replace the vast cantonments and stores of the Suez area. On the other hand, the former Italian colonies of North Africa, though geographically convenient for a re-entry into Egypt, are desperately short of water, and Tobruk is a quite inadequate port.

The Chiefs of Staff did not take long to decide. They preferred Palestine; and in 1946 work was begun on the construction of new airfields and of barracks to the value of five million pounds near Gaza. These large-scale military plans were begun on the clear assumption that Bevin would achieve a political settlement such as would permit Palestine to become the main British base in the Middle East.

BEVIN was faced with a very delicate situation. It had to be admitted that the speedy development of the Middle Eastern oilfields was only possible on the basis of large-scale American capital investment.

Britain had not the financial resources available to construct either the new refineries or the new pipelines that would enable the oil to flow direct from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, and so save the enormous dues payable by tankers passing through the Suez Canal. With Bevin's encouragement, therefore, commercial treaties were negotiated between the British and American oil interests, under which Britain could sell part of the crude oil derived from the Anglo-Iranian oilfields for the dollars she so urgently needed. The oil thus acquired would then be piped and refined by the American companies.

It was well known in Britain that the American oil interests and the American Chiefs of Staff were at least as anti-Zionist as the Foreign Office. Mr. Bevin has always hoped that they would be strong enough to swing the administration behind his "realistic" policy for dealing with Zionism. That this hope was not fantastic was later proved by the administration's about-face on partition. Reluctant to accept any political or military responsibilities in the Middle East, the administration has always secretly desired to side-step the Zionist issue and to support any British policy that seemed likely to satisfy America's strategic requirements in the Middle East without increasing American commitments.

So far we can talk of a British policy which, whatever its morality, was at least consistent. When, in June 1946, a few weeks after the Anglo-American Report, the British Army cracked down on the Haganah and Bevin attempted to pressure the Jews into accepting the Morrison Plan, all of this merely meant that the White Paper policy of 1939 was being followed to its logical conclusion. The tactic used to placate the Arabs in the event of a war against Hitler and Mussolini was again being employed under the threat—and it was a real threat, as was shown in Azerbaijan—of Russian aggression.

But this policy collapsed when the Jews did not capitulate. There is little doubt that, if some of the British generals and

Irgun leaders had been permitted to wage the war they both desired, Jewish resistance could have been smashed. But when it came to the point, the Labor government balked at a war of extermination, and the Jewish Agency was able to maintain its authority and to limit resistance of the vast majority of the Yishuv to passive resistance. The result was that Bevin fell between two stools. Half-hearted enforcement of the White Paper antagonized both Jews and Arabs.

By the autumn of 1947, when the matter was finally referred to UN, British policy was bankrupt. All that the British representative at Lake Success could do was passively resist the partition proposals in every way while they were being debated, and actively prevent their being carried into effect when the Assembly had approved them. This was done in the vain hope of retaining Arab friendship by demonstrating that partition was not Britain's fault.

Meanwhile the British Chiefs of Staff had to think again. At the end of 1947 it seemed clear to them that, whatever happened, Palestine had been rendered unsuitable for use as a British military base. Even the most prejudiced anti-Jew had to admit that a hostile Yishuv in war time would be totally unmanageable. A naval and military base needs industry and skilled workers, and only the Jews could provide them.

The decision was therefore taken to transfer the base to Cyrenaica, despite all its natural disadvantages. The gigantic piles of stores and equipment, painfully transferred to Palestine from the Suez area, were re-directed back to Suez, or forwarded to Cyrenaica. Work has begun to put Tobruk in order and to build barracks in Libya. Today the British troops, as they are evacuated from Palestine, are shipped across the Mediterranean to its southern shores.

Out of the frying pan into the fire. Britain holds Libya and Tripoli only by right of conquest. She has so antagonized the Arab world that she cannot be certain of the necessary two-thirds majority if she seeks to obtain a trusteeship over Cyrenaica and so to

put her administration on a permanent basis. Moreover, her claim will certainly be opposed by the Eastern bloc; and America, anxious to secure Italy's full attachment to the Western bloc, is wondering whether she can support the British claim to the Italian colonies. The military base in Cyrenaica, therefore, is politically insecure.

But Bevin is a very obstinate man. Come what may, he has decided to cut his losses in Palestine and to rule it out as a British military base. The policy of evacuation, interpreted by most observers outside Britain as a stalling device, is meant quite literally.

It is here that the passions analyzed in the first part of this article cut across imperial policy. Imperial policy would demand a rethinking of the Palestine situation in the light of the new balance of power revealed by the Arab-Jewish trial of strength this spring. It has always been clear to the unprejudiced observer that the basis of peace in Palestine lies in an arrangement between King Abdullah and the Jewish state, under which the Arab areas of Palestine would be incorporated in Transjordan, and the Jewish state would become a member of Greater Syria. Recommending the adoption of the Anglo-American Report as a method of achieving a few months' breathing space, I wrote to Bevin in April 1946 that the time would come, if he was patient, when conciliation would be possible along these lines. I believe that Bartley Crum made the same suggestions to President Truman. Everything that has happened since confirms us.

But at present there is no sign that Bevin accepts this line of thought. Foiled and frustrated, he only wants to turn his back on Palestine and to find a country politically more amenable to the requirements of a British Middle Eastern base. As if to emphasize his disregard of material interests, he has summarily thrown Palestine out of the sterling bloc, despite the value to Britain of its potash, citrus crop, and refineries.

In this policy of "bag and baggage" he has public opinion solidly behind him. Indeed, if he were personally to change his mind, it is doubtful, in the present mood of public

opinion, that he could propose any change of attitude that would involve the continued presence of British troops. The British public is obsessed by the idea of total evacuation, come what may. It has been taught that it has no obligations to, and no interests in Palestine, and it is in no mood to be persuaded that a single British life should be risked for either morality or expediency.

BUT this does not exclude either British influence on the course of the present war or a later re-entry into Palestinian politics. After all, Abdullah's army is officered by Glubb Pasha and his colleagues and is largely paid for by the British treasury. Low as British prestige in the Middle East has sunk, it is still potent in Amman. I do not believe that, in the present mood of the Foreign Secretary, it will be used actively to foment an Arab war against the Jews. Now that the mandate is ended, Mr. Bevin's whole influence will be cast in the direction of insulating the conflict, with an eye to mediation when both sides are exhausted.

If the Jews are wise, and are content to hold a compact area instead of attempting prestige victories such as the capture of Jerusalem, they should be in a very strong position for negotiation in six months' time. Unless they wish to produce what they most fear, they should not assume that in such negotiations Bevin will necessarily use his influence against them. Having triumphantly exposed the hollowness of the presumptions on which British policy was based—that Arab military strength was greater than Jewish, and Arab nuisance value correspondingly higher—they can afford to treat British policy of the last three years as an aberration, in which passion overruled reason. After all, a British base in Cyrenaica is not a second but a tenth best. With the end of the mandate and of the horrible war arising out of it, both British and Jewish resentments could rapidly cool and, with prudent statesmanship on both sides, the strong common interests which unite the British Commonwealth and the Jewish state could re-assert themselves.

WHO CAN TRANSLATE YIDDISH?

The "Hidden Policy" of the Language

MAURICE SAMUEL

IT IS useless to try to explain why the rules of good English forbid you to say: "He made himself a non-perishable name by inventing an imperishable food." You let it go with the remark that that happens to be the genius of the English language—and then add hastily that "genius" as here used does not mean extraordinary gift of native power, but pervading spirit. Every language has its genius, which is non-transferable; and Yiddish differs from English or French or Italian just as these differ from one another.

It differs in the same way from German, even though it has taken from a German dialect about eighty-five per cent of its raw material. The primitive roots of a language are like foods absorbed by different persons: the end results are incommensurable. Ivan eats a potato and it becomes Ivan, Hans eats the same potato and it becomes Hans. From this point of view it is wholly wrong to identify Yiddish with German, and especially silly to call it,

as some do, a corrupted German. (It is of course equally absurd to suggest, as others are tempted to, that German is a corrupt Yiddish.) When the Jews of the Rhine valley had, after some centuries, digested the German roots, they were no longer recognizable as far as the spirit is concerned.

TRUE, the Yiddish words *tish* (table), *Imensh* (person), *kop* (head), *ferd* (horse), are, as raw material, pretty much the same as in German, and a pidgin German-Yiddish conversation can be carried on by their means. But the moment spirit enters, the communication is broken. A couple of instances will suffice:

The simple Yiddish phrase *dem Rebbens shnur* (the Rabbi's daughter-in-law) is in one sense easily understood by a German, only he would say *die Schnur des Rabbiners*, although *Schnur* is now archaic and *Schwiegertochter* is the modern equivalent. Actually *dem Rebbens shnur* and *die Schnur des Rabbiners* are worlds apart, for reasons which, even if we could elucidate them, would not help us at all to make the two worlds one.

Dem Rebbens shnur! It is a phrase loaded with many values, each of which is brought out by an appropriate intonation. Say it one way, and it is quiet and dignified, evocative of Friday evening candles and the Sabbath loaf. Say it somewhat differently—pulling in your chin a little—and it becomes an epitome of small-town snobbery: the young woman walking down the street, *her* chin pulled in a little, and the whisper passing from door to door: "*Dem Rebbens shnur!*" A third manner, and the physical image vanishes; it becomes an abstraction, a function in a lofty tradition, an institution for which there is no substitute. But *die Schnur*

A GIFTED writer in his own right, MAURICE SAMUEL is also one of the finest practitioners of that most tricky and difficult art—the art of translation. It has been said that of all languages Yiddish is the most untranslatable—and from his struggles to render into English such masters of Yiddish literature as Sholom Aleichem and I. L. Peretz, Mr. Samuel has evolved his theory of the peculiar genius of Yiddish, and its hidden linguistic "statesmanship." Mr. Samuel was born in Rumania in 1895 and was educated in Manchester, England, where he attended the university. He came to the United States in 1914. His more recent books have been: *The Great Hatred* (1940), *The World of Sholom Aleichem* (1943), and a historical novel, *The Web of Lucifer* (1947). Much of the material in this essay will appear in his forthcoming book on Peretz, *Prince of the Ghetto*, to be published this fall by Knopf.

des Rabbiners, like the Rabbi's daughter-in-law, is merely a young woman who married the son of a rabbi—a statistical fragment.

There is a curious and charming portmanteau word in Yiddish, *Staitch!* which can best be described (if described at all) as an expletive of expostulation. If one Jew has told another a tall story, which can neither be accepted nor denied, it is not impolite to answer with the exclamation, "*Staitch!*" In this sense it may be tormented into English as: "Bless my soul! You don't tell me!" Or if someone has committed a misdemeanor (as distinguished from a serious crime), he may be reproved with a somewhat distressful "*Staitch!*" which amounts more or less to: "But my dear fellow, one can't do that sort of thing!" Or if someone makes an unreasonable demand, you counter with an appeal to the sense of proportion: "*Staitch!*"—which now becomes an ironical but not unfriendly "How d'you get that way?" And still again, recalling to an ingrate the benefits he once received, "*Staitch!*" approximates to: "Man alive! In the face of all I've done for you?" And in a similar spirit, though on other grounds, it may be addressed to the Almighty Himself, meaning then: "Father in heaven! After all our faithfulness!"

It all depends on the intonation, which may be: (1) courteously sceptical (the tall story); (2) fraternally reproachful (the misdemeanor); (3) amicably derisive (the excessive demand); (4) speechlessly distressful (the ingrate), or (5) intimately but unresentfully accusatory (the Almighty). And I do not speak of the possible permutations and combinations of these five variations which, in the mouth of an unusually expressive person, may achieve incredibly edifying results.

NOW THE word *Staitch!* has been traced back to the German phrase *wie heisst's auf Deutsch?*—"How do you say that in German?" It may originally have been an innocent question or a provocative challenge. I have heard Americans, confronted with some baffling or offensive statement,

cry back: "Say, what's that in American?" Or, as Maria says to the clown in *Twelfth Night*, "Make that good." *Wie heisst's auf Deutsch* was gradually constricted from four syllables into one, and the shorter it grew in pronunciation the wider it grew in implication. What connection is there now between the Germanic raw material and the Yiddish finished product? Who can translate the latter back into the former? As well try to unscramble an omelette and hatch a chicken from it. It is of course interesting and instructive to trace the transmutation; but the information thus provided brings the outsider no nearer to the insider's "*Staitch!*" And in the same way, if someone were to trace the steps by which *imperishable* and *non-perishable* acquired their specific tonalities in English, he could not thereby learn the usage of the words; that comes from practice plus instinct, rather than from logic.

SIMILARLY with personal names. Why is it that the English name *Tom* has become synonymous with manliness and honesty?—in combination, naturally, with honest and manly surnames. Fielding's Tom Jones and Hughes' Tom Brown are two of the most famous exemplars of English solidity of character. To be sure, they corresponded to widely divergent ideals; Tom Brown would have shrunk from Tom Jones as a gross and sensual early Georgian, and Tom Jones would have grinned at Tom Brown as a mid-Victorian milksop. But each was to his age the embodiment of grand old English grit and mettle. *Caleb*, on the other hand, is naturally a villain, a tricky lawyer, a heartless collector of mortgages. One is tempted to look back to the Hebrew original: *kelev*, a dog. But *Caleb* was not a name of evil association among the Hebrews. On the contrary, a well-known Caleb, namely, ben Yefunneh, shares with Joshua ben Nun the distinction of having brought back from Palestine the first favorable minority report. Of the twelve spies sent in by Moses, only these two were undaunted by the dangers of the

conquest. We see, then, that names, passing from one language or people to another, may undergo transvaluations just like other words. And what can translators do about it?

Shprintze is an especially lovable girl's name in Yiddish. It has gaiety and goodness. One thinks of *Shprintze* as young and bright-eyed; one sees her running, basket on arm, to the village market, her shining, pointed nose innocent of powder, her lips parted in a happy smile. She is poor but jolly, betrothed—or recently married—to a sturdy workman, who is admittedly not much of a scholar, but is respectful of learning, observant of the tradition, and prepared, of course, to give his children the finest education obtainable. That is *Shprintze*. The name is derived from the Spanish *Esperanza*, and was brought (it is surmised) by Spanish Jews at the time of their expulsion into the valley of the Rhine, where Yiddish was already in an advanced stage of crystallization.

Now I do not know what suggestions the name *Esperanza* carries with it for most Spaniards. The word means "hope," but that may go for nothing. A girl called *Hope* in English unfortunately suggests one from whom there is little to be hoped, just as *Friedrich*, in German, suggests anything rather than its literal meaning, "rich in peace." For me (and since I do not know Spanish my feeling about the name has nothing to do with its Spanish overtones) *Esperanza* suggests alternately the cloister and the guitar. Well, whoever *Esperanza* was, she has become *Shprintze*, altogether unrecognizable; and never again will *Shprintze* be *Esperanza*.

In a like way the Yiddish girl's name *Yente*—it is really not a girl's name; somehow one thinks of it always as belonging to a grown woman—goes back to the Italian *Gentilia*. But for the Yiddish world, *Yente* has become synonymous with noisiness and vulgarity, plus implications of rough good-heartedness: it is the equivalent of "washerwoman." It would be absurd, in translating a Yiddish story into Italian, to make

Yente again *Gentilia*; but neither would the Italian get any hint of the author's intention if the name is left *Yente*.

Possibly the most extreme instance of such a transformation is found in the Yiddish name *Feivish*, which began as Phoebus-Apollo. Now *Feivish*—especially when coupled with *Yukel*—is perhaps the most comical-trivial man's name in the Yiddish-speaking world. Zangwill found an equal for it in *Soshe Shmendrik*, which is, however, synthetic. Not only is *Feivish* utterly remote from any physical suggestion of Phoebus-Apollo ("He was a man born with thy face and throat, lyric Apollo," sings Browning in "The Dead Grammarian"); no writer would dream of assigning to a *Feivish* the smallest task calling for dignity, common sense, learning, or even clear enunciation.

ALL this is intended to illustrate that Yiddish has its separate genius, and more particularly to make clear that the etymological origins of Yiddish words are no longer a clue to their living identity, some language scholars to the contrary notwithstanding. The result is—as I mentioned in *The World of Sholom Aleichem*—that it is just as hard to translate classical Yiddish into German as into English or French. Indeed, it is actually harder to translate classic Yiddish (I shall explain further on what "classic" Yiddish is) into German than into French or English or Italian, precisely because of the physical affinity of German and Yiddish. When a ghetto Jew wanted to sound cultured in the modern sense, superior to his surroundings and generally "tony," he Germanified his Yiddish; that is, he tried to unscramble the omelette. Thus a serious translation of Yiddish into German savors of the outlandish and affected, at least to the Yiddish ear, so that the translator is thrown off balance. Besides which, German, either in its involved and stately mood, or in its homely mood, is not as apt as Anglo-Saxon English to convey whatever can be conveyed of Yiddish to a non-Jew.

Now when most Jews speak of the "im-

possibility" of translating Yiddish into English, they have in mind just those differences of spirit and idiom which are the ordinary barriers between all languages. They will ask, for instance, "How on earth can you say in English, 'Hayre off tzu hacken a tchainik?'" *Hacken a tchainik* (literally to chop or wallop a tea kettle) is to talk nonsense long and earnestly on a given subject. *Hayre off* is stop, or give over. To make it harder they will cite: "*Er hot gehackt a tchainik off vos die velt shteht*" (he walloped a tea kettle on what the world stands on), meaning incessantly, interminably, or, in idiom, to beat the band.

But when such instances are given—and it should be noted that we have to do here with words of non-Hebrew origin—they are really beside the point as far as the particularity of Yiddish is concerned. These difficulties do not make of Yiddish a uniquely untranslatable language; they merely show that Yiddish is neither more nor less translatable than other languages, and has nothing special to complain of. There is another level on which Yiddish is in fact unique, and I shall come to that later on.

Meanwhile I am willing to concede that perhaps Yiddish is in fact somewhat more difficult of translation than other languages even on the ordinary level. In *The World of Sholom Aleichem* I called Yiddish a "knowing language," because of the special intramural hints, allusions, and interjections in which it abounds; it is also that because of intonation and gesticulation. I have not yet come across a theory which explains why some languages—Chinese, for instance—give the same syllabled words entirely unrelated meanings on different pitches. I am tempted to suggest that the early crystallizers of Yiddish, speaking a dialect which was then much nearer to the originating language, and therefore intelligible to the hostile strangers around them, began to develop a technique of gesture and intonation which enabled them to converse on two levels simultaneously, one for themselves, one for the outsiders. There is a popular Yiddish story about a Jew who is being tried

for the theft of a chicken: asked by the judge—via an interpreter—whether he pleads guilty or innocent, he answers in quiet despair: "I stole the chicken!" The interpreter, obviously not a Jew, translates, "Guilty," whereas a Jew would have known from the intonation that "I stole the chicken" means the exact opposite.

Later, when Yiddish was spoken (in Poland, Russia, Rumania) among peoples who could not have understood it, the presence of a Gentile may have impelled the Jew to develop the gesture as an auxiliary of speech, and occasionally as a substitute for it. Gesticulation is common in all languages, though in varying degrees. The French gesticulate much more freely than the English, the Americans, or the Germans. But I do not find in French gesticulation the peculiar relationship to meaning which I find in Yiddish. The Frenchman seems to gesticulate because he is energetic, the Jew because he is subtle; the Frenchman emphasizes his meaning, the Jew changes it.

THERE are, of course, Yiddish phrases and idioms which are the crystallization of purely Jewish experience or social form. *Dem Rebbens shnur* is what it is in Yiddish because of the accumulation of associations around a specifically Jewish institution. A phrase like *areinfallen vie a Yoven in Sukkah* (to blunder like an ignorant Greek into a festival-tabernacle) condenses a world of circumstance. The *Sukkah* is the ritual tabernacle which Jews put up during the festival of Sukkoth. To adorn the *Sukkah* beautifully, to take one's meals in it ceremoniously, to sit there whenever possible, is a commandment and a delight; there is about the *Sukkah* a peculiarly intimate and tender complex of memories and emotions. The image of an insensitive stranger blundering into a *Sukkah* as if it were an ordinary hut or lean-to is therefore vivid and painful. *Yoven*, a Greek (figuratively any boorish fellow), may be an echo of Maccabean times. "Bull in a china-shop" is the best I can do with the phrase in English.

There are phrases and turns of speech

which are quite hopeless from the translator's point of view. A certain type of Jew is described as a *shadchan* a *badchan* a *ganev* a *lamdan* a *Yid*. Literally, a *shadchan* is a marriage-broker, a *badchan* a wedding jester, a *ganev* a thief (but the word is used jestingly, too), a *lamdan* a scholar, a *Yid* a Jew. But these professions or attributes are each imbedded, for the Yiddish-speaking Jew, in entire sub-worlds of association, and a man who is all those things put together is a one-man civilization. The best I can produce here, for rhythmic effect and friendliness of tone, is: "a rascally son-of-a-gun of a scholarly matchmaking Jew." Not very helpful.

Sometimes there is an incredibly felicitous approximation. *Gott die neshomeh shuldig* (literally, owing God his soul, i.e., blameless as a babe unborn) is hit off perfectly in English by "butter wouldn't melt in his mouth." The phrases cover each other perfectly, nothing missing, nothing left over. And it is amusing—as well as rather touching—to observe how two such disparate languages have found the identical attitude of good-humored derision toward impudent rascality parading as injured innocence.

Thus, so far, Yiddish is a language like others, with certain inalienable values and an inalienable spirit: these are not my reasons for saying that classic Yiddish cannot be translated. Extraordinary things have been done in the way of translation. The Bible in English at once springs to mind, and after it Shakespeare in German. Almost as great as these, for ingenuity and insight, is Scott-Moncrieff's translation of Proust. And as an instance of what can be done by way of murdering someone in a foreign language, we have only to look at the English translations of *Faust*. There is a special delight in reading the Bible with the Hebrew and English side by side, or Shakespeare with the English and German: there are neatnesses and profundities of transmission which bring a sudden smile of joy to the lips. I say "joy"—for it is that kind of happiness which attends the breaking down

of seemingly insuperable barriers between one people and other, one language and another. And yet: one becomes alive to the paradox that very often the better the translation the more it wrongs the original. The less it reads like a translation (and is not that the conscientious translator's aim?) the more uneasy the original creator must be feeling at the transformation. "Very wonderful," he murmurs wryly, "but is that really me?"

WE NOW come to the unique aspect of Yiddish: it is a language with a policy, a program—and is at the same time unequivocally natural and authentic.

Between ten and twelve per cent of classical written and spoken Yiddish consists of Hebrew words. These, however, are not, like many of the German root words, transformed in spelling and meaning. They remain pure Hebrew, written as Hebrew is written. They are almost never mutilated by the phonetic Yiddish spelling (of the rare exceptions I can think only of *bahavent*—adept, and, sometimes, *ballebatim*—householders). Sometimes they are given Germanic prefixes and suffixes; in that case the Hebrew word is retained intact, and in writing is separated from the prefix and the suffix by an apostrophe.

Thus: *harog* is Hebrew for "to kill." It is written *hrg*—Hebrew has no written vowels. When the word is used in written Yiddish it is also spelled *hrg*, although Yiddish has vowels (it uses some of the Hebrew letters for that purpose). In Yiddish, *killed* is written *ge'hrg'et* and pronounced *geharget*. One does not tamper with the Hebrew root.

The same rule applies to *ge'chlm't* (pronounced *gecholemt*)—dreamed; *ge'yrsh'nt* (pronounced *geyarshent*)—inherited; *ge'gnv't* (pronounced *geganvet*)—stolen; *ge'ml't* (pronounced *gemallet*)—circumcised, etc. And of course Hebrew words which stand alone, without prefix or suffix, are spelled in the original.

Now the oddity is that in Yiddish most of these Hebrew root words have their Germanic root doubles, and the two words are

used side by side! It is sound folk Yiddish to say, "*a simchah a freid*," (German *Freude*) for "a rejoicing"; "*a yellolloh a gevein*" (German *weinen*) for "a lamentation"; "*a kabtzan an orreman*", (German *armer Mann*) for "a pauper"; "*a sof an ek*" (German *Ecke*) for "an end."

One would almost think that it is an echo of the poetic dittology so familiar in the Bible: "Hear O heavens, and give ear, O earth. . . . I have *nourished* and *brought up* sons . . . Ah, *sinful nation*, a *people laden with iniquity*. . . ." But it is not that at all. For in the Hebrew the repetition has variation, and the rhythm has an ascending effect; it is a reinforcement. A parallel to this type of repetition is to be found in archaic English. Louis H. Gray, in his fascinating *Foundations of Language*, quotes from the Book of Common Prayer: "to acknowledge and *confess*," "to *assemble* and meet together," "to *pray* and beseech." The italicized words are of Roman origin, while their parallels come from Anglo-Saxon. And again: "*mortify* and kill," "*perceive* and know," "*power* and might." Professor Gray then points out that in the Roman missal, from which the above prayers are taken, there is only one Latin word where the English translation has two: *mortifica* becomes "*mortify* and kill," *videant* becomes "*perceive* and know," *virtutem* becomes "*power* and might." The reason for this practice, as we know, lies in the history of the English language, in the need which once existed to make public utterance intelligible both to speakers of Anglo-Saxon and of Norman-French during the period of the fusion of the two languages.

We are tempted to assume that the Jews of the Rhine valley adopted a similar device. The mass of the people spoke a Germanic dialect, the learned spoke Hebrew; the repetitions were a sort of bridge; in time the two languages would fuse into one, each losing its separate identity. But the explanation will not do. It was never in the mind of Yiddish-speaking Jews (let alone Hebrew-speaking) that Hebrew should be lost. The pattern of their lives was directed at the

perpetuation of the national-religious identity, with Palestine as the land of the return, and Hebrew as the language of the redemption. All the prayers, with a few very minor exceptions, were said in pure Hebrew even by those who understood them imperfectly, or not at all.

Both the ritual and the prayers are unintelligible unless they are seen from the point of view of national-cultural conservation. Classic Yiddish writing derives its stylistic strength and charm from the deliberate emphasis on Hebrew phraseology. *Yiddish had a policy which gave it its folk-character—and that was, to keep Hebrew alive.*

QUITE a number of simple Hebrew words so established themselves in Yiddish that the German repetitive explanatory word was hardly needed, or not needed at all. So, one says *ganev* (thief), never *Dieb*; *chasseneh* (marriage), seldom *Heirat*; *lamdan* (scholar), seldom *Gelehrter*—and then only for non-Jewish learning; *matbeya* (coin), never *Muenze*; *meshugas* (lunacy), never *Wahnsinn*; *mumcheh* (specialist), seldom *Spezialist*.

There are some minor oddities in the language which only point up the thesis I am presenting. Jews became so accustomed to the repetitive technique that in a few cases they applied it without the purpose I am suggesting—namely, the conservation of Hebrew. They say "*an umglick a malayre*," a misfortune, the *umglick* being German, the *malayre* French (*malheur*). (*Malheur* and *égal* came into the Yiddish of Russian Jewry with the Napoleonic invasion.) There has also crept into Yiddish a queer and enchanting form of repetitiveness direct from the Hebrew. "*Ki goonav goonavi m'eretz ha-Ivrim*" laments Joseph in Egypt. "*Goonav goonavi*" are the same verb; literally: "to be stolen I was stolen from the land of the Hebrews." The regular translation is: "For indeed I was stolen." I have even met, in Peretz, this phrase: "*Isn is er a nar*," literally, "to be, he is a fool"; meaning: "as for what he is, he is a fool."

In the most typical work of the leading practitioners of "classic" Yiddish writing (Peretz, Sholom Aleichem, Mendele Mocher Sforim), one finds that they have loaded their Yiddish so heavily with Hebrew—over and above the common usage as already described—that it is impossible to read them intelligently without a good knowledge of Hebrew; and the beauty of their style springs, strangely enough, from the naturalness of this bias. Still more strangely, they do not simply put in Hebrew quotations, phrases, verses from prayer and Holy Writ: in most instances they translate them at once into German-origin Yiddish. And yet it does not sound like a translation, but rather like a repetition. The effect is not one of pedantry and affectation, as if an English writer were to strew his pages with Latin tags. On the contrary, the style thereby becomes more homey and authentic. It has echoes of childhood and the *cheder*, of winter conversations around the stove in the house of study, of the nostalgia for learning which was a perpetual mood of the Jewish masses—echoes of spiritual salvation, of the synagogue, the cemetery and the festival.

This programmatic and purposive character of good Yiddish, aiming at the teaching of Hebrew, cannot of course be rendered in translation. For if a Jew says "*a sof an eck*," you can only translate it as "an end"; and if he says, "*sein bas yechidah, sein eintzige tochter*," he has merely said "his only daughter," once in Hebrew-origin Yiddish and once in German-origin Yiddish. It does not sound at all repetitious in the Yiddish; it is on the contrary charming and natural; it has a "dying fall," and a little touch of melancholy, or perhaps of mere reflectiveness. But in English I can neither say "his only daughter, his only daughter," nor can I insist on "*his bas yechidah, his only daughter*," since my reader does not want to learn Hebrew, and even if he did he would want to go about it without mutilating the English narrative.

Beauty, we are told, must be functional if it is not to be meretricious, trivial, or decadent. One of the functions of Yiddish,

therefore, one of its sources of beauty, is—or was—precisely this teaching of Hebrew. It does not matter if the Yiddish reader happens to know Hebrew perfectly. We are told, regarding the Passover ceremony of the *seder*, that no matter how wise and learned we may be, it is meritorious to dwell once again on the completely known story of the exodus from Egypt; so, knowing Hebrew thoroughly, it is still proper for us to use the repetitive Germanic and Hebrew words side by side. It is a ritual, sanctified by usage; it expresses, implicitly, the ancient hope that Hebrew will one day be restored to the Jewish homeland; it is a reminder that the secular must always be at the service of the sacred. We speak Yiddish not only to convey our transient thoughts, but to keep in touch with the eternal language.

So Yiddish is a double instrument; and when we translate it into English we remove one element of beauty by defunctionalizing half of it.

THE FUSION of the secular and sacred in Yiddish makes possible a charming transition from the jocular to the solemn and back again. Well-worn quotations from sacred texts mingle easily with colloquialisms, and dignified passages jostle popular interjections without taking or giving offense. There is about it all a suggestion of an oriental bazaar.

In one of Peretz's stories there is a passage which illustrates this point. It is about a young man, Chiya, who was recommended by the Prince of the Babylonian Academy to the Rabbi of Safed as a prospective son-in-law. The Hebrew words which I reproduce below are there in the Yiddish text. They are not current words in ordinary Yiddish, yet a moderately well-educated Jew is supposed to know their meaning without a translation. Nevertheless they are followed by their translation in simple Yiddish—just as they are followed below by my English translation. But after the solemn Hebrew, the simple Yiddish is given a touch of humor, almost as if the author were dig-

ging his reader in the ribs, implying: "I know you know what the Hebrew phrases mean, so I'll give their translation a slightly comical twist." And, thinks the author to himself, "If you don't know any Hebrew, well, certainly no harm done."

Here is the little passage:

"And the Prince of the Babylonian Academy wrote to the Rabbi of Safed, concerning the young man Chiya, neither more nor less than the following: *ateret roshi v'ateret ha-Yeshivah*, which is to say, the crown of the Prince's head, and the crown of the Academy itself; and, what was more, *shalsholet hayuchsin*, of the loftiest descent, i.e., the *crème de la crème*, the pick of the basket." (I am afraid this is not much fun in English.)

In one of the strongest Yom Kippur prayers there is a phrase, *moshul kecheres ha-nishbor*: "the likeness is that of a broken potsherd," alluding to the worthlessness of the life of man. Yiddish has taken over the phrase and has put it to colloquial, ironical use. If someone utters an incongruity, or commits a grotesque non-sequitur, it is *moshul kecheres ha-nishbor*. In another prayer the life of man in the hand of God is likened to "clay in the hands of the potter, which at his will he draws out or cuts short," a moving if not particularly original simile. The Hebrew phrase "*birtzoto marchiv u-birtzoto mekatzer*," "at his will he draws it out, and at his will he cuts it short," is applied in Yiddish to all sorts of situations, from someone making a speech to someone taking a nap. And it is a remarkable circumstance that the colloquialization of these solemn phrases has not robbed them of their force in their original context. A Jew at his Yom Kippur prayers, encountering these phrases again, sees them re-endowed with their first pathos; he is not in the mood to remember their workaday usage. They are now clothed, like himself, in dignity.

Perhaps I can come nearer to the tone of that kind of Yiddish narrative by inventing rather than translating a passage. I offer the following:

"And behold, Yechiel cast his eyes upon

Sarah, and the maiden found favor in his eyes, so that his soul was bound unto her soul, even as the soul of David was bound unto the soul of Jonathan, by which I simply mean to say that he fell head over heels in love with her. And she said unto him, 'It is written, thou shalt speak unto the maiden's father,' at which words the soul of Yechiel ran out of him like water, that is to say, he nearly dropped dead from fright."

This sort of thing, done at any length in English, becomes tedious, for it is not native to the language. Neither, for that matter, can it be long sustained in Hebrew. It is a very odd circumstance to be confronted with—that classical Yiddish cannot be translated into Hebrew! For there is no need to teach Hebrew to the Hebrew reader; repeating the phrase would be as pointless in Hebrew as in English. In fact, the whole folkloristic machinery which was erected to keep Hebrew and Palestine alive in the mind of the Jews becomes obsolete in the Jewish homeland. It has fulfilled itself. And it may be said of it, while it is being dismantled, that it succeeded in a task which baffled other peoples—the Irish, for instance, who never set up a similar machinery for the conservation of Gaelic, and now find themselves unable to revive it.

It served its purpose well, but gave up its task most reluctantly, even in Palestine. It had, so to speak, become enamored of its job. There were Jews in Palestine, in the early days of the Zionist movement, who wanted Yiddish to become the language of the reborn Jewish National Home. The means had become so precious and interesting that they were now an end in themselves. But then Zangwill tells us of the old Jew who settled in Palestine, and every day at the Wailing Wall repeated the prayer: "Next year in Jerusalem."

DO WE then obtain nothing by translating classical Yiddish into English? We obtain a great deal, but what is gone forever is the stylistic grace. It disappears in translation, and it has disappeared from neo-Yid-

dish as distinguished from classical Yiddish.

Neo-Yiddish is the Westernized and internationalized Yiddish which is stripping itself of the Hebrew-nationalist function. It is a Yiddish which can be translated as easily as any other language. While it does not Germanize the spelling of the Hebrew words, it reduces Hebrew to a minimum, avoids the introduction of Hebrew phrases from the prayer-book, the Bible, and the Mishnah, and drops the musical and instructive repetitiveness I have described. It is not redolent of the synagogue, the *cheder*, and the festivals; it is a language without nostalgia.

The neo-Yiddish style is capable of powerful effects. It is the style of Sholem Asch's later works, and of much of J. L. Singer. And it must strike us at once as something very relevant that Asch's later works, and part of Singer's, have found wide audiences in English and other languages, while Asch's earlier works, closer to the classical Yiddish, have found a much smaller audience. This is not due to the superiority of, let us say, *The Nazarene* over *Salvation*; and not even to the more universal theme of the former. The fact is, simply, that *The Nazarene* is translatable and *Salvation* is not. The very titles furnish a clue. The first book is called, in Yiddish, *Der Man fun Natzeret*—literally, *The Man of Nazareth*. This is a simple, unloaded phrase, international in its freedom from particular associations. But the second book is called, in Yiddish, *Der T'hilim Yid*, literally, *The Psalm Jew*, which conveys nothing in English. *Salvation* is an evasive and quite misleading title; but after long effort I have come to the conclusion that I, at least, cannot find an English title which will retain anything of the simple and heart-warming grace of the Yiddish original. A *t'hilim Yid*—quite apart from Sholem Asch's story—is an unlettered Jew who cannot worship God with the wisdom and learning of scholars; he is the pure, untutored soul whose devotions consist of repetitions of the Psalms; he is the obscure, devout little man, full of loving-kindness, for whom the Baal-

Shem, the founder of Hasidism, took special thought. All this is in the phrase *Der T'hilim Yid*, which is classical, not modernized and denatured Yiddish.

WHAT we do obtain in translating classical Yiddish into English seems to be its permanent Jewish, non-Yiddish value. This needs some explaining.

Jewish life has always been conscious of the permanent and the episodic in history. Permanent was the faith, which comprised the developed ethics and the religious sense, the Messianic hope and the Palestine promise. Episodic were the separate historic incidents or experiences: the Babylonian, the Spanish, the East European. The Yiddish-speaking episode in Jewish history, comprising the creation of an entire civilization, was only one of many. Its basic values were not different from those of the other episodes. The wide folk interest in moral problems, the worship of learning, the lively immediateness of remote figures like the patriarchs, Moses, Elijah, King David, the peculiar intimacy with God, are the permanent features of the large Jewish record. But each separate chapter had some special cultural technique for the nurture and increase of these values. These permanent values make up the translatable element; it is the episodic which is untranslatable.

And yet the episodic is so intimately the garb of the permanent. It is quite fantastic how the Yiddish-speaking civilization took elements from the surrounding world and turned them to its peculiar use. The Yiddish language is the most striking instance, but it is certainly not the only one. There are folk-religious customs which the naive East European Jew regarded as having the same sanctity as the law from Sinai, which nevertheless were of local Gentile origin. The caftan and *shtreimel* (gabardine and flat, circular, fur headgear) of the Polish Jewish pietist were the national dress of the Poles before the coming of the Jews. The Jews adopted them, the Poles dropped them. Among the Jews, that long caftan, that round *shtreimel*, became sacrosanct symbols

of Jewishness. If a wayward son threw off the caftan and put on a short coat, his father was as like as not to count him as dead and mourn for him in the prescribed ritual of death.

There was the wearing of the *sheitel*, or wig, obligatory for married women. Every pious Jewish bride had to crop her head before marriage, and this tragic theme has been woven into a thousand Jewish stories. But there is absolutely no mention of such a law in Talmudic literature; nor is the practice known to non-European Jews. Dubnow (I believe) traces it to the practice of cutting off the hair of a bride—and not only of a Jewish bride—so that she might sell it to the wigmaker and with the money buy herself out from the *jus primae noctis* of the medieval lord. The Jews retained the symbolic gesture long after the necessity had disappeared, and they made it so Jewish that the refusal of a pious Jewish daughter to sacrifice her hair before marriage was considered the equivalent of apostasy.

The *gefilte* fish of the Friday evening meal is of Christian (and pre-Christian) origin; the Hasidic melodies are Ukrainian and Moldavian; and just as these have become completely and tacitly Jewish in the Yiddish-speaking civilization, so certain East European places like Vilna, Medzibozh, and Volozhin have become sanctified in Jewish memory. You say "Vilna" to a non-Jew, and his response is: "The capital of Lithuania." Say it to an East European Jew,

his response is—or would have been a little while ago: "The Jerusalem of Lithuania." Volozhin is for everyone else an obscure village in Russia; for the Jew it was a glorious center of scholarship, a name precious to him and to the Almighty whose sacred word was studied in its famous Talmudic Academy.

All this is the episodic which cannot be recaptured. In its day it created its proper illusion of permanence, so that even some Jews were misled; they thought it would endure until the coming of the Messiah. Certainly a writer of Yiddish like Peretz, though not a Messianist, believed that it would endure along with the rest of the world. He was not a Zionist, if anything, he was an anti-Zionist. He was confident of a time, close at hand, when anti-Semitism would disappear; he kept on hoping that the Jews, by changing their way of life, would win the good opinion of the world. And carried along by these illusions, he could never have guessed what, in him, was episodic and what permanent. He did not know that his essential concern was with the moral being of the Jew—according to the tradition—which he wanted purified, whatever the world might think of the Jews. He could not know that if he were to survive beyond Yiddish it would have to be as the carrier of the ethical faith who, stripped of folklore's episodic qualities of the moment, emerges as the traditional moralist of the Jewish folk.

OUR NEW GERMAN POLICY AND THE DP's

Why Immediate Resettlement is Imperative

SAMUEL GRINGAUZ

ALMOST as tragic as the story of the extermination of the Jews, is that of the surviving Jewish remnant. It is a crowning irony that under present conditions the very fact that some European Jews were lucky enough to survive—that the mass murderers did not complete their work—today constitutes a threat to world peace. Because of these “lucky” survivors grave political and social tensions have arisen; because of them blood is being shed every day in the Holy Land; because of them the lives of eight hundred thousand Jews in the Middle and Near East are in immediate danger; because of them the United Nations has reached an impasse; because of them Jewish sentiment here in the United States has become nervous and uncertain. And as for the survivors themselves, they are compelled to go on living in the midst of the people who were the source of all their sufferings and humiliations.

SAMUEL GRINGAUZ's article “Jewish Destiny As the DP's See It,” published in the December 1947 COMMENTARY, evoked wide and continuing discussion both in this country and Europe. Here he returns to another aspect of this crucial problem: the new situation that has resulted from a shift in relationships between the DP's and the Germans, in consequence of new American occupation policy. Dr. Gringauz was three times president of the DP camp in Landsberg, Germany, and was also president of the Congress and Council of Liberated Jews in the American Zone of Germany. Born in 1900 in what was then East Prussia, he was scientific assistant at the Heidelberg Institute of Social Sciences until Hitler came to power. He then left Germany to become judge in the District Court of Appeals in Memel—and, eventually, an internee in a concentration camp. He is at present in the United States, where he is working on a study of the consequences of the war on European personality.

The problem of the survivors has its focal point in the American zones of Germany and Austria. This is where most of the Jewish DP's are located and where new refugees from the East have gathered. It is also becoming the nerve center of American world policy and the front line of American defense. Germany has ceased to be the unified objective of a single Allied postwar policy, but has broken down into fragmentary and conflicting objectives reflecting the East-West conflict. Germany is no longer our foe in a war not yet concluded, but a potential ally in a war that has not yet begun. The creation of a Western European bloc, and of a West German state to be included in the ERP, means exactly that. Germany is to be transformed from a defeated enemy into the guardian of our European front line. The Jewish survivors in the occupied zone of Western Germany are an obstacle to this development. What makes their situation intolerable is that they are still in acute conflict with the nation which Allied occupation policy wants to make into an ally.

That is the core of the present problem of the Jewish DP's.

IT is recognized that the question of our occupation policy in Germany has political implications far wider than even its importance for the American people and the German population. But under present circumstances, it is also a Jewish question, of special import for American Jews. The anti-German sentiment of the Jewish DP's in the occupation zone clashes with the American policy of supporting a West German state. If serious thought is not given to the problem, this unhappy conjuncture may result in fanning anti-Semitism both in

the American forces and in the German population, with the possibility of serious repercussions on Jewish life in Europe and America.

In the occupation zone, thousands of young Americans come in contact with Jewish DP's whose nerves have been rubbed sore by abnormal living conditions and by the constant Jew-baiting of German officialdom and private individuals. The deteriorating economic position of the DP's, their mounting political disillusionment and moral despair, the social tensions throughout Germany, due in large part to the breakdown of economic life into a controlled and a free (black) market—all these factors make for friction between the occupation forces and the DP's.

American political involvement in Western Germany is no short-term affair. Since the formation of the Western European Union, whose military front coincides with the Eastern boundaries of the occupation zone, the tie between the United States and the occupation zone has become an organic one and assumed long-term perspectives. The formation of a West German state would further strengthen this tie.

From the point of view of Jewish policy, the American zone in Germany must therefore be regarded as a part of the United States, and the treatment of the Jewish DP's by the occupation authorities must be considered as an element in American-Jewish relations as a whole.

A thorough examination of American occupation policy and its effect on the problem of the Jewish DP's thus becomes imperative.

THE policy of the American authorities towards the DP's can be divided into three periods—which might be called: the military-police period, the humanitarian period, and the political period.

In the first months after the liberation, the military police were in control. The DP's were penned up in camps surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by armed soldiers. Earl G. Harrison described the

situation in his report to President Truman (summer 1945): "Beyond knowing that they are no longer in danger of the gas chambers, torture and other forms of violent death, they see—and there is—little change. . . . They hear or see nothing in the way of plans for the future and consequently they wonder and frequently ask what 'liberation' means. As matters now stand, we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them. One is left to wonder whether the German people seeing this are not supposing that we are following or at least condoning Nazi policy."

An end was put to this situation by a letter from President Truman to General Eisenhower on August 31, 1945. The President wrote: "You will agree with me that we have a particular responsibility towards these victims of persecution and tyranny who are now in our zone. We must make clear to the German people that we thoroughly abhor the Nazi policies of hatred and persecution. We have no better opportunity to demonstrate this than by the manner in which we ourselves actually treat the survivors remaining in Germany."

This letter of President Truman's inaugurated a new policy towards the DP's, the humanitarian policy. Unfortunately the new orientation came very late. Four months of a military-police regime had given the German population the impression that, at least in the treatment of Jews, the occupation had common elements with Nazi ideology. As for the Jewish DP's, disillusionment and suspicion had been born in their minds. Nevertheless, this new stage (autumn 1945 to summer 1947) was marked by an enormous growth of self-help organizations and self-administration; it was a period of moral and cultural rehabilitation; looking back, it seems a kind of golden age.

The humanitarian policy coincided with general political trends. According to the first directive to the Commander in Chief of the United States Forces of Occupation (released October 17, 1945), the principal Allied objective was "to prevent Germany from becoming a threat to the world" and to

bring home to the Germans "that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon the world and themselves." The occupation policy was anti-Nazi and anti-militaristic, directed against fundamental German attitudes; its main programmatic points were de-militarization, de-Nazification, punishment of war criminals and of criminals against humanity. These points were, of course, fully supported by Jewish opinion.

During this second period, the high-level policy of the American Army towards the Jewish DP's was guided by a profound understanding and a humane sympathy. As Commander in Chief of the Allied forces, General Eisenhower declared in a proclamation: "The liberation, care and repatriation of the DP is a major Allied objective." His successor, General Joseph McNarney, opened the borders of the American Zone to fugitives from Poland, organized orientation lectures in which Jewish representatives addressed groups of soldiers, and legalized self-government by the Jews, with a central council and a central committee. He forbade German police to enter Jewish camps and removed the DP's from German jurisdiction. A special directive ordered that arrested DP's were to be brought before a military court officer within twenty-four hours.

This policy of understanding and sympathy was continued by McNarney's successor, General Clay, and his aides, Generals Huebner, Keys, White, and Harrold. Important work was done by their advisors on Jewish affairs, Rabbi Philip Bernstein, Judge Simon Rifkin, and Judge Louis Levinthal.

The following official statement by General Clay is characteristic of the high-level policy at that time and also gives a highly accurate and understanding picture of the Jewish DP's:

"The behavior of the Jewish DP's has not been a major problem at any time since the surrender of Germany. I wish that I could say the same of all other groups. The Jewish DP's were quickly gathered into communities where their religious and select-

ed community leaders insisted on an orderly pattern of community life. Of course, we have had many minor problems resulting from the large assembly of Jewish DP's in the midst of the people who have caused their suffering.

"Moreover, the unsettled conditions in Germany have made barter trading and black-market operations a common problem. Even in this field the Jewish DP's have not been conspicuous in their activities as compared to other displaced persons groups or, in fact, as compared to the German population itself.

"The Jewish DP's have on the whole established an excellent record insofar as crimes of violence are concerned, and in spite of their very natural hatred of the German people have been remarkably restrained in avoiding incidents of a serious nature with the German population.

"In view of the conditions under which they have had to live in Germany, with their future unsettled and their past suffering clear at hand, their record for preserving law and order is to my mind one of the remarkable achievements which I have witnessed during my more than two years in Germany."

In the latter part of this period, relations between certain local occupation authorities and the Jewish DP's deteriorated, but for this there were specific causes unrelated to over-all policy. So long as the American combat army still furnished the occupation personnel, there was no difficulty. The soldiers of the combat army had seen the German concentration and extermination camps and they themselves had liberated the surviving remnant. Consequently, the attitude of the Army, from general to common soldier, was understanding and sympathetic.

But when the combat veterans were relieved by young soldiers who had not experienced the struggle for liberation, there was a change. The young soldiers had not seen the Germans in their loathsomeness. They saw clean German homes and pretty, accommodating German girls; they heard

anti-Semitic whispers; they were influenced by German officials. While the big black-market deals in official German quarters remained concealed, the attention of Americans was drawn almost exclusively to the DP's, whom they came to regard as a nuisance that complicated an otherwise easy-going routine. The consequence was several extremely unpleasant local conflicts.

THE third and most recent period of occupation policy did not begin suddenly or unexpectedly. It was foreshadowed in Secretary Byrnes' Stuttgart speech on September 6, 1946, and was formulated in the new directive to the Commander in Chief, released on July 15, 1947.

This directive, in force today, is no longer oriented towards the material and ideological disarming of Germany, but towards rehabilitating her as part of the Western European bloc. The main objective has now become "the establishment of stable political and economic conditions in Germany which will enable Germany to make a marked contribution to European recovery."

With this stage, occupation policy entered into a basic conflict with the Jewish DP's. The Jews cannot forgive the Germans—certainly not by directive. In the eyes of the Jews, the Germans have forfeited the right to exercise sovereignty over them and will not recover this right until they themselves have undergone a fundamental change, and, particularly, until their bestial hatred of Jews has been overcome.

But today, as all reports indicate, this hatred is on the rise.

At the beginning of May 1947 it was stated by the ICD (Information Control Division) in Munich that, according to a poll of the German population, anti-Semitic tendencies had increased during the preceding eight months. Nineteen per cent of those questioned declared themselves to be Nazis; 22 per cent supported Nazi ideas; and another 20 per cent declared themselves convinced anti-Semites; in other words, 61 per cent openly avowed anti-Semitism (report in *Neue Zeit*, May 4, 1947). Respon-

sible observers—Rabbis Philip S. Bernstein and James G. Heller and Professor William Haber—agreed that the personal safety of the Jews was insured only by the presence of occupation troops.

Meanwhile, the desecration of Jewish cemeteries has become a common occurrence in Germany. In the British Zone alone, twenty-seven cemeteries have been desecrated. In the American Zone the number is not smaller. My colleagues and I established a cemetery in the village of Schwabhausen-bei-Landsberg for those who had died on the march when the Germans evacuated Dachau. In October 1947, this cemetery was totally destroyed, desecrated, and defaced with painted brown swastikas. In none of these incidents have the culprits been reported by the German population or identified by the German police. Such is the state of German public opinion today. Thousands of war criminals and murderers of Jews are living in Germany, free and undisturbed; none of them is ever caught except when accidentally recognized by a victim.

On April 28 of this year, the Military Governor of Wuerttemberg-Baden, Charles M. La Follette, suspended from office the newly elected Mayor of Schwaebisch-Gmuend, Franz Konrad, because he won the election by using Nazi tactics. In ordering the dismissal the Military Governor said: "Evidence indicated among other things that his campaign was conducted in a Nazi fashion—yellow Stars of David were painted on the market place, Konrad's opponent was described as a 'half-Jew'. . . . The tune of the Horst Wessel Song was sung to the words, 'The SA is on the march and Konrad is with us'."

In the local elections that took place in April in traditionally democratic Hesse, one-third of the votes fell to disguised Nazi groups. On April 29, General Lucius D. Clay said in a press conference: "There are many evidences that Nazi-minded groups, including many former Nazis, are seeking to rise again in German politics." He referred to the show of strength of the new

National Democratic party in the local elections, and predicted increased manifestations of Nazism. (*New York Times*, April 29, 1948).

Dr. Philipp Auerbach, Bavarian State Commissioner for Victims of Political and Racial Persecution, has published a compilation of the official papers of his commissariat, "Anti-Semitism in Bavaria" (in *Neue Welt*, No. 1). It is a gruesome picture. Jews in trains have been insulted, beaten, and thrown out of the cars. Scandalous scenes have taken place in streetcars. The State Commissioner has innumerable affidavits disclosing anti-Semitic acts by conductors and passengers. A German woman, talking about Auschwitz with a Jewish woman, was reviled by fellow passengers: "What do you care about that Jewish sow? What the Allies are doing to the Germans today is much worse than anything that ever happened in Auschwitz." Both were compelled to leave the car. In stores and restaurants wild anti-Semitic scenes are a frequent occurrence. In Garmisch, Memmingen, and other cities, the visit of General Clay to the Munich synagogue was shown in a newsreel. When the speaker declared that six million Jews had been murdered, many members of the audience shouted: "They didn't kill enough of them!" There was deafening applause. In Garmisch the showing of the newsreel was broken off at this point and rioting took place in the street outside, so that the military police had to intervene. In a cabaret in Bad Reichenhall licensed by the German government and the military authorities as politically unobjectionable, these verses were recited:

The Jews are eating chocolate now.

Only six million were gassed. Too bad!

The crowd received this with uproarious applause, although all members of the audience later interviewed declared themselves as non-Nazis. And Commissioner Auerbach cites hundreds of examples of similar incidents in theaters, housing bureaus, government offices, etc. In a recent statement, he declared that the staff of his office is not sufficient even to register all the infor-

mation received about anti-Semitic manifestations (*Unser Weg*, Munich, April 6).

There is also official Jew-baiting, which extends from policemen and government clerks to high state and bi-zonal officials.

THE various provincial governments and political parties have reacted in like pattern. In the Austrian city of Ischl, an anti-Semitic mob attacked the building of the Jewish DP's with cries of "Down with the Jews!" and "Hang the Jews!" The ring-leaders were tried and sentenced by an American military court, whereupon the Austrian government submitted to General Keyes a memorandum stating that "the sentence is not only contrary to the sentiment of justice of the Austrian population, but is likely to provoke extreme unrest." (*Aufbau*, November 7, 1947.)

Bavarian Vice Premier Dr. Mueller demanded in a speech in Marktreidwitz that the DP's be placed under German judicial and police jurisdiction, on the ground that they were more to blame for "past developments" (i.e., the war) than the greater part of the German population. He further remarked that when in times of hardship a people can find no vent for its dissatisfaction, there is danger of a revolution. (*Pas-sauer Neue Presse*, February 13, 1947.) Bavarian Minister-President Dr. Erhard declared in a press conference in Nuremberg: "The Bavarian government intends to demand that all DP's be placed under German jurisdiction. . . ." He claimed that subversive elements had infiltrated into these groups (*New York Times*, April 10, 1947). In October 1947 the Committee on Social Questions of the Bavarian Diet demanded the evacuation of the Neu-Freiman DP camp (the best in the zone), on the ground that the camp had become a "hiding place for unsavory elements" (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 1947). Somewhat earlier, the bi-zonal committee in Frankfurt demanded the elimination of extra rations for former concentration-camp inmates.

The Germans often try to justify their anti-Jewish sentiment by saying that the DP

camps are centers of black-market activity. This accusation is utterly absurd. The centers of black-market activity are its sources, that is, farmers, industrialists, jobbers, and wholesalers. The Bavarian peasant, for example, sends seventy-five per cent of his eggs and forty per cent of his pork to the black market. Factories and merchants likewise deliver a considerable portion of their products to the black market. In November 1947, a Nazi underground organization was uncovered whose funds came exclusively from black-market deals that included a transaction in precious metals to the value of 45 million marks (*Neue Welt*, December 1947). The DP's themselves participate in the black market only as petty intermediaries—and Jews play the smallest role of all. Whereas the Jews constitute twenty per cent of the total number of DP's, only 105 out of 2200—or 4.7 per cent—of the DP's in penal institutions in the US zone on April 2, 1948 were Jews.

The situation of the Jews in Germany is clearly shown by an open letter of resignation written to Dr. Erhard, the Bavarian Minister-President, by Heinz Guttsman, at that time the sole surviving German Jewish higher government official. Guttsman wrote:

"I have come to realize that National Socialism with all its ramifications is a manifestation of the *German* nature, which broke through after all ethical and moral inhibitions had been swept away by a group of criminal monomaniacs. I have been fortified in this realization by the behavior of the broadest sections of the people, who are again succumbing without resistance to the poison of anti-Semitism and the plague of neo-fascism. . . .

"One is amazed and shaken by the political baseness, the treachery, the stupidity, the lack of good will in the broadest sections of the population. . . .

"The State Commissariat for Victims of Persecution has thus far published only a small portion of its abundance of material supporting my contentions: it is the daily little pinpricks that make life a torment in Germany. . . ."

FOR an understanding of the situation in Germany, it is absolutely necessary to bear in mind that present anti-Semitism in Germany cannot be attributed entirely to the rule of Nazism. Paradoxically, certain aspects of it are grounded precisely in the defeat of Nazism.

First of all there is the *justification complex*. Now that the whole world has become aware of the enormity of Germany's crimes, the national conscience must find some inner alibi for them. The Pope has said that the world should forgive and forget Germany's war crimes, but that is not enough for the German. He himself cannot forget; he has to justify himself to himself. And he does so by telling himself that the German crimes were no crimes at all. The only possible defense of murders too vast to deny is to slander and blacken the victims—the Jews.

The non-Nazi official who collaborates with the enemy—that is, the occupying powers—finds himself impelled to avert the imputation of treason and to win the sympathies of the Nazi masses. An anti-Jewish attitude is the readiest means to hand. This second new element in the rising anti-Semitic tide is the *patriotic complex*.

At the same time the German discovers that the anti-Semitic elements in the armies of occupation are the only ones that show any sympathy for him and his past. Quite naturally he tries to ingratiate himself with precisely these elements. This may be called the *occupation complex*.

The Jew is the only war enemy who is without military protection. He is therefore the only enemy on whom the German can vent his hatred. This is the *xenophobic complex*.

Just as the Germans put the blame for their murders on the victims, they ascribe their present economic hardship not to the heroic world conquerors—the Nazis—but to the DP's. This is the *DP diversion complex*.

German anti-Semitism at present is an autochthonous social reality brought about by Nazi conditioning and the effects of the German defeat. It has nothing whatever to do with the anti-German sentiment of

the Jewish DP's and could therefore not be altered by a change in Jewish attitudes. Nor can the re-education of the German people, which will inevitably require many generations, offer any practical solution to the present problem, which is immediate. We must recognize anti-Semitism as an emergent reality of German postwar life. Inhibited by the former occupation policy, it has reasserted itself with the change in that policy.

WE MUST accept the new development in American occupation policy as a fact. The officials called upon to carry out this policy are fully aware of its paradoxes. General Robertson, Military Governor of the British Zone, declared to the North Rhine Westphalian Diet on April 7, 1948: "Is it strange that I should talk to you like this? Yes, it is strange. But these are strange times. . . ."

In the present situation, as I stated above, Germany is expected to become our ally, the guardian of our European front line. The surviving Jews are and cannot help remaining openly antagonistic to Germany. They are an obstacle to the development of American policy. They have always wanted to leave the country. It was formerly a humanitarian duty to take them out of Germany; it was formerly a moral duty to help the victims of war crimes. But perhaps for that very reason nothing was accomplished. As everyone knows, humanitarian and moral duties somehow do not get themselves carried out. Despite all such obligations and the various resolutions of all the various commissions, it has been impossible since 1945 to obtain one hundred thousand Palestinian visas; and visas for emigration elsewhere have been similarly non-obtainable.

But today the emigration of the Jews from Germany would seem an indispensable adjunct to the success of our general European policy, and particularly our German policy. It is well known that when European security policy demands them, things can be done quickly, both in the national and international sphere. What a pro-Jewish

policy could not accomplish can be accomplished by the necessities of our present pro-German policy. What a DP policy could not do a broad American policy-need can do. What a Palestine policy could not give us can be obtained from a European policy. What as a humanitarian duty was trampled under foot may be respected as a move in the game of power politics. *The resettlement of the Jewish DP's from West Germany must be seen as an integral part of our new American security policy, if not the very basis of its application in Germany.* And since the American Zone of Germany is at the center of the problem, that area must, it would seem, become a chief concern of American-Jewish interest and activity.

The focus of that interest and activity must be on two points:

1. If the newly-created state of Israel is to be able to absorb large numbers of DP's from the American zone of Germany, it is necessary above all to achieve the military and political stabilization of the new nation. Absorption of DP's depends on this stabilization, which in turn depends primarily on the degree to which the great powers are ready to defend the state of Israel from the aggression of the Arab states outside Palestine. This is a question of the utmost urgency. It therefore becomes the task of the leaders of American Jewry to make plain to the American government that the defense of Palestine is an integral and essential part of America's *European* policy, and to persuade the Administration to use its influence with other governments—including the British—on that basis.

2. Since the young state of Israel will not immediately be able to absorb the entire mass of Jewish DP's, and since certain groups among the DP's have at any rate expressed the desire to emigrate to the United States, it also becomes our task to emphasize the needs of American security, and the dangers of the inevitable reactions to the continued presence of Jewish DP's in Germany, as compelling arguments in support of permitting large-scale immigration of DP's to the United States.

MARTIN BUBER AND CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

His Threefold Contribution to Protestantism

PAUL TILLICH

ALTHOUGH we met late in our lives, Martin Buber and I soon realized that there were many points of agreement in the deepest levels of our thought and spiritual passion. And it was not difficult to trace the common sources: the prophetic message of social justice as the criterion of political thinking and acting today; the mystical tradition—especially in the form into which it was cast by that unique Protestant mystic Jacob Boehme and his philosophical follower Schelling; the enthusiastic participation in the philosophical,

THIS year marks the seventieth anniversary of the birth of Martin Buber. His pioneer work in collecting and preserving the Hasidic legends is known to Jews the world over, but it is perhaps not so fully realized that this work was—and is—part of a general philosophic system that has left a sharp impress upon 20th-century religious thought. Professor PAUL TILLICH, one of the outstanding living Protestant thinkers and a founder of Christian *Existenzphilosophie*, here analyzes Martin Buber's influence upon and contribution to contemporary Protestant theology. Paul Tillich was born in Starzeddel, Prussia, in 1886. He received his doctorate at the University of Breslau in 1911 and, after serving as a chaplain in World War I, taught at various German universities. From 1925 to 1929 he was professor of theology at Dresden and Leipzig universities, and from 1929 to 1933 professor of philosophy at the University of Frankfurt. Professor Tillich came to the United States in 1933, and since that time has been professor of philosophical theology at Union Theological Seminary in New York. He has contributed extensively to periodicals both here and abroad, and is the author of several books. Three of these are already available in English: *The Religious Situation* (1932), *The Interpretation of History* (1936), and *The End of the Protestant Era* (1948, University of Chicago Press). Another of his books, *The Shaking of the Foundations*, will be published shortly by Scribners.

artistic, and educational movements between World War I and the victory of Nazism.

It was especially the first of these agreements which led to active cooperation: we found each other in the so-called religious-socialist movement, which was the attempt to bridge the ideological and practical gap between the churches and labor in postwar Germany. I never shall forget the conference somewhere in Hesse in the early 20's where I was to deliver the main address on the principles of religious socialism. In order to make myself understood to those unfamiliar with or opposed to religious terminology, I had tried with great care to avoid any of the traditional religious words like God, sin, salvation, Christ, etc. After I had finished, Martin Buber got up and challenged my paper, not with regard to its content but its language. He stated with great seriousness that certain words are not replaceable, that there are "*Ur-Worte*" (primary words) which no other, especially no philosophical terms can ever supersede. Later liturgical attempts (which I made for special purposes) confirmed for me the truth of Buber's assertion. And his whole interpretation of the "word" as more than the bearer of a logically defined meaning has become an integral element of my theological and philosophical thought, and a weapon against the attempts of modern semantics to reduce the word to a quasi-mathematical sign.

Another occasion which has impressed itself deeply on my memory was a night Martin Buber spent in my house. It was not the "dialogue" (a favored term of his) we engaged in, but the radiation of a mind "full of God" that I remember. It was a condensed, almost substantial presence of the divine, as I have seldom experienced it—at least to such a degree—among Christians.

It is my undertaking here, not to evaluate the work of Buber—this has been done and will be done by others more competent for the task—but to show what Protestant theology has received and should receive from his religious message and theological ideas. My conviction is that it is much. Of course, this conviction is dependent on my own theological point of view and on the amount of influence Buber has had directly and, even more, indirectly on my thought. Therefore I cannot speak for Protestant theology as such, but only for my understanding of it.

But I know that in all the points I make here there are many Christian theologians and laymen who will agree with me and with my valuation of Buber's significance for Protestantism.

I see this significance in three main directions: Buber's existential interpretation of prophetic religion, his rediscovery of mysticism as an element within prophetic religion, and his understanding of the relation between prophetic religion and culture, especially in the social and political realms. Here, too, in each case it is not a report about Buber's position as a whole or about its development that I wish to give, but a description of the Protestant theological situation insofar as it has shown itself receptive to his central ideas.

II.

MY FIRST point is the latest in Buber's development. It is explained systematically in his book *I and Thou*, a most important and influential philosophy of religion—if this term can be used for a small book which is at least as much a religious pronouncement as it is a cognitive analysis. Buber's interpretation of religion can be called "existential"—a term which has become very familiar and, unfortunately, very fashionable today.

An interpretation of religion is existential if it emphasizes the two-way character of every genuine religious experience, the involvement of the whole man in the religious situation, and the impossibility of having

God outside this situation. The phrase "I and Thou" has as its function to formulate this character of the religious experience in a radical and concrete way.

Buber distinguishes the "I-Thou" relationship from the "I-It" relationship. This distinction contains the main problem of Existentialism, namely, how to be or to become an "I" and not an "It," how to be or to become a person and not a thing, how to be or to become free and not determined. Long before the modern type of existential thinking appeared, Buber had asked and answered these questions on the basis and by the power of prophetic religion: there is no other way of becoming an "I" than by meeting a "Thou" and by accepting it as such, and there is no other way of meeting and accepting a "Thou" than by meeting and accepting the "eternal Thou" in the finite "Thou." Whenever we meet a "Thou" our whole being is involved, we are completely within the situation. The "Thou" is not an object vis-à-vis a subject, not a thing vis-à-vis a person. The "I-Thou" relation cannot be produced—it occurs, it is given, it is felt like suffering; it is not mediated through ideas, it is direct, immediate; it is not conditioned by time and space and causality, but is unconditional in its presence; it is, wherever it occurs, exclusive, it "fills the heavens." This relation, of course, is mutual. In it not only the "Thou" is established as "Thou," but also the "I" as "I." Only in this relation is the whole of one's being involved—I myself, and not some part of me. Such a relationship is possible with a tree and with another man and with a spiritual essence and in all of them and through all of them with God. The name of the "I-Thou" relation is love.

BUT this relation stands under the tragic fate of being continuously transformed into an "I-It" relation. The "Thou" becomes a thing, is put by us into time and space and under the law of causality. Even if we say "he" or "she," it is no longer the "I-Thou" relation. The relation in which both sides are completely involved has be-

come a detached relation; God no less than man, and man no less than tree become things, objects, and the "I" becomes a subject looking at them, but not in a full relation with them. Only a part of one's being, the cognitive or the practical interest, is involved. If I say that I see the tree, it has become an object to be described, analyzed, used; but in this moment the tree has ceased to be a "Thou," a living being with whom I have an exclusive relation.

It is our "melancholic fate" that this happens eternally, that it has happened in the beginning of human history and that it will last as long as man's conscious life. Man is alienated, separated from his world, except in the flashes of "I-Thou" co-relation, because he is estranged, alienated from the "eternal Thou" by transforming it continuously into an "It."

However, in order to transform this relation, men must first have it; and all names given to the "eternal Thou," all divine names if addressed in terms of "I-Thou," create a flash of shared experience between the "I" and God. As every "I-Thou" relation is exclusive, the relation to the "eternal Thou" is absolutely exclusive. But since this relation appears only in and with all other potential and actual "I-Thou" relations it is, at the same time, all-inclusive. Those who separate God and the world talk in terms of Ego-It. Those who identify God and the world also talk in terms of Ego-It. But those who include everything in God, speak of him in a true Ego-Thou co-relation. Therefore, God cannot be an object inferred by conclusions from nature, man, or history, for this would mean that the "It" is first given to us and then the "eternal Thou" derived from it. But nothing is more given to us, nothing is nearer to us (not even we ourselves) than the "eternal Thou."

Yet, we make God into a thing, not arbitrarily, but by the tragic law of existence. Man wants to have God in the continuity of time and the extension of space, in communal acts, in institutions, cults, and doctrines. This desire for continuity is justified insofar as the "I-eternal Thou" relationship

is all-embracing and therefore related to every moment of our lives. But the will to continuation is, at the same time, destructive because it makes God into an object to be concerned with, to be taught about, to be managed. So the history of religion is the history of the fall from the "I-Thou" into the "I-It" relation; but it is also the history of revelation and salvation, namely the reversion from the God who has become an "It" to the God who is the "eternal Thou."

PROTESTANT theologians have been deeply impressed by these ideas of a religious Existentialism—which are perhaps less original and less powerful than those of Kierkegaard, but which are also less paradoxical and less forced. But the weight of both the orthodox and the liberal tradition in Protestantism was too great to admit Buber's ideas to the full influence they deserve.

Liberal Protestant theology, since the rise of Deism, has tried to mediate between the world interpreted by modern science and the biblical idea of God. This, of course, is the task of theology, and Kierkegaard and Buber are no less mediating theologians than Ritschl and Rauschenbusch. But the question is: how to mediate? And if this question is asked the answer must be: liberal Protestantism has adapted the God of the Bible to the It-world of modern technical civilization. This It-world, this realm of unrelated objectivity, of mere things, embraces nature as well as man, and man individually as well as socially. Nature is, in the classical Newtonian view, a whole of totally determined bodies, moving according to quantitatively measurable laws. An "I-Thou" relation to a natural object is impossible in such a view of nature. Man there controls nature for his own purposes. God becomes a "limiting concept," which means that he is removed to the utter limits of nature, unable to interfere with it. The same principles were progressively applied to man and society by scientific psychology and sociology. The individual person becomes subjected to the great machine of production and consumption and he himself becomes a

machine subjected to the law of stimulus and response. The "I-Thou" relation is delivered over to emotion and subjective feeling.

Against this situation Existentialism protests, whether in atheistic or in religious terms. It is its intention to rediscover life under things, freedom under mechanisms, meaning under means, the "Thou" under the "It." As the older Existentialism had to fight against the logical mechanism of Hegel's system, as the later Existentialism had to fight against the physical mechanism of a scientific world view, so recent Existentialism fights against the social mechanisms of industrial society.

Liberal Protestantism saw the danger of this situation for religion and culture; but it was unable to cope with it. Protestant apologetics tried to show that within the whole of things there is a place for a divine being; and that personality and active interrelation with the world must be attributed to it. "Empirical theology" tried to show that this being can be approached with the general methods of scientific research. Historical inquiries were supposed to give the foundation of faith; religion was to elevate the moral personality over the nature in us and around us. The meaning of history was seen in the progressive establishment of a society in which peace and justice governed. All these ideas, however, remain, in Buber's terms, within the realm of the "I-It" relation. They try to transcend the It-world, but they do not succeed because they have accepted it at the beginning. They do not break through the ultimate presuppositions of the It-determined modern world view, and therefore they have no power to interpret convincingly the divine-human relationship. Buber's existential "I-Thou" philosophy reaches the very depths of the situation and should be a powerful help in reversing the victory of the "It" over the "Thou" and the "I" in present civilization.

Such a help cannot come from old or new orthodoxy. It is easy to use Kierkegaard's and the other Existentialists' protests against the It-determined attitude of our time for

the sake of religious and cultural reaction. Buber also can and has been used in this way. But he permanently tries to show that orthodoxy (or liturgical traditionalism) does ultimately what liberal theology does: it transforms the "I-Thou" relation into an "I-It" relation. Wherever the "eternal Thou" can be manipulated, whether by rational or by irrational methods, whether by morals or by dogmas or by cults, the divine "Thou" has become an "It" and has lost its divinity.

The "I-Thou" philosophy of Martin Buber, challenging both orthodox and liberal theology, points a way beyond their alternatives.

III.

BUBER was deeply influenced by mystical traditions outside and inside Judaism, and he himself has in many ways contributed to the interpretation of mystical ideas and movements. His discovery of the significance of genuine Hasidism was decisive for his development and greatly influenced the general religious and theological atmosphere in the first quarter of this century.

While Catholicism, by its very nature, is able to include the mystical tradition within itself and has done so from early times to the present, Protestantism, like Judaism, has a naturally ambiguous relation to mysticism. Both belong to the prophetic personalistic type of religion, and both had to fight during their whole history against magic sacramentalism and depersonalizing ecstasy. On the other hand, there is no living religion in which the principle of mysticism, the immediate presence of the divine and the way of union with it, is not thought and practiced. Ecstatic and visionary experiences are abundant in the prophetic literature and in orthodox Jewish teaching. Orthodox Protestantism knew the doctrine of "mystical union" (*unio mystica*) and produced, from its very beginning, pietistic movements within itself. Whether it was the doctrinal, the ethical, or the mystical element that came into the foreground was not a matter of religious principle but of personal and historical conditions.

But this is not the whole story. Both Judaism and Protestantism have developed within themselves forms of mysticism which were considered by representatives of their respective orthodox, as well as liberal, theologies as trespassing the limits of what is possible on the basis of prophetism. Nineteenth-century Protestantism developed an especially strong anti-mystical feeling in connection with its capitulation before the I-determined modern world view. In the Kant-Ritschlian school of Protestant theology which dominated the second half of the 19th century in Europe as well as in this country, mysticism was considered the arch-enemy of genuine Protestantism. Pietism was considered as a Catholic remnant, the "mystical union" was criticized as un-Protestant, a purge even of those mystical elements which are implicit in metaphysics was attempted. The Christian message was measured by moral standards and adapted to the demands of a rational and sober control of nature and a corresponding organization of society.

It was this anti-mystical bias which, in contrast to many other elements of liberal theology, has been taken over by the so-called neo-Orthodox leaders of present-day Protestant theology. But mysticism also found defenders in 20th-century Protestantism: the rediscovery of the idea of the holy by Rudolph Otto, the influence of Eastern-Orthodox Christianity mediated by Dostoevsky and the Russian refugees after the First World War, the intensive interest in the great mystics of East and West, the liturgical movements, the new understanding of sacraments and symbols, the new rise of metaphysical thinking and of corresponding artistic expressions—all these made it necessary for Protestant theology to take the question of mysticism much more seriously and—as I believe—to deal with it much more affirmatively than it did in the previous one hundred years.

IN THIS situation Buber's reinterpretation of Hasidism is extremely valuable. It shows the possibility of a mysticism which does not contradict but which intensifies

prophetic religion. Original Hasidism grew up in Polish Judaism in the middle of the 18th century. It was a movement which kept strictly within the frame of Jewish tradition. It did not want to reform but to intensify. Jewish mysticism as embodied in the Kabbala was effectively included in it, but in such a way that the neo-Platonic elements of the Kabbala, the valuation of ecstasy and religious metaphysics were strongly reduced in significance. They did not disappear: ecstatic experiences, complete union with God, were not denied. But since they were restricted to rare moments, it was the daily life and the daily work in which the divine was encountered. Man, it was asserted, must become a unity in the encounter with the divine unity. But he cannot merge into the divine One. The "I-Thou" relation between man and the "eternal Thou" cannot be transcended, at least not in this life. Therefore the mystical union is man's union with himself and with God for action, for the life in this world, and for the recognition of the divine ground in everything.

Religion, for Hasidism as well as for Buber, is consecration of the world. It is neither acceptance of the world as it is, nor a bypassing the world in the direction of a transcendent divine, but it is consecration in the double sense of seeing the divine spark in everything created and acting to realize the divine in everything.

This attitude removes the dualism of a holy and a secular sphere. In spite of the observance of doctrine and cult, in spite of its emphasis on the continuous conversation between the individual soul and God in prayer and meditation, the decisive characteristic of Hasidic religion is its way of looking at the world and acting in it. For man's action in the world has significance not only for man but also for God. Man is responsible for the destiny of God insofar as God is in the world; man is called to re-establish the broken unity in himself and in the world. God waits for man; and the answer to man's action is divine grace. Man's action is not by way of asceticism or extraordinary deeds. It is the consecration of the

moment, it is the simple act which is demanded from a special individual in a special situation, it is the acting of the anonymous people, the children and the simple ones. Such acting, if it is done in consecration, prepares the coming of the Kingdom of God. It is messianic action.

Buber, who in his first encounter with Hasidism was attracted by its purely mystical side, came to realize more and more the significance of the active side. And while in the introduction to his collection of mystical sayings, *Ekstatische Konfessionen*, he emphasized the union with God in which the differences of God, world, and self disappear, he later sharply criticized the "doctrine of absorption." It is, according to him, not lived reality and is therefore the most refined expression of the "It." The doctrine of absorption is the attempt to get rid of the "Thou" and consequently of the "I." It annihilates the world and loses the "eternal Thou." It is a possibility on the brink of being—Buber has not denied this—but he has denied its ultimate significance. Significant is the daily life and the union the "I" achieves in the encounter with the "eternal Thou," and the radiation into the world of him who is united in himself.

A serious consideration of this way of solving the problem of "mysticism and prophetic religion" by Protestant theology would help it avoid many futile discussions and the elaboration of untrue contrasts. It is not true that mysticism and prophetic religion contradict each other. The thought and the reality of Buber are witness to this.

IV.

IF BUBER'S mysticism had separated him from his prophetic tradition he could not have joined the religious socialist movement. Of course, he never was a politically active member of the small group of men and women who called themselves religious socialists in postwar Germany, but he was a friend and adviser of the movement and his ideas about the relation of the religious encounter—between the "I" and the "eternal Thou"—to the cultural encounters between

the "I" and the human "Thou"—are worth the attention of Protestant theologians.

One of the most difficult problems for Protestant theology is that of social ethics (including politics, foreign relations, economics, education). Roman Catholicism has an authoritative system of social ethics. Orthodox Judaism has developed one out of the Torah. Protestantism has neither a Torah in the Jewish sense, nor a classical system of ethics in the Catholic sense. It is—especially in its Lutheran form—more spiritualistic than both of them. It pronounces the ethics of love and believes that the inner side of all human relations can be ordered by the spirit of love, while the external side must be ordered by the repressive power of the state. The work of the state, it says, is not opposed to love because its sword serves ultimately the Kingdom of God by keeping down the evildoers, but it is a "strange," "improper" work of love that is performed in this way. It is therefore impossible to derive from the religious sphere rules to which the state must subject itself, and requests that the church could make upon the state. This makes the state independent of the ultimate human relation—to God. The state must be obeyed even if its rulers and institutions are bad. Revolution must be denied under all circumstances.

It is understandable that such an attitude completely estranged a revolutionary group like German labor from churches and religion and produced a gap between the masses of the workers and the religious tradition, even in its liberalized form. Many people were deeply concerned about this situation, and when, after the First World War, labor participated in the control of the state, religious socialism tried to close that fateful gap. But before it could succeed the forces of reaction and fascism took over and destroyed the movement, expelling, killing, or suppressing its representatives.

The question facing the religious socialists was: on what theological basis can religion support socialism or any other concrete political and social idea? It was, of course, impossible for someone who had acquired even

the slightest insights into the origin of Christianity to make Jesus into a socialist or to confuse the prophetic message with an economic program. And it is equally impossible to derive concrete laws of political behavior from any biblical statements. The Bible, especially the New Testament, does not give institutional commandments or advice. And if it does so (or seems to do so) it is dependent on the historical situation in which it was written. Religious socialism, therefore, emphasized that socialism is the demand of the concrete situation of late industrial society, if seen in the light of the principles of love and justice. This, however, is a matter of judgment by individual Christians and cannot become a doctrine of the church. The church has to pronounce the principles and to criticize the given reality in the light of these principles, but it cannot decide about their concrete application. At least the Protestant church cannot. It must leave this to the courage, intuition, and risk of voluntary groups.

IT is obvious that from the point of view of Buber, especially of his "I-Thou" philosophy, this is the only permissible attitude toward concrete cultural and social questions. Buber, like all religious socialists, accepts the criticism of bourgeois society by Marx while rejecting the anti-religious bias of Marxism. He accepts, with all religious socialists, Marx's doctrine of the self-estrangement of man in modern capitalism, his becoming a "thing," a quantitatively calculable piece of working power; but, like all religious socialists, he rejects the belief of Marxism that a special group, the proletariat, its revolutionary victory, and the new institutions following this victory, will bring about a change in human nature. This, obviously, would be thinking in terms of the "I-It" pattern and would mean the loss of the "Thou." Buber, from his presuppositions, had to start with the single "I-Thou" relation and enlarge it to what is called in German *Gemeinschaft* (community), the living unity of a group which has a common spiritual basis and a genuine "I-Thou" relation between its

members. Socialism is real in such communities. It cannot be produced by the state, but only by small groups who realize socialism in themselves and go towards it in their personal life and in the power of their common center, the relation to the "eternal Thou." *Gemeinschaft* is a messianic category, and socialism acts in the direction of the messianic fulfillment; it is a messianic activity to which everybody is called.

This, of course, is a highly spiritualistic interpretation of religious socialism which agrees to a great extent with the spiritualistic attitude towards social ethics in early Protestantism. The question for Protestant theology, therefore, cannot be whether it is wrong—it certainly is not—but whether it is sufficient. And again I would say, it certainly is not. It leaves the state, the political power, almost completely to the "demons," to an absolutized "I-It" relationship. Such a surrender is not warranted. Even the state has potentialities for "I-Thou" relationship. It can be considered as one of those spiritual forms which for Buber belong to the third type of "I-Thou" relation. And there is no reason why this should not be so, if everything created is included in the divine and can be consecrated. Here is the point over which the religious socialists disagreed with Buber, and it is the reason why he kept himself at the fringe of the movement.

It is for the same reason that Buber in his relation to the Zionist movement was always in a special position. He affirmed it as a messianic attempt to create *Gemeinschaft*, while he negated it as a political attempt to create a state. History, however, seems to show that without the shell of a state, a community cannot exist.

There are many other points in which Buber's significance for Protestant theology is manifest—for instance, his doctrines of the "word," of myth and symbol, of the meaning of art. But the three points developed in this article seem to me the most important and most embracing. They show that the interrelation and conversation, the "I-Thou" encounter of Judaism and Christianity, has not yet, and never should, come to an end.

GENTILE AND JEW

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

IT IS also as an attempt to escape that we must interpret the attitude some Jews assume toward their own bodies.

We know that the only ethnic characteristics of the Jews are physical. The anti-Semite has seized upon this fact and has transformed it into a myth: he pretends to be able to detect his enemy at one glance. The reaction of certain Israelites, therefore, is to deny the body that betrays them. Naturally this negation will vary in intensity as their physical appearance is more or less revealing; in any case, they do not feel toward their bodies that tranquil sentiment of property which characterizes most "Aryans."

For these latter the body is a fruit of the French soil; they possess it by that same profound and magical participation which assures them the enjoyment of their land and their culture. Because they are proud of it, they have attached to it a certain number of values that are strictly irrational but are intended to express the idea of *life* as such. Scheler has accurately called them "vital values"; in effect, they concern neither the elementary needs of the body nor the demands of the spirit, but a certain blossoming, a certain biological style that seems to be a manifestation of the intimate functioning of the organism, the harmony and independence of the organs, the cellular metabolism, and above all the "life plan," that

blind and wily design which is the very essence of life. Grace, nobility, vivacity are among these values. In fact, we ascribe them even to animals: we speak of the grace of a cat, of the nobility of the eagle.

It is obvious that people introduce a great number of these biological values into the concept of *race*. Is not race itself a pure vital value; does it not enclose in its basic structure a judgment of value, since the very idea of race implies that of inequality? Hence the Christian, the Aryan, feels his body in a special way. He does not have a pure and simple consciousness of the massive modifications of his organs; the messages and appeals that his body sends him come with certain coefficients of ideality, and are always more or less symbolic of vital values. He even devotes a portion of his activity to procuring perceptions of himself that correspond to his vital ideal: the nonchalance of the elegant, the vivacity and "stir" which characterize the stylish manner in certain epochs, the ferocious air of the Italian Fascist, the grace of women—all these seek to express the aristocracy of the body. And to these values are naturally linked some anti-values, such as the discredit attaching to the "lower functions" of the body, or certain codes of behavior and sentiments—modesty, for example. The latter, certainly, is not merely a sense of shame at showing one's nakedness; it is also a way of making the body precious, a refusal to see the body as a mere instrument: the body is hidden in its sanctuary like an object of adoration.

The inauthentic Jew is deprived of his vital values by the Christian. If he becomes conscious of his body, the concept of race immediately appears to poison his intimate sensations. The values of nobility and grace have been preempted by the Aryans, who refuse them to him. If he accepted these values he would be constrained perhaps to reconsider the notion of ethnic superiority with all its consequences. In the very name of *universal man*, he refuses to lend an ear

IN THE April and May issues of COMMENTARY, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE wrote on "The Situation of the Jew," and drew a "Portrait of the Inauthentic Jew." In these two articles, M. Sartre probed the problem of how the Jew is "created" by the non-Jewish world and how the "inauthentic" Jew attempts to escape from this situation. In this final article, M. Sartre concludes his discussion of the "inauthentic" Jew and analyzes the problem of anti-Semitism in its general significance. These three articles comprise approximately three-quarters of the book *Réflexions sur la Question Juive*, published in Paris in 1946. The translation is by George J. Becker.

to the private messages his organism sends him; in the name of *rationality* he rejects irrational values and accepts only spiritual values. Universality being for him at the summit of the scale of values, he conceives of a sort of *universal and rationalized body*. He does not have an ascetic's disdain for his body, he does not call it a "rag" or a "beast," but neither does he see it as an object of veneration. Insofar as he does not actually forget it, he treats it as an instrument, which he concerns himself with only in order to adapt it with precision to his ends.

And just as he refuses to consider the irrational values of life, so he refuses to set up a hierarchy among the natural functions. This refusal has two purposes: on the one hand it entails a denial of the ethnic specificity of Israel, and on the other it is an offensive weapon aimed at persuading Christians that their bodies are only instruments. That "lack of shame" with which the anti-Semite reproaches certain Jews has no other origin. It is primarily an effort to treat the body rationally. If the body is a mechanism, why cast an interdict upon its needs for excretion? Why exercise a perpetual control over it? It must be cared for, cleaned, maintained, without joy, without love, and without shame—like a machine.

And sometimes, indeed, there is also a certain despair behind this lack of shame: what is the good of veiling a body that the gaze of the "Aryans" has denuded once and for all? To be a Jew in the eyes of the world—is that not worse than being naked? Of course, this rationalism is not confined to the Jews: there are a good many Christians—doctors, for example—who assume such a rational point of view toward their own bodies, or the bodies of their children. But in such cases it is a matter of a conquest, of an enfranchisement which coexists, usually, with many prelogical survivals. The Jew, on the other hand, is not trying to criticize the vital values; he has become such that he has no feeling of them.

It should be added, however, as a point against the anti-Semite, that this bodily uneasiness that occurs among Jews may have quite opposite results and may lead to shame of the body and an extreme modesty. I have been told of many Jews who go far beyond most Christians in this respect and whose constant concern is to conceal their bodies.

And there are others who are preoccupied with spiritualizing their bodies, that is, clothing them in spiritual signification, since they deny them vital values; to a Christian the faces and gestures of certain Jews are often embarrassing—they express intelligence, goodness, resignation, or pain too clearly and for too long a time.

It is customary to make fun of the rapid and voluble gestures that the Jew makes with his hands when he speaks—though this mimic vivacity is actually less widespread than people think. It is highly important that we distinguish this trait from behavior that resembles it in appearance, such as that of the typical citizen of Marseille, for example. The mimicry of the Marseillais—exaggerated, rapid, unquenchable—goes with his interior fire, his constant nervousness, his desire to render with the whole body what he sees and what he feels. In the Jew there is primarily a desire to be totally meaningful, to feel the organism as a medium in the service of an idea, to transcend the body that weighs him down and go beyond it toward objects or truths susceptible to reason. Let me hasten to add that in such delicate matters we must protect ourselves with all sorts of reservations. What we have just said does not apply to all inauthentic Jews; above all, it varies in importance with the general attitude of the Jew, depending on his education, his origin, and especially the general pattern of his behavior.

It seems to me that one might explain in the same way the famous Jewish "lack of tact." (Of course, there is a considerable amount of malice in this accusation.) In the last analysis what we call tact is connected with "subtlety of spirit," a thing the Jew does not trust. To act with tact is to appreciate a situation at a glance, to embrace it as a whole, to feel it rather than to analyze it, but it is at the same time to direct one's conduct by reference to a multitude of indistinct principles, of which some concern vital values and others express ceremonies and traditions of politeness that are altogether irrational. Thus to act "with tact" implies that the doer of the act has adopted a certain conception of the world, one that is traditional, ritual, and synthetic; one for which *he can give no reason*. It implies also a particular sense of psychological en-

semples, it is in no sense *critical*, and we might add that it takes on its whole meaning only in a strictly defined community with common ideas, mores, and customs. The Jew has as much natural tact as anybody, if by that is understood a basic comprehension of others, but he doesn't *seek* to have it.

To agree to base his conduct on tact would be to recognize that reason is not a sufficient guide in human relations and that traditional and obscure powers of intuition may be superior to it when it is a question of adapting oneself to other people or of handling them. That would mean to admit a kind of casuistry, a morality of particular cases, and thus to renounce the idea of a universal human nature that demands universal treatment; it would be an admission that concrete situations, as well as concrete men, cannot be compared; it would mean a relapse into particularism. And by that the Jew would assist his own downfall, for in the name of this tact the anti-Semite denounces him as a particular case and excludes him from the national community.

The Jew has a marked inclination to believe that the worst difficulties may be resolved by reason; he does not *see* the irrational, the magical, the concrete and particular nuance; he *does not believe* in singularities of sentiment. By a very understandable defense reaction, this man who lives by the opinion that others have of him tries to deny the values of opinion. He is tempted to apply to men the reasoning which is suited to objects; he moves toward the analytic rationalism of the engineer and the worker: not because he is formed or attracted by objects but because he is rejected by men. And the analytical psychology he constructs permits him readily to reduce the synthetic structures of consciousness to a play of interests, to the composition of appetites, to the algebraic sum of tendencies. The art of dominating, of reducing, or of persuading becomes a rational calculation. Only, this explanation of human conduct by universal notions entails the risk of abstraction.

INDEED, it is the taste for abstraction that explains the Jew's special relationship to money. Jews love money, we are told. Yet this collective consciousness that is eager to paint the Jew as avid for gain rarely confuses him with that other popular

myth of the miser: the munificent prodigality of the Jew is even a favorite theme of the anti-Semite's accusations. Certainly, if the Jew loves money, it is not because he has any particular appetite for copper or gold or bank notes: for him money often assumes the abstract form of shares of stock, checks, bank deposits.

Actually it is the power of purchase that appeals to him, and if he prefers this form of property to all others it is because it is universal. Appropriation by purchase does not depend on the race of the buyer; it does not vary with his idiosyncrasies. The *price* of the object is set in reference to *any* buyer, who is set apart only by the fact that he has the amount written on the ticket. And when that sum is paid, the buyer is legally proprietor of the object. Thus property by purchase is an abstract and universal form of proprietorship, in contrast to the singular and irrational ownership by participation.

Here there is a vicious circle: The richer a Jew is, the greater the tendency of the traditionalist anti-Semite to insist that true property is not legal property but an adaptation of body and spirit to the object possessed. In this way, as we have seen, the poor man recovers the soil and the spiritual goods of France. Anti-Semitic literature abounds in proud replies addressed to Jews by virtuous orphans and ruined old nobles, the substance of which is that honor, love, virtue, taste, etc., are "not to be bought." But the more the anti-Semite insists on this sort of possession—which aims to exclude the Jew from the community—the more the Jew will be tempted to affirm that the sole form of property is legal property gained through purchase. In opposition to that magical possession that is refused him and which deprives him even of the objects he has bought, he becomes attached to money as the legitimate power of appropriation by the universal and anonymous man he seeks to be. If he insists on the power of money, it is to defend his rights as a consumer in a community that contests them, and it is at the same time to rationalize the bond of possessor to object possessed in order to bring property into the framework of a rational conception of the universe. In effect, purchase, as a rational commercial act, legitimizes property, which becomes in these terms simply a right of use. At the same

time, the *value* of the object, instead of appearing as some mystical quality accessible only to the initiate, becomes identified with its price, which can be known by everybody.

Thus we see all the background for the Jew's alleged taste for money. If money defines value, then value is universal and rational; it does not emanate from obscure social sources, it is accessible to all. The Jew cannot then be excluded from society: he becomes a part of it as anonymous purchaser and as consumer. Money is a factor of integration. To the fine formulas of the anti-Semite—"Money can't do everything"—"There are things money can't buy"—the Jew replies sometimes by affirming the absolute power of money: "Anybody can be bought, if you can just find his price." This is not cynicism or baseness; it is merely a counter-attack. The Jew would like to persuade the anti-Semite that irrational values are a pure appearance and that there is no one who is not ready to turn them in for cash. And if the anti-Semite lets himself make a purchase, there is the proof—proof that at heart he also prefers legal appropriation by purchase to mystical appropriation by participation: at one stroke he becomes anonymous; he is no more than a universal man who is defined solely by his power to buy. Thus are explained at one and the same time the Jew's "eagerness for gain" and his very real generosity. His "love of money" merely indicates his deliberate decision to consider valid only the rational, universal, and abstract ties that men have with things; the Jew is a utilitarian because opinion refuses him all enjoyment of things except *use*. At the same time he wishes to acquire through money the social rights that are refused him as an individual. He is not shocked at being loved for his money; the respect and adulation riches procure for him go to the anonymous being who possesses such a power of purchase. It is precisely this anonymity he seeks, for, paradoxically, he wishes to be rich in order to escape notice.

THESE comments should permit us to see the principal traits of Jewish sensibility. It is, one suspects, deeply marked by the choice the Jew makes of himself and how he understands his situation. But we do not intend to draw a portrait here. We shall only recall the long patience of the Jew and

his expectation of persecution, that pre-sentiment of catastrophe which he seeks to hide from himself during happy years but which bursts out suddenly in prophetic vision as soon as the skies darken. We shall emphasize the particular form of his humanism, that will to universal brotherhood which collides with the most obstinate of particularisms, and the bizarre mixture of love, hate, admiration, and distrust that he feels toward those who wish nothing to do with him.

Do not believe that if you go up to him with your arms outspread, he will give you his confidence. He has learned to detect anti-Semitism under the most noisy protestations of liberalism. He is as distrustful of Christians as workers are of those young members of the middle class who have "a love for the people." His utilitarian psychology leads him to look for self-interest, calculation, and the pretense of tolerance behind the manifestations of sympathy that some people lavish on him. And he is rarely mistaken. Yet he seeks eagerly for these very manifestations; he loves the honors that he mistrusts; he wants to be on the other side of the social barrier—with the others, among the others; he caresses the impossible dream of being suddenly rescued from universal suspicion by real affection, by evident proofs of good will.

We must understand this world of extremes, this humanity cut in two; we must see that every Jewish sentiment has a different quality depending on whether it is addressed to a Christian or a Jew. The love of a Jew for a Jewess is not of the same nature as the love he may feel for an "Aryan" woman. There is a basic doubling of Jewish sensibility concealed beneath the exterior of a universal humanism.

Finally, we should note the disarming freshness and the uncultivated spontaneity of Jewish feelings. Completely given over to rationalizing the world, the inauthentic Israelite can no doubt analyze his affections, but he cannot cultivate them: it is possible for him to be Proust, but not Barrès. This is because the culture of sensibility and of the self presupposes a profound traditionalism, a taste for the particular and the irrational, a recourse to empirical methods, the tranquil enjoyment of deserved privileges: all these the principles of an aristocratic sensibility. A Christian will derive

from this the tendency to treat himself like a luxurious plant, or like those barrels of good wine that are sent to the Indies only to be brought back at once to France, so that the sea air may penetrate them and give the wine an unparalleled savor. The culture of the ego is entirely magical and participationist, yet the continual turning of attention toward oneself does in the end bear some fruit. The Jew who is fleeing from himself and who conceives of psychological processes as mechanical functionings rather than as the flowering of an organism, does no doubt observe the play of his inclinations, for he has placed himself on a reflective level, but he does not cultivate them; he is not even sure that he gets their real meaning: introspective analysis is not the best instrument for psychological inquiry. Thus the rationalist is constantly overwhelmed by a fresh and powerful mass of passions and emotions. He joins crude sensibility to the refinements of intellectual culture. There is a sincerity, a youth, a warmth in the manifestations of friendship of a Jew that one will rarely find in a Christian, hardened as the latter is by tradition and ceremony. This is also what gives a disarming character to Jewish suffering, the most overwhelming of sufferings.

But it is not necessary to labor this point. It is enough to have indicated the consequences Jewish inauthenticity may have.

WE SHALL content ourselves in conclusion with indicating in broad strokes what is called Jewish uneasiness. For Jews are often uneasy. An Israelite is never sure of his position or of his possessions. He cannot even say that tomorrow he will still be in the country he inhabits today, for his situation, his power, and even his right to live may be placed in jeopardy from one moment to the next. Besides, as we have seen, he is haunted by that impalpable and humiliating image which the hostile mob has of him. His history is one of wandering over the course of twenty centuries; at any moment he must be ready to pick up his stick and his bundle. Ill at ease even inside his own skin, the unreconciled enemy of his own body, following the impossible dream of an assimilation that constantly recedes, he can never have the security of the "Aryan," firmly established on his land and so certain

of his property that he can even forget that he is a proprietor and see the bond that unites him to his country as *natural*.

However, it should not be thought that Jewish uneasiness is metaphysical. It would be an error to identify it with the anxiety that moves us to a consideration of the condition of man. I should say rather that metaphysical uneasiness is a condition that the Jew—no more than the worker—cannot allow himself today. One must be sure of one's rights and firmly rooted in the world, one must be free of the fears that each day assail oppressed minorities or classes, before one dare raise questions about the place of man in the world and his ultimate destiny. In a word, metaphysics is the special privilege of the "Aryan" governing classes. Let no one see in this an attempt to discredit metaphysics; when men are liberated, it will become again an essential concern of mankind.

The disquietude of the Jew is not metaphysical; it is social. The ordinary object of his concern is not yet the place of man in the universe, but his place in society. He cannot perceive the loneliness of each man in the midst of a silent universe, because he has not yet emerged from society into the world. It is among men that he feels himself lonely; the racial problem limits his horizon. Nor is his uneasiness of the kind that seeks perpetuation; he takes no pleasure in it—he seeks reassurance.

It has been called to my attention that there have been no Jewish surrealists in France. That is because surrealism, in its own way, raises the question of human destiny. Its destructive activities and the great fanfare raised over them were the luxurious games of young members of the middle class completely at ease in a victorious country that belonged to them. The Jew does not dream of destroying, or of considering the condition of man in its nudity. He is the social man *par excellence*, because his torment is social.

It is society, not the decree of God, that has made him a Jew and brought the Jewish problem into being. As he is forced to make his choices entirely within the perspective set by this problem, it is in and through the social that he chooses even his own existence. His constructive effort to integrate himself in the national community is social; social is the effort he makes to think of him-

self, that is, to situate himself, among other men; his joys and sorrows are social; but all this is because the curse that rests upon him is social. If in consequence he is reproached for his metaphysical inauthenticity, if attention is called to the fact that his constant uneasiness is accompanied by a radical positivism, let us not forget that these reproaches return upon those who make them: the Jew is social because the anti-Semite has made him so.

SUCH, then, is this haunted man, condemned to make his choice of himself on the basis of false problems and in a false situation, deprived of the metaphysical sense by the hostility of the society that surrounds him, driven to a rationalism of despair. His life is nothing but a long flight from others and from himself. He has been alienated even from his own body; his emotional life has been cut in two; he has been reduced to pursuing the impossible dream of universal brotherhood in a world that rejects him.

Whose is the fault? It is our eyes that reflect to him the unacceptable image that he wishes to dissimulate. It is our words and our gestures—all our words and all our gestures—our anti-Semitism, but equally our condescending liberalism—that have poisoned him. It is we who constrain him to choose to be a Jew whether through flight from himself or through self-assertion; it is we who force him into the dilemma of Jewish authenticity or inauthenticity. We have created this variety of men who have no meaning except as artificial products of a capitalist (or feudal) society, whose only reason for existing is to serve as a scapegoat for a still prelogical community—this species that bears witness for essential humanity better than any other because it was born of secondary reactions within the body of humanity—this quintessence of man, disgraced, uprooted, destined from the start to either inauthenticity or martyrdom. In this situation there is not one of us who is not totally guilty and even criminal; the Jewish blood that the Nazis shed falls on all our heads.

The fact remains, you may answer, that the Jew is free: he can choose to be authentic. That is true, but we must understand first of all that *that does not concern us*. The prisoner is always free to try to run

away, if it is clearly understood that he risks death. Is his jailer any less guilty?

Jewish authenticity consists in choosing oneself *as Jew*—that is, in realizing one's Jewish condition. The authentic Jew abandons the myth of the universal man; he knows himself and wills himself into history as a historic and damned creature; he ceases to run away from himself and to be ashamed of his own kind. He understands that society is bad; for the naive monism of the inauthentic Jew he substitutes a social pluralism. He knows that he is one who stands apart, untouchable, scorned, proscribed—and it is *as such* that he asserts his being. At once he gives up his rationalistic optimism; he sees that the world is fragmented by irrational divisions, and in accepting this fragmentation—at least in what concerns him—in proclaiming himself a Jew, he makes some of these values and these divisions his. He chooses his brothers and his peers; they are the other Jews. He stakes everything on human grandeur, for he accepts the obligation to live in a situation defined by the fact that it is unlivable; he derives his pride from his humiliation.

The moment he ceases to be passive, he takes away all power and all virulence from anti-Semitism. The inauthentic Jew flees Jewish reality, and the anti-Semite makes him a Jew in spite of himself; but the authentic Jew *makes himself a Jew*, in the face of all and against all. He accepts all, even martyrdom, and the anti-Semite, deprived of his weapons, must be content to yelp at the Jew as he goes by, and can no longer touch him. At one stroke the Jew, like any authentic man, escapes description. The common characteristics we have attributed to the inauthentic Jews emanate from their common inauthenticity. We shall encounter none of them in the authentic Jew; he is what he makes himself, that is all that can be said. In this isolation to which he has consented, he becomes again a man, a whole man, with the metaphysical horizons that go with the condition of man.

But this does not mean that we can soothe our consciences by saying: "Very well, since the Jew is free, let him be authentic, and we shall have peace." The choice of authenticity is not a solution of the social aspect of the Jewish problem; it is not even an individual solution. No

doubt authentic Jews are today much more numerous than one may suspect. The suffering that the Jews have undergone during the past few years has done much to open their eyes, and it seems to me even probable that there are more authentic Jews than authentic Christians. Yet the choice they have made of themselves does not smooth their way as individuals, rather the contrary.

Take the example of one "authentic" French Jew who, after fighting in 1940, directed a French propaganda review in London during the occupation. He wrote under a pseudonym, because he wished to avoid trouble for his "Aryan" wife, who had remained in France. This is what many French émigrés did, and when they did it, it was all right. But since he was a Jew, he was refused this right: "Aha," people said, "another Yid trying to hide his origin." Again, he chose the articles he published with strict reference to their merit. If by chance the proportion of Jewish articles was considerable, the readers sneered; they wrote to him: "I see that the happy family is getting together again." On the other hand, if he refused a Jewish article, he was accused of acting like an anti-Semite. "Oh well," you may say, "let him ignore all that, since he is authentic." That is easily said, but he cannot ignore it, precisely because he is engaged in carrying on propaganda and must therefore depend on opinion. "Very well, then; it simply means that this sort of activity is closed to Jews: they'll have to give it up." There we are: you would accept authenticity if it led straight to the ghetto. And it is you who refuse to see it as a solution to the problem.

SOcially, moreover, things are no better. The circumstances we have created are such that in the end division is created among the Jews. The choice of authenticity can, in fact, lead to conflicting political decisions. The Jew can choose to be authentic by asserting his place as Jew in the French community, with all that goes with it of rights and martyrdom; he may feel that for him the best way to be French is to declare himself a *French Jew*. But he may also be led by his choice of authenticity to seek the creation of a Jewish nation possessing its own soil and autonomy; he may persuade himself that Jewish authen-

ticity demands that the Jew be sustained by a Jewish national community.

It is not impossible that these opposing choices might be reconciled and made complementary as two aspects of Jewish reality. But for that it would be necessary that Jewish behavior should not be constantly spied upon and should not involve the constant risk of furnishing weapons for the Jew's enemies to use against him. If we had not created for the Jew his *situation* as a Jew, it would be possible for him to exercise an option between Jerusalem and France; the immense majority of French Jews would choose to remain in France, a small number would go to increase the Jewish nation in Palestine. That would not mean that the Jew who was integrated in the French national community would preserve ties with Tel-Aviv; at most, Palestine might represent in his eyes a sort of ideal value, a symbol, and certainly the existence of an autonomous Jewish community would be infinitely less dangerous to the integrity of French society than, for example, the existence of an ultramontane clergy, which we tolerate with perfect equanimity.

But the temper of our time turns so legitimate a choice into a source of conflict among our Jews. In the eyes of the anti-Semite, the establishment of a Jewish nation furnishes only another proof that the Jew is out of place in the French community. Once, he was reproached for his race; now he is regarded as coming from a foreign country: he doesn't belong here, let him go to Jerusalem. Thus authenticity, when it leads to Zionism, is harmful to the Jews who wish to remain in their original fatherland, since it gives new arguments to the anti-Semite. The French Jew becomes angered at the Zionist, who complicates further an already delicate situation, and the Zionist is angered at the French Jew, whom he accuses *a priori* of inauthenticity.

Thus the choice of authenticity appears to be a *moral* decision, bringing certainty to the Jew on the ethical level but in no way serving as a solution on the social or political level: his situation is such that everything he does turns against him.

THE preceding remarks of course make no pretense at providing a solution to the Jewish problem. But perhaps they do give

us a basis for stating the conditions on which a solution might be envisaged.

In effect, we have just seen that, contrary to a widespread opinion, it is not the Jewish character that provokes anti-Semitism but, rather, that it is the anti-Semite who creates the Jew. The primary phenomenon, therefore, is anti-Semitism, a regressive social force and a conception deriving from the prelogical world. With the problem thus stated, what are we to do about it? Clearly, the solution of the problem involves a definition both of the goal to be attained and of the means for its attainment. All too often people discuss means when they are still uncertain of their goal.

In short, what can we seek? Assimilation? That is a dream; the true opponent of assimilation is not the Jew but the anti-Semite, as we have already demonstrated. Since his emancipation—that is, for about a century and a half—the Jew has tried to gain acceptance in a society that rejects him. It is pointless to ask him to hasten this integration, which always recedes before him; so long as there is anti-Semitism, assimilation cannot be realized.

It is true that some people advocate the employment of drastic means. There are even Jews who suggest that all Jews be forced to change their names. But this measure would be inadequate; it would be necessary to supplement it with a policy of mixed marriages and a rigorous interdiction against Jewish religious practices—in particular, circumcision. I say quite simply: these measures would be inhumane. Possibly Napoleon might have thought of such measures, but what Napoleon sought was precisely the sacrifice of the person to the community. No democracy can seek the integration of the Jews at such a cost.

Moreover, such a procedure could be advocated only by inauthentic Jews who are a prey to a crisis of anti-Semitism; it aims at nothing less than the liquidation of the Jewish race. It represents an extreme form of the tendency we have noticed in the democrat, a tendency purely and simply to suppress the Jew for the sake of *the man*. But *the man* does not exist; there are Jews, Protestants, Catholics; there are Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans; there are whites, blacks, yellows. In short, these drastic measures of coercion would mean the annihila-

tion of a spiritual community, founded on custom and affection, to the advantage of the national community. Most conscious Jews would refuse assimilation if it were presented to them under this aspect. Certainly they wish to integrate themselves in the nation, but *as Jews*, and who would dare to reproach them for that? We have forced them to think of themselves as Jews, we have made them conscious of their solidarity with other Jews. Should we be astonished that they now reject a policy that would destroy Israel?

It is idle to object that they form a nation within a nation. We have attempted to show that the Jewish community is neither national nor international, neither religious, nor ethnic, nor political: it is a *quasi-historical* community. What makes the Jew is his concrete situation; what unites him to other Jews is the identity of their situations. This quasi-historical body should not be considered a foreign element in society. On the contrary, it is necessary to it. If the Church tolerated its existence at a time when the Church was all-powerful, it was because it took on certain economic functions that made it indispensable. Today those functions are open to all, but that does not mean that the Jew, as a spiritual factor, makes no contribution to the peculiar nature and equilibrium of the French nation. We have described objectively, perhaps severely, the traits of the inauthentic Jew. There is not one of them that is opposed to his assimilation *as such* in the national society. On the contrary, his rationalism, his critical spirit, his dream of a contractual society and of universal brotherhood, his humanism—all these qualities make him an indispensable leaven in that society.

WHAT we propose here is a concrete liberalism. By that we mean that all persons who through their work collaborate toward the greatness of a country have the full rights of citizens of that country. What gives them this right is not the possession of a problematical and abstract "human nature," but their active participation in the life of the society. This means, then, that the Jews—and likewise the Arabs and the Negroes—from the moment that they are participants in the national enterprise, have a right in that enterprise; they are citizens. But they have

these rights as Jews, Negroes, or Arabs—that is, as concrete persons.

In societies where women vote, they are not asked to change their sex when they enter the voting booth; the vote of a woman is worth just as much as that of a man, but it is as a woman that she votes, with her womanly intuitions and concerns, in her full character of a woman. When it is a question of the legal rights of the Jew, and of the more obscure but equally indispensable rights that are not inscribed in any code, he must enjoy those rights not as a potential Christian but precisely as a French Jew. It is with his character, his customs, his tastes, his religion if he has one, his name, and his physical traits that we *must* accept him. And if that acceptance is total and sincere, the result will be, first, to make easier the Jew's choice of authenticity, and then, bit by bit, to make possible, without violence and by the very course of history, that assimilation to which some would drive him by force.

But the concrete liberalism we have just described is a goal; it is in danger of becoming no more than a mere ideal if we do not determine upon the means to attain it. As we have shown, it cannot be a matter of acting on the Jew. The Jewish problem is born of anti-Semitism; thus it is anti-Semitism that we must suppress in order to resolve the problem. The question therefore comes back to this: What shall we do about anti-Semitism?

Ordinary procedures, particularly propaganda and education, are by no means without importance. It is to be hoped that the child in school will receive an education that will permit him to avoid errors of passion; but the results of such education may have only an individual reference. Likewise, we should not be afraid to prohibit by basic law statements and acts that tend to bring discredit upon any category of Frenchmen. But let us have no illusions about the effectiveness of these measures: laws have never embarrassed and will never embarrass the anti-Semite, who conceives of himself as belonging to a mystical society outside the bounds of legality. We may heap up decrees and interdictions, but they will always come from the legal France, and the anti-Semite pretends that he represents the real France.

Let us recall that anti-Semitism is a conception of the Manichean and primitive

world in which hatred for the Jew arises as a great explanatory myth. We have seen that it is not a matter of an isolated opinion, but of the total choice that a man in a situation makes of himself and of the meaning of the universe. It is the expression of a certain ferocious and mystical sense of real property. If we wish to make such a choice impossible, it will not be enough to address ourselves by propaganda, education, and legal interdictions against the liberty of the anti-Semite. Since he, like all men, exists as a free agent within a situation, it is his situation that must be modified from top to bottom. In short, if we can change the perspective of choice, then the choice itself will change. Thus we do not attack freedom, but bring it about that freedom decides on other bases, and in terms of other structures.

Political action can never be directed against the freedom of citizens; its very nature forbids it to be concerned with freedom except in a negative fashion, that is, in taking care not to infringe upon it. It acts only on situations. We have demonstrated that anti-Semitism is a passionate effort to realize a national union *against* the division of society into classes. It is an attempt to suppress the fragmentation of the community into groups hostile to one another by carrying common passions to such a temperature that they cause barriers to dissolve. Yet divisions continue to exist, since their economic and social causes have not been touched; an attempt is made to lump them all together into a single one—distinctions between rich and poor, between laboring and owning classes, between legal powers and occult powers, between city-dwellers and country-dwellers, etc., etc.—they are all summed up in the distinction between Jew and non-Jew. This means that anti-Semitism is a mythical, bourgeois representation of the class struggle, and that it could not exist in a classless society. Anti-Semitism manifests the *separation* of men and their isolation in the midst of the community, the conflict of interests and the cross-currents of passions: it can exist only in a society where a rather loose solidarity unites strongly structured pluralities; it is a phenomenon of social pluralism. In a society whose members feel mutual bonds of solidarity, because all are engaged in the same enterprise, it would have no place.

Finally, anti-Semitism indicates a certain

mystical and participationist liaison of man with his "goods" which results from the present system of property. Again, anti-Semitism would have no existence in a society without classes and founded on collective ownership of the instruments of labor, one in which man, freed of his hallucinations inherited from an older world, would at long last throw himself wholeheartedly into *his* enterprise—to create the kingdom of man. Anti-Semitism would then be cut at its roots.

Thus the authentic Jew who thinks of himself as a Jew because the anti-Semite has put him in the situation of a Jew is not opposed to assimilation any more than the class-conscious worker is opposed to the liquidation of classes. On the contrary, it is an access of consciousness that will hasten the suppression of both the class struggle and racism. The authentic Jew simply renounces *for himself* an assimilation that is today impossible; he awaits the radical liquidation of anti-Semitism for his sons. The Jew of today is in full war. What is there to say except that the socialist revolution is necessary to and sufficient for the suppression of the anti-Semite? It is for the Jews *also* that we shall make the revolution.

AND while we wait for it? After all, it is lazy to place on a future revolution the burden of liquidating the Jewish question.

Anti-Semitism is a problem that affects us all directly; we are all bound to the Jew, because anti-Semitism leads straight to National Socialism. And if we do not respect the person of the Israelite, who will respect us? If we are conscious of these dangers, if we have lived in shame because of our involuntary complicity with the anti-Semites, who have made hangmen of us all, perhaps we can understand that we must fight for the Jew, no more or less than for ourselves.

I am told that a Jewish league against anti-Semitism has just been reconstituted. I am delighted; that proves that the sense of authenticity is developing among the Jews. But can such a league be really effective? Many Jews, and some of the best among them, hesitate to participate because of a sort of modesty: "That's biting off too much," one of them said to me recently. And he added, rather clumsily but with undoubted sincerity: "Anti-Semitism and persecution are not important."

It is easy enough to understand this repugnance. But *we* who are not Jews, should we share it? Richard Wright, the Negro writer, said recently: "There is no Negro problem in the United States, there is only a White problem." In the same way, we must say that anti-Semitism is not a Jewish problem; it is *our* problem. Since we are not guilty and yet run the risk of being its victims—yes, we too—we must be very blind indeed not to see that it is our concern in the highest degree. It is not up to the Jews first of all to form a militant league against anti-Semitism; it is up to us.

It is evident that such a league will not end the problem. Yet if it spread out all over France, if it succeeded in getting official recognition from the state, if its existence brought into being in other countries similar leagues with which it could unite to form ultimately an international association, if it intervened successfully wherever injustices were called to its attention, if it acted through the press, through propaganda and education, it would attain a triple result: First, it would permit the adversaries of anti-Semitism to know their strength and to unite in an active group; second, it would rally many hesitating people, people who have no convictions on the Jewish question, for an organized group always exercises a considerable force of attraction; finally, to an adversary who is always ready to contrast the real country with the legal country, it would offer the sight of a concrete community engaged in a particular fight having nothing to do with universalist abstractions of legality. This would take away from the anti-Semite his favorite argument, which rests on the myth of the concrete. The cause of the Jews would be half won if only their friends brought to their defense a little of the passion and the perseverance their enemies use to bring them down.

In order to awaken this passion, what is needed is not to appeal to the generosity of the "Aryans"—with even the best of them that virtue is in eclipse. What must be done is to point out to each one that the fate of the Jews is *his* fate. Not one Frenchman will be free so long as the Jews do not enjoy the fullness of their rights. Not one Frenchman will be secure so long as a single Jew—in France or *in the world at large*—can fear for his life.

ALL-OUT WAR ON THE PRODUCTION FRONT?

Labor Looks to Political Weapons

A. H. RASKIN

TWO of America's prime weapons in the cold war against Communism are the vitality of our democracy and the efficiency of our productive machinery. With the world looking to us for both moral and material leadership, it is depressing to report that we are moving backward in terms of the management-labor cooperation that is indispensable to a fruitful economy based on the principles of industrial democracy.

At a time when our responsibilities to the world and to ourselves require the smoothest and most continuous operation of our productive facilities, we are entering upon a period of mass strikes and conflict without parallel since the early days of the Wagner Act. The most alarming phase of the present discord is that it is accompanied, on the part of large sections of the labor movement, by a return to the old slogans

CURRENT labor-management struggles and tensions seem to most observers to mark a critical stage in postwar industrial relations, with serious implications, not only for the strength and stability of our domestic economy, but for American efforts to intervene effectively for the reconstruction of Europe. Moreover, the contesting forces may well be setting a long-range pattern for the future. Here, A. H. RASKIN, from his first-hand observation of the conflict in steel, coal, railways, automobiles, and other major industries, tries to chart the lines of battle, and to interpret their meaning both on the economic and political level. Mr. Raskin is among the best-informed labor journalists in the country. He has been on the staff of the *New York Times* since 1935, except for a wartime interlude as a lieutenant-colonel in charge of labor relations, and has contributed articles to previous issues of *COMMENTARY* as well as to other national magazines. He was born in Edmonton, Canada, in 1911, and was graduated from the College of the City of New York.

of class struggle and distrust for the good faith of management.

Linked with this is a belief that government is being made the servant of industry, and that this process will become complete after the November elections. Even among the more moderate and responsible union leaders, there is a fear that labor will have to battle for its life during the next four years and that many of the present organizations will not be able to survive the battle.

The decision of the General Motors Corporation to raise wages by eleven cents an hour has made it plain that there will be no real showdown this year between industry and labor, but this major break in what appeared to be a "united front" of big business has not removed labor's fears for the future.

A good deal of this fear stems from the myopic nature of labor's relation to the community—a myopia that blinds it to its own faults and gives it an exaggerated sense of the hostility it must overcome. But there is enough solid basis for apprehension left to justify the kind of "digging in" that labor is doing today on both the economic and political fronts.

It is instructive to examine the elements that have given American unions such a sense of insecurity at a time when they are enjoying unparalleled prosperity in terms of membership and dues collections. It is also appropriate to consider the repercussions of the new situation on management-labor relations and on the present and future conduct of American politics.

THE passage of the Taft-Hartley Law year ago was the first red light in labor's path, but most labor leaders had the feeling that the new weapons the law placed

in employers' hands would not be invoked until after the 1948 election unless a major depression occurred before that time.

Early experience under the law tended to confirm this judgment. The unions that suffered most were those that refused to comply with the non-Communist affidavit requirement, but even among such unions the casualties were few. In coal and other basic industries, employers passed up the opportunity to challenge the union's bargaining position on legalistic grounds of non-compliance with the Taft-Hartley Act. This was notably true, of course, in the cases of unions like the United Mine Workers, which were so deeply entrenched in their industries that the possibility of dislodging them could not seriously be contemplated, no matter how defiant they might be of the processes prescribed by the new law.

For the most part, pay increases and union security formulas were agreed upon without great difficulty and strikes dropped toward all-time lows. Four principal explanations presented themselves for this harmonious condition:

1. Lush profit opportunities that made it wiser from a business standpoint to compromise with unions than to risk strikes.
2. Confidence that the Republicans would win control of the White House, as well as Congress, unless labor became aroused by a feeling that employers were out to smash their unions.
3. Lack of certainty about the legality of some sections of the Taft-Hartley Law and reluctance on the part of most employers to be "fall guys" in testing the disputed sections.
4. Development in large sections of industry of stable working relationships based on mutual trust between employers and unions.

In the last four or five months, all of these factors have operated with much less force. In the first place, consumer resistance to high prices has had an impact on profit possibilities. In the second place, the emergence of a third-party ticket under the leadership of Henry Wallace has removed any

doubt on the part of employers that the Republicans will win, no matter what happens to labor. In the third place, the National Labor Relations Board has enforced the Taft-Hartley Law with a vehemence that is often embarrassing to the authors of the statute and that far exceeds the expectations held by most employers at the time the law was passed.

THE fourth factor of stable management-labor relations has suffered as a result of the deterioration in the other three. This is best illustrated by the experience of the United Steel Workers under the leadership of CIO President Philip Murray. Mr. Murray, an earnest and able negotiator, with a firm regard for the sanctity of contractual obligations, had built up what he felt was a responsible two-way relationship with the United States Steel Corporation.

In 1947 Mr. Murray agreed to a "package" wage settlement that provided an increase of 15 cents an hour for workers in the basic steel industry. At that time the company gave assurances that it would not raise steel prices to offset this second-round wage rise. In return, Mr. Murray signed a two-year contract that provided for a wage reopening in April 1948, but that established no machinery for arbitration in the event the company and the union could not agree on new pay scales at that time.

Subsequently, "Big Steel" used the granting of a wage boost to John L. Lewis' miners as an excuse for increasing steel prices and thus negating this section of its "gentleman's agreement" with Mr. Murray. With steel leading the upward spiral, living costs rose during the latter half of 1947, and continued to rise, except for brief dips, during 1948.

The steel workers approached their wage negotiations with some confidence that a pay increase of about ten cents an hour would be agreed upon. So far as can be learned, this was not based on any guarantees that had been given by the industry. In any case, the hope was rudely shattered.

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Following the lead of the General Elec-

tric Company, U.S. Steel announced that it was opposed to a third-round pay rise on the ground that it would promote inflation. The company, which had jacked up its price list by about \$28,000,000 a year in February, trimmed \$25,000,000 off the list in April to demonstrate the sincerity of its position. The steel union, noting that the cut amounted to less than half a cent a pound on steel prices, denounced the company for "monstrous hypocrisy."

The union's leaders grew increasingly bitter as other steel companies barred wage increases and, in most instances, failed to make even token price cuts. Loyal to his contractual commitments, Mr. Murray passed the word to his locals that there were to be no strikes or slowdowns. But in his talks to union members, Mr. Murray became an evangel of hatred against "economic pirates, hijackers, and racketeers." Abandoning his customary moderation, he set forth his conviction that the free enterprise system had been swallowed up in the greed of monopolistic corporations.

The same bitterness spread to other industries, where the no-increase pattern was repeated. Labor sought vainly to press its argument that profits were high enough to permit both price cuts and wage rises. Industry contended that the only way to combat inflation was to keep wages where they were (or even to cut them). Reductions in prices were usually confined to items in which stocks were piling up on dealers' shelves for lack of buyers. Many companies did not even suggest the possibility that they would alter their price lists.

IT MUST be acknowledged that experience in the first and second rounds of post-war pay increases lent considerable popular appeal to industry's argument that another round would work out to labor's long-range detriment by overloading an already top-heavy price structure. Labor missed out in not insisting on a fuller exploration of the interrelationship of wages, profits, and prices in a democratic society. With profits and prices racing upward, the notion that labor should

carry the burden of fighting inflation almost single-handed by foregoing higher pay is hardly a tenable one. It puts the principal pressure on those least able to bear it and threatens a collapse of the total economy through curtailment of purchasing power.

Actually, the acknowledgment by industry of the relation between prices and wages serves to open up new vistas in collective bargaining if labor is clever enough to capitalize on them. If employers take the view that price considerations stand in the way of raising wages, then it is appropriate for a union to inquire into the adequacy of the price cut proposed by the company or the justification for maintaining prices at present levels.

This puts the union in the excellent strategic position of bargaining not so much for its own members as for consumers in general. Obviously a reduction in steel prices affects steel workers and all other citizens in roughly equal degree. Similarly with a reduction in the price of any other item that enters into the basic cost of living.

The unions have been slow to turn to their own advantage the new tack taken by industry. Instead of allowing themselves to be jockeyed into a position where they appeared to be fighting against the interests of consumers, imaginative union leaders would have demanded industry-wide or even economy-wide bargaining on price cuts sufficiently substantial to bring down the cost of living. It is not inconceivable that the National Labor Relations Board would have entertained charges of unfair labor practices if they had been brought by unions against employers who barred wage increases and refused to discuss lower prices.

A bargaining theory that ties together prices and wages also brings in such related factors as profit margins, operating efficiency, and even sales policies. Outside of the needle trades, industry has always attempted to stifle labor's voice in the determination of production procedures. Now, by its unilateral action in ruling out higher wages for price reasons, management has seemingly unlocked the door to demands

by labor for inclusion of every phase of business operation within the bargaining range.

One cannot escape the thought that a leader of Walter Reuther's enterprise might have succeeded in dramatizing the implications of management's new bargaining position had he not been hospitalized by an assassin's bullet just as the new line was taking form. As one who sees economic problems in global terms, Mr. Reuther will undoubtedly adapt the price-wage pattern into an instrument of pressure against management in future negotiations.

EVEN without Reuther, the auto workers did better than the rest of American labor. For this the credit is due more to General Motors, colossus of the industry, than it is to the union itself. Instead of following the pattern set by other large employers, GM took the view that industry should share with labor the responsibility for combating inflation and promoting efficient production.

Accordingly, the company proposed a pay increase plan under which allowance would be made for fluctuations in the cost of living and for positive improvement in the workers' living standards. The new agreement, which will run for two years, represents an affirmation by GM of its faith in America's stability and progress. Put forward at a time when all the trump cards appeared to be in management's hands, it is a powerful refutation of the too facile assumption that there exists in this country a conspiracy on the part of big business to throttle trade unionism.

No one expects, however, that the GM settlement will usher in a period of complete peace or obliterate the memory of the defeats that preceded it. Too many unions have lost out even where the merit of the situation was overwhelmingly on their side. The recent strike against the New York Stock and Curb Exchanges was indicative. The union, complying with the requirements of the Taft-Hartley Law, had won union-shop elections among the employees of the

two exchanges by margins of eleven and fifteen to one. Despite this overwhelming expression on the part of the workers and despite the enthusiasm the financial community had exhibited for the new labor law, both exchanges fell back on the well-worn position that they would not be party to requiring any employee to join a union against his will. All compromise formulations, including one that had been accepted by the Cotton Exchange, were turned down, and the union was finally obliged to settle on substantially the terms originally offered by the employers.

One outcome of this and similar situations in which workers have voted almost unanimously in favor of the union shop has been a loss of ardor for this section of the law by its congressional sponsors. It had been expected by some Congressmen that the election procedure would show that workers really did not welcome the union shop and that they were herded into such arrangements by union "bosses." When the workers, under protection of a secret ballot, demonstrated their strong desire for union security, these same Congressmen decided the whole process was a waste of time and money.

This sophistry, coupled with the increasing frequency of injunctions and police assaults on picket lines, helps bolster the notion that government is on industry's side in the current conflict. This feeling tends to persist even when due allowance is made for the extent to which government interference in labor disputes has been provoked by labor's own perverseness.

Leaving John L. Lewis to one side, it must be conceded that unions have been something less than astute in picking their battlegrounds this year. The meat strike, which occasioned some of the worst picket-line melees, should never have been called. The CIO insisted on striking after the AFL had settled for 9 cents an hour. After ten weeks the CIO union went back to work on the employers' original terms. It is the desperation produced by that kind of futile tie-up that reflects itself in violence on the

picket line and the calling in of state troopers.

THE responsiveness of the present Congress to employer pressure and the probability that far more repressive measures are to come have convinced labor that the crucial fight in the next few years will be waged on the political, rather than the industrial, front. There will be few gains at the bargaining table until a more friendly atmosphere prevails in Washington and in state legislative halls.

This realization has thrust the unions into the political arena. In all parts of the country, elaborate organizations are being set up by the AFL, the CIO, the railroad brotherhoods, and the principal independent unions to mobilize labor's voting strength.

Unfortunately for labor, there is little reason to expect that these organizations will exert a very potent influence on the election returns this year. The fact is that neither major party seems likely to put forward a candidate with enough magnetism to win the enthusiastic support of the rank and file.

President Truman has made it clear that he will endeavor to build his campaign around an appeal to labor, but most labor leaders are still hoping they can put across an Eisenhower or Douglas boom at the Democratic convention. If this fizzles—and the chances of success seem slight—Mr. Truman will probably have the half-hearted backing of labor's high command. But there is little hope, in the light of the President's ineffectuality as a national leader, that the mass of American workers will rally to the Truman banner. It is even more unlikely that any Republican candidate will have widespread labor support.

That leaves Henry Wallace as the potential recipient of a large part of the labor vote, despite the conviction of virtually all labor leaders outside the Russia First camp that his third-party candidacy was promoted by the Communists for the specific purpose of creating confusion in the country and blocking effective administration of the European Recovery Program.

Some of those who are least sympathetic to the new party concede that the Wallace vote may range between 6,000,000 and 8,000,000 if Mr. Truman is his Democratic opponent. A vote of these dimensions would be interpreted by Mr. Wallace's backers as proof that the American people, and particularly the workers, are fed up with "red-baiting" in both its domestic and international phases.

Such a conclusion would not, in my judgment, square at all with what is happening in American unions today. The more discontented workers become with the existing political and economic situation, the less disposed they appear to be to embrace the Communists as trustworthy allies in seeking to improve things. It is not merely the top leadership of labor that is rejecting the "united front" philosophy; it is the rank and file as well.

The two biggest unions in the CIO—Philip Murray's Steel Workers and Walter Reuther's Automobile Workers—are both intensely anti-Communist, and the defection of Michael J. Quill and Joseph Curran from the left-wing ranks is expected to swing their unions, the Transport Workers Union and the National Maritime Union, into the anti-Communist ranks.

Another bulwark of the leftist group, the American Communications Association, has been whittled down to less than one-fifth of its former strength as a result of strike defeats and the transfer of large sections of its membership to anti-Communist unions in the CIO. Virtually all the other unions with a pro-Soviet orientation, including the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, largest in the group, are beset with internal difficulties and secession movements.

INDEED, the sentiment against Communist penetration of the labor movement is so violent in some instances as to cause alarm among staunch supporters of the right-wing viewpoint. What amounted to a lynch spirit animated delegates to the Boston convention of the United Steel Workers last month.

And reports of physical assaults or arbitrary removal of Communist sympathizers drift in from local unions in various sections. These manifestations are less disturbing to the Communists, who feast upon them as evidence that the "storm troop" variety of fascism has taken root in America, than they are to honest believers in the doctrine that the superiority of democracy to totalitarianism can best be demonstrated by the free exercise of democratic rights.

The depth of anti-Communist feeling in labor's ranks makes it plain that any support Mr. Wallace receives will come in spite of, and not because of, his ardor for the Soviet cause. He will find himself the beneficiary of a gathering revulsion against both major parties and a feeling that labor needs an independent avenue of political expression. So profound is this feeling that it makes almost inevitable the development in the next four to eight years of a new political alignment rooted in the trade union movement but appealing also to farmers and the non-Communist Left.

No matter how many votes Mr. Wallace draws this fall, his party will not provide the nucleus for this realignment. The degree to which it is spotted with pro-Communists rules it out as a vehicle for the future. More probably the initiative for the new political instrumentality will be taken by men like Walter Reuther and David Dubinsky, who have been active in the affairs of Americans for Democratic Action, an organization dedicated to the carrying forward of a positive program for combating Communism and fascism through the strengthening of democracy.

The state of political impotence in which labor finds itself today has produced a surprisingly wide acceptance on the part of conservative leaders in both the AFL and CIO that it is time to reconsider the non-partisan policy of "reward your friends and punish your enemies" that has been the touchstone of labor's political credo since the AFL was formed more than sixty years ago.

How rapidly this challenging of old con-

cepts will mature into independent political machinery is difficult to say. Both the CIO Political Action Committee and the AFL League for Political Education are beginning to recognize that it is not sufficient to throw together a political organization on the eve of an election. Both are thinking in terms of a permanent program of basic political education of a type that has been almost non-existent in this country up to this time.

The chances of success for such a drive in the visible future are dimmed by the continuing divisions in labor's own ranks and by its failure to develop any real ties with agriculture, small business, or the professions. There have been some vague peace overtures made by the AFL to the CIO, but the tone still smacks too much of the invitation to the erring son to return to the house of his fathers.

THE coolness exhibited by the AFL high command to Paul Hoffman's offer to appoint two deputies, one from the federation and the other from the CIO, to assist him in administration of the Marshall Plan, indicated the vast gulf that remains to be bridged before labor unity can be achieved. The rejection of Hoffman's proposal was especially disheartening because the AFL a year ago had agreed to let Clinton S. Golden of the CIO Steel Workers represent all labor in the Griswold mission to Greece.

Impressed by labor arguments that Soviet efforts to paint the European Recovery Program as a Wall Street plot could most effectively be counteracted by giving labor top-echelon representation in running the program, Mr. Hoffman had proposed to name Mr. Golden and Irving J. Brown, the AFL's dynamic European representative, to assist him in Washington and Paris. The AFL executive council rebuffed this suggestion with the brusque comment that it could not agree to CIO representation so long as the CIO maintained its affiliation with the World Federation of Trade Unions. Now there is considerable warrant for the AFL belief that the state-controlled Soviet trade

unions exert a dominant influence in the WFTU secretariat, but the CIO, with the help of the British Trades Union Congress, has succeeded in recent months in putting substantial curbs on this influence.

Tossing in the sponge and leaving the field clear to the Russians and their satellites would seem to make little more sense than withdrawal of our representatives from the United Nations because of our inability to agree with the Soviet Union. There are too few avenues for interchange of views between our people and the rest of the world for us to be over-hasty in abandoning any of those that do exist.

The refusal of the AFL to cooperate with the CIO in the current political campaign, despite their common hatred for the Taft-Hartley Law and its sponsors, provides further evidence of the handicaps that must be conquered before a real labor party can be established. In some localities, however, joint political drives are already under way. This trend will almost certainly be accelerated as Communist influence is extinguished in the CIO and as legislative pressure against labor grows more intense.

One of the worst aspects of the conflict that lies ahead is that labor will be so pre-occupied with fighting a rear-guard action in support of its rights that it will give diminishing attention to the need for working out a long-term program for community welfare and fulfillment of its national and international responsibilities.

Bread-and-butter problems will tend to take precedence over efforts to find more scientific methods of conducting management-labor relations and of safeguarding the public welfare. The Lewis brand of militancy is likely to gain in popularity in labor's ranks, with an inevitable decrease in labor's popularity with the public. All in all, it is not a pleasant prospect.

BUT one thing is sure. The labor movement will not be wiped out. With fifteen million members and well-filled treasuries, American unions are not in the

desperate position some of their more alarmist spokesmen like to depict. If nothing else assured them stability, the size of the insurance and welfare funds they administer jointly with the employers in their industries would be a powerful safeguard. The International Ladies Garment Workers Union has about \$60,000,000 in employer-financed welfare funds. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers has \$46,000,000. The United Mine Workers has \$35,000,000.

Every one hopes, but no one is sanguine, that there will not have to be a revival of the strife that marked the rise of industrial unionism in this country. In the present state of labor's strength, the results might cripple the world economy. That makes it highly desirable that the new President call, as early as possible in 1949, a labor-management conference designed to work out a program for industrial peace based on cooperation rather than restrictive legislation.

At the same time labor will be giving increasing thought to ways in which it can stand on its own feet politically. Its future well-being is likely to be determined more by its effectiveness at the voting machine than by its militancy on the picket line.

In all of its policies and struggles, labor's long-term hope resides in its ability to fuse its interests with those of the whole population. To the extent that unions are working for the common good, they will move forward in public esteem and support. To the extent that they measure the common good solely in terms of the self-interest of their own members, unions will lose out both economically and politically.

Wise employers will try to encourage a return to the principles of cooperation, but there is little sign that most of industry will accept this approach. We are in for a period in which extremists on both sides will have full sway, with most of the weapons in the hands of industry.

The most we can do is hope that the explosions ahead will not be of atomic proportions.

BY THE RIVER

JACOB SLOAN

WARM Sundays, the excursion ships
Pass our watching bench, en route
To Hellgate and the other bridge.
Silently we sit and look

Underneath our Sunday paper
At their waves' end. If they waved,
Would we have the hands to answer?
Our image in their camera

Would be merely shading eyes.
Or call out across the water?
But they have their naming guides
And will hear no amateurs.

They pass and pass. We sit and wait.
Not one of them comes back.
We raise our paper to our face
And see them, white on black

And see ourselves out on a lake,
Pulling with locked oars,
Cursing crowds that block the way,
Mocked by crowds on shore.

AFTER ships, plane comes, spelling
A new Commandment in the air.
Letters drifting huge as Bibles.
But God is not here.

And is not in the church bells ringing,
And is not in the synagogues,
And is not in the halls of Congress:
There is no God.

Nor any thirst in the land
For cola to satisfy.

Nor any hunger in man
For a new cloud in the sky.

Only: white gas to read.
Only: wet leaking cold.
No bitter book to eat.
No living coal.

But what would we do with wings?
Angels in heaven!
We have more faces
To cover than seven.

WHEN planes and ships have gone,
River and we remain,
Each in his single place,
Each with his proper name.

We have been named too well,
Too deeply circumcised
To overflow the will
Of what no will decides:

Suddenly, should the plane
Bomb us to Hell,
Should the ship's smoke
Sound our knell—

We would not be surprised,
Partly expecting this,
Yet waiting and hoping for
Death by a kiss.

Though it come angrier,
Too young and too soon,
We shall not wrangle
With any quick doom.

JACOB SLOAN has published a volume of poetry, *Generation of Journey*, and is responsible for many of the translations in *The Language of Faith*, published by Schocken Books. Mr. Sloan was born in Brooklyn in 1918. He is now on the staff of the American Jewish Committee.

THE MALE-FOREST OF TARNOPOL

A Story

J. L. TELLER

HOW can one forget one's dread of the forest of Tarnopol, although removed in time by a quarter of a century?

It wasn't a forest of trees, for these were chopped down to the last one by the Germans and Russians and all the various hordes that ravaged Galicia in the years 1914-20. It was a forest of adult Jewish males, moss-covered with *peyes* (earlocks) and beards, tumultuous with voices of various degrees of formidability and rich in strange and menacing gestures.

These forbidding males, almost all, were fathers, and constituted mobile shelters to which their children, losers in a gang-fight, or aggressors who wished to escape a trouncing by the victim, scurried quickly, searching them out in crowded humid synagogues, or in jammed market places among stalls and shops and wagons laden with peasants' perishable goods.

When angry, these fathers would pinch their children's cheeks, like the flanks of the horses over which they haggled with peasants, or turn their ears half-way round like door knobs. They rarely laid their hands on another man's child, however. But the scornful "nee-nee," meaning "git!" with which they chased off another man's child, was more smarting than the corporal punishment on their own.

On Saturdays and holidays all children made nuisances of themselves, pushing through in crowded synagogues vociferous

with prayer, jostling the anonymous male figures enshrouded in prayer-shawls, tripping over adult legs to get towards their fathers or away from them. A disturbed male would suddenly freeze in his praying frenzy, peek from under the shroud, then lift it back, fold it around his shoulders, and give the jostling youngster a scornful look that discouraged the most venturesome.

The child's father, if he were there, would hurriedly disentangle him from the congregation and hide him beneath his praying shawl from the stranger's wrath. But children with no fathers slunk away like chastened dogs.

Saturday afternoons and all afternoons on which holidays concluded were the most trying for children without fathers. These were the afternoons when the adult males seated themselves at long tables in the synagogue, singing and praying and partaking communally of fish and *haleh* and beer. Children would cluster around the table, each group of children behind its father's back, and even the meekest and humblest of men—the shoemaker, tailor, or water-carrier, sitting at the far end of the table—would strain and stretch and snatch from the communal *haleh* enough for himself and his children. The fatherless child would hang around shame-faced in his abandonment, and wince and smart still more when some other child's father in a sudden upsurge of compassion would beckon him and give him some sardines on *haleh*. It was humiliating, like begging, yet no child could resist accepting the dole.

J. L. TELLER was born in Poland in 1912 and came to this country in 1921. He has contributed to the *Nation*, *Commonweal*, *American Mercury*, and the Palestine and Latin-American press. He is at present with the Palcor News Agency and is also on the staff of the *Jewish Morning Journal*.

I WAS one of the fatherless children. A "live orphan"—meaning a child whose father had deserted his family. My father hadn't exactly abandoned his family, but he

was away in America seeking his fortune when the war broke out and couldn't return, and adults used to whisper behind my back—and the child's hunched shoulders and alert ears were tense with anticipation of the innuendo—who knows whether Baruch is still among the living, and, if he is, whether he won't pretend that he is dead as many had done who had gone to America and left their wives behind. They were quite certain that I was a "*lebediger yosem*" (live orphan), but uncertain whether my mother was a widow or an *aguna* (deserted wife).

The war over and trans-oceanic mail resumed, one day we got a registered letter from my dad, containing dollars which my mother quickly exchanged on the black market, and a photograph of a man with gold-rimmed spectacles, which my mother intermittently peered at and hugged to her bosom as she sobbed: "Look, what's become of my Baruch?"

The stranger in the photograph had a trimmed beard and no *peyes*, which aroused criticism among the adults, re-echoed by the neighbors' children—"that Baruch has become a real *goy* in America," and envy—because the trimmed whiskers and gold-rimmed spectacles testified to father's rise in the world, for only the affluent could afford gold-rimmed glasses and would dare trim their beards.

And as it is forbidden to invoke God's name in vain, so I forbade myself to invoke father's name too often, just bearing him in mind whenever a scornful male stared me down from underneath his prayer-shawl. Even in boastful conversation with other children I referred to him as "He in America," and rarely said "Father," for fear of an *eiya hara* (evil eye). America was something special among countries and a father in America was something special among men, and I couldn't believe that it had really happened to me. Perhaps I had lost my mind, and all this was a delusion and my mother and grandmother, brother and neighbors were all in on a great conspiracy to humor me as they humored the

town loon who pinned potato-peels to his chest and boasted that they were decorations for valor given him by Emperor Franz Joseph himself.

But evidence grew that it was not a dream. There were, for example, the periodic registered letters from America, ceremoniously delivered by the postman. He was invited in for *haleh* and whiskey whenever he brought one, and as mother searched for her spectacles and a pencil to sign the receipt, the mailman would sit at the table, wiping his moustache and discoursing on the virtues of America and how fortunate the "*Zhidi*" were, in having relatives there. But as the evidence multiplied, so did my anxiety that it was all a grand hoax staged especially for me because of everyone's compassion for a "living *yosem*."

I was unconvinced even when my mother called in a dealer to appraise our furniture, and when she finally decided that she would rather distribute it among the neighbors than sell it for the low price he offered and expose it to the indignity of "falling into improper hands." Nothing could really convince me, not even that last parting visit with mother to relatives and neighbors, when the sobbing was loud as at funerals and on the prescribed annual visits to the cemetery. When we returned from our relatives, there was a carriage waiting at our door, and, after some more tearful hugging and kissing, we piled in and were off to the railroad station on the first leg of our journey to America.

MANY things happened, and several seasons passed between that carriage trip and my first meeting with father. There were the many days spent in queues in consular offices, waiting for visas, humid days with people fainting from heat and tension and winter days with people collapsing from exhaustion; mother tightly holding my hand and pushing me towards stern officials at desks and pleading "for this poor child's sake" when all other pleas failed.

It all culminated in another railway

trip and incarceration in the immigrants' assembly center in Danzig, with its barbed wire fences and steaming disinfection hall, where we were all forced under showers that spouted simultaneously ice-cold and scalding water, had our clothes deloused and our heads shaved, and were assigned places in a tremendous drafty dormitory cut up into innumerable rows of three-tier berths. I pinched my cheeks even then, and later too, when we were assigned our berths in the three-tier steerage dormitory of the vessel that was taking us to America, for I couldn't believe that I had a father in America and that we were actually on our way to him.

When the passengers crowded along the railings on the decks for a sight of the Statue of Liberty and of their American kin waving to them from rocking little boats that had come out to meet our ship, I was down with chicken pox and high fever. It was in the ward for contagious diseases on Ellis Island that I first met my father. I was burning up with a temperature of 104, and eagles screamed above my head and breakers swept over me, pinning me down.

Above this confusion of pounding and screaming, the nurse's voice came softly to me in several languages—"fater, father, daddy, *tate*,"—and my eyes focused on the low partition across the threshold where in a rubber cape, with rubber gloves, provided by the hospital, on his hands, stood a grey-bearded old man, tears streaming down his face. "*Kind*," he said and his voice broke. "*Mein kind*." I was overwhelmed with pity for that man. "It's nothing, father, it's nothing," I shouted above the pounding tide, for the first time in my life addressing anyone as father. Until then all friendly males were "uncle" to me.

The nurse nudged the pitiful apparition of an old Jew, and he slunk timidly away—even as I had done, to escape compassion and the dole, when fathers distributed *haleh* to their children in Tarnopol's synagogue in the twilights when holidays peter out.

But from then on, I no longer doubted. This was real. This was my father, tears

streaming down his cheeks, timid even before a female nurse, unable to reach out to me across partitions, nudged and reminded when his time was up and guided away from me down cavernous, circuitous corridors. I felt let-down and yet happy, conscious that I would be more at ease with him than I might have been with the poised, elegant, omnipotent father I had dreamed of when his letters began coming from America.

MANY were the times I saw him cry after that.

The years of separation had not been easy, neither for father nor for mother. The routine misunderstandings between husband and wife were exacerbated by what years of abstinence and the strain of becoming re-accustomed to each other had done to their nerves.

Quarrels always ended with father slamming the door like a domineering male and slinking down the steps like a chased-away kitten, and letting himself in again near midnight, inwardly chastened but outwardly belligerent and taciturn, prowling in the kitchen for food. They had quarreled before dinner, and he had eaten nothing since breakfast. Mother, on her bed, leaning on her elbows—alert to the noises in the kitchen, waiting for him to speak first, but pride finally giving way to compassion—would call out: "Don't rummage. I'll go down and give you. Your dinner is still waiting." Father, still proud and hurt, would grumble: "Do me no favors. I'm not asking you. I don't want your food." I would then slip off my bed, quietly so mother couldn't hear me, and go into the kitchen and find father leaning sideways against the wall, his hand over his eyes as he held it during prayers, his shoulders shaking with sobs. I would go to him and stay there until he looked up and saw me. Sometimes he would push me off: "Go, go to your mother, you're your mother's son." But more often he would pat my head and we would agree that I'd go to sleep if he did too.

I RESENTED my father's meekness only on Friday nights and Saturdays when we attended synagogue. Recalling my fatherless years in the Tarnopol synagogue, awed by the fierce, forbidding men shielding their children in the folds of tent-like soiled prayer-shawls, I yearned for him to be the father I had dreamed of. He failed me inevitably.

The trustees of the East Side synagogues were, for the most part, untutored but affluent men, one-time tailors who were now jobbers and manufacturers employing scores of workers. It was their view that the synagogue was primarily a social center where at least once a week one could meet with *landsleit* for an exchange of gossip before and during services. My father was always a leader of the "learned opposition," talmudic scholars who maintained that services should be prefaced by study. The synagogues were small and the laughter and loud talk of the "*grobe yungen*" (ignoramuses) would drown out the low sing-song of the scholars and confuse their abstruse dialectic discourse.

Often one of the "*grobe yungen*," made restive by his inferiority, would reach across the "learners'" heads, pound his fist on their table, and willfully announce that it was time for the services to commence.

"Since when have you become that pious?" a "learner" would retort. "There is time for both, study and prayers. No hurry." This inevitably precipitated a crisis, and my father always found himself in the position of spokesman for the "learners," or "*sheine yidden*" (beautiful Jews), as the "*grobe yungen*" ironically called them.

And one of the "*grobe yungen*" would heatedly tell him off.

"We don't need *sheine yidden* here. America judges people by their wealth, not by their beards," he would yell, and father, his throat choked with tears, would hurriedly fold his *tallis* and, holding my hand tightly, hurry out of synagogue "for ever and ever," expecting the other "*sheine yidden*" to follow him.

They never did. But out of the trustees'

sight they would visit father to prevail upon him to return to the synagogue and not to take the matter "to heart." "Why should you let *grobe yungen* chase you out?" they would argue. These, however, were not the terms on which my father was willing to return to their synagogue. He expected the "*grobe yungen*," the trustees themselves, to come and plead with him.

Soon envoys from other synagogues began visiting father. Mother would produce a new table cloth, serve steaming tea in glasses and cookies in a big bowl, as the envoys nodded their heads appreciatively at my father's talmudic discourse and invited him to attend their synagogues.

"We are not like those *grobe yungen*, we want the sweet voice of a learner raised beneath our roofs on Saturdays."

My father would accept their invitation and for the first few weeks feel truly elated. "Ah, they certainly know how to pay their respects to a scholar," he would boast.

But the novelty soon wore off, and the "*grobe yungen*" of the new synagogue too raised their voices in talk and laughter and grunted when father pleaded with them to speak more softly. And soon one of them would begin making remarks within father's earshot, and within less than two months father would be fleeing this synagogue too, as he had so often done before, and as his forebear Jacob fled before Esau, and as the Jews fled before Pharaoh.

Defeated, a DP from the neighborhood's synagogues, he would pace the floor of our three-room tenement apartment, his fingers tearing at his face, his shoulders heaving with sobs. Mother, leaning on her elbow in bed, would call: "Enough is enough, go to sleep," and he would turn on her angrily: "Who is asking you?" Offended, she would retort: "You yell like a *meshugener*, no wonder you can't get along with people." That was a stab at his heart.

I pitied him and pitied myself at such moments, as I saw the rapid shrinking of the great father image that sustained me in the awesome male-forest of Tarnopol.

THE MONTH IN HISTORY

THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL

Mandate's End—US and UN—The Arabs Move

MAURICE J. GOLDBLOOM

End of the Mandate

ON May 15, 1948, Great Britain surrendered the mandate over Palestine which she had held for a quarter of a century. On the same day, David Ben Gurion proclaimed the establishment of the state of Israel. Eleven minutes after it had officially come into being, the new state received *de facto*—though not yet *de jure*—recognition from the United States of America.

Actually, British rule in Palestine had been for months largely fictitious. British troops had been withdrawn from one area after another, and even where they remained, they had been able or willing to do little more than protect themselves and carry messages between the belligerent forces of Zionists and Arabs. Their presence had, however, a certain juridical significance. So long as Britain nominally retained the

mandate, the Arab states could not officially send their armies onto Palestinian soil without invading territory under the British flag. At the same time, it was still possible for the debate on Palestine's future to continue at Lake Success, and for optimists to hope that some way would there be found to halt the bloodshed.

But in and around Palestine, the five and a half months between the passage of the UN Assembly's partition resolution and the end of British rule had been a period of military preparation on both sides, and of skirmishes building up to full scale war. And at Lake Success there had been a period of futile search, first for a way of carrying out the Assembly resolution, and then for one of replacing it. Now, with the end of the period of grace, the makers of war were ready, but the makers of peace were not.

Certainly the special session of the Assembly, called at American insistence to consider once again the problem of Palestine, had contributed little to its solution. Nations which had reluctantly yielded to the pressure of the United States in favor of partition in November were unready, five months later, to yield again to pressure from the same source for its revocation in favor of trusteeship. Perhaps they would have been more willing to do so, had there been any evidence that the United States had considered the implications of its new position any more thoroughly than it had those of the old one. But, so far as could be seen, this was not the case. Hence the readiness of the United States to jump from the certainly uncomfortable frying pan, into what appeared to be an equally

IN TIMES when the month-by-month march of events is of such a character as to give little comfort to the hopes of men in general, and perhaps of Jews in particular, it is the thankless but necessary task of the writer of this department to winnow out the facts from the welter of belief, propaganda, actuality, and emotion that constitutes present-day public information and opinion. MAURICE J. GOLDBLOOM has had many years of experience as a news analyst, and brings to his work of appraisal here a rich store of knowledge in modern history and international affairs. The judgments expressed here are, of course, those of the writer, and in no sense represent or reflect official policy. Mr. Goldbloom was associate editor of the magazine *Common Sense*. He was born in New York City in 1911 and is a graduate of Columbia University.

uncomfortable fire, failed to inspire eager emulation on the part of the other delegations.

True, trusteeship could have worked if the Zionists had been willing to accept it, just as partition could have worked if the Arabs had acquiesced. But in neither case was this condition of feasibility met. It was easy enough to adduce arguments to show that the Arabs of Palestine and of the neighboring countries would profit more by peaceful cooperation with the Zionists than by war against them, and that the Jews of Palestine and of the world would be far better off under a settlement acceptable to the Arabs than if they insisted on one which the Arabs were determined to resist. But it was another thing to make these arguments appear persuasive to the leaders of one camp or the other, particularly in view of the fact that the leaders on both sides felt the pressure behind them of a nationalist hysteria which they had helped to create but could not control.

Partition by Default

If the special session of the Assembly was unable to devise any substitute for partition which could command the necessary support, neither did it succeed in doing anything to implement the November 29 resolution. No council of government for the Arab state envisaged in the partition plan was set up, or even seriously thought of. No steps were taken to create a trusteeship for Jerusalem. Nothing was done about creating the economic union, without which partition could never be more than vivisection. Even the British proposal for a temporary emergency regime, without political character and designed merely to maintain the essential services which had to exist on an all-Palestinian basis if they were to exist at all, fell by the wayside.

Hence what actually came into being on May 15 was a government exerting military control over a fluctuating area—by no means identical with that assigned to the Jewish state under the partition resolution—but with all aspects of its economy except one completely disrupted. Of course this one—the financial aid which it received from the Diaspora, and particularly the United States—was crucial, but it was hardly a basis on which the new state could build its future.

Only two constructive results had come out of the special session. One was the appointment by the British, in agreement with both Jews and Arabs, of Harold Evans as municipal commissioner for Jerusalem. Evans, a Quaker from Philadelphia, was given broad authority but no instruments for enforcing it. Yet, since both sides trusted him—as they clearly did not trust either the British or the UN itself—it seemed possible that he might succeed in arranging a truce for Jerusalem where others had failed. Both Zionists and Arabs were, in principle, committed to the desirability of such a truce. But as first one side and then the other had held the upper hand militarily, it had sought to postpone the truce until after its expected victory.

The other achievement of the Assembly was the decision to have the five permanent members of the Council—acting as a committee of the Assembly—appoint a mediator to seek agreement between Jews and Arabs in regard to the Palestinian situation in general. Perhaps because the veto did not apply in a committee of the Assembly, perhaps merely because the mediator had been carefully stripped of any actual or potential power, the Big Five found no difficulty in unanimously agreeing on Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden for the job. Count Bernadotte accepted the task, while making no secret of the fact that he did not expect to succeed in it. Perhaps in the hope of clothing himself with more authority than a mere representative of the United Nations could possess, he announced that he wished to be regarded as a representative of the International Red Cross.

The War

The new state found itself at war on many fronts. Indeed, the war antedated the state. Most of the battlefields had been, and still were, outside the territory assigned to the Jewish state by the partition resolution of the Assembly. (This fact was cited by the British representative in the Security Council, Sir Alexander Cadogan, as one of the reasons why it would be difficult to determine who was actually the aggressor.) Even before the British had left, the Irgun and Haganah had joined to seize control of Jaffa, inhabited entirely by Arabs and assigned by the

UN to the Arab state. Similarly, Haganah had begun its assault on Acre—also in the territory allotted by the Assembly to the Arabs—well before the British had left, although that historic fortress-city did not capitulate until some days after the proclamation of the state of Israel. Again, the approaches to Jerusalem, for which Haganah had unsuccessfully battled since early April, were all in Arab territory. And in Jerusalem itself, where the partition resolution had provided that neither Jews nor Arabs should exercise jurisdiction or have armed forces, Haganah had seized control of the Arab Katamon quarter while the mandate was still in force, and had occupied the central portion of the city as soon as the British left.

The locale of the fighting was not, of course, the consequence of Arab self-restraint. In part, it resulted from the fact that the boundaries set by the partition resolution assumed full cooperation between Jews and Arabs. Without such cooperation, they were unworkable—particularly in the case of the Jewish state, two of whose three sections were islands entirely surrounded by Arabs, as was Jerusalem itself. Hence the Jewish state was faced with the alternatives of accepting the isolation of Jerusalem, sacrificing Galilee and the Negev, and confining itself to the coastal strip between Tel Aviv and Haifa, or invading the territory allotted to the Arabs. It chose the latter.

The attacks on Jaffa and Acre, however, were not necessitated by the geography of partition. They appeared, rather, to be the result of Haganah's determination to seize all possible positions of vantage before the regular armies of the Arab states could enter into the battle and neutralize its advantages of numbers and equipment.

With the end of the mandate and the entrance into action of the regular armies of the Arab states, the balance of strength was altered in favor of the Arabs. As a result, although the principal fighting continued to be in and around Jerusalem, the territory of Israel was also brought under attack. In the case of the coastal plain—now almost solidly Jewish, since the flight of one hundred and fifty thousand Arab inhabitants of the area—this was for the moment confined to raids by the Egyptian air force. In the Negev, however, the Egyptian army

advanced up through the Arab coastal area to Gaza and then cut across to Beersheba, effectively controlling most of that desert area. And in Galilee, while most of the territory allotted to the Jewish state was still in the hands of Haganah, troops of Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan had all won a foothold. And Haganah had apparently abandoned completely any hope of defending isolated colonies in Arab areas.

Militarily, the Negev appeared untenable for the forces of the new state. True, a sufficient concentration of them might succeed in recovering it from the Egyptians. But the maintenance in the desert of a garrison sufficient to hold the area was a task which appeared beyond the capacity of Haganah. In Galilee, the situation was somewhat more favorable to Israel. Here, the numerous colonies formed an interlocking chain of bases for its forces. But the mobilization of the entire male population, and the evacuation of women and children, meant that the fields went untended. Communications with the coastal area were inadequate and uncertain. And the principal electric supply of Galilee, from the Ruthenberg hydroelectric plant at Naharayim in Transjordan, was cut off by King Abdullah.

It was in the Jerusalem area, however, that the intervention of the Arab regulars appeared most likely to produce decisive results in the immediate future. Here, Haganah had held the advantage in the city itself, although unable to break the blockade which Fawzi el Kawukji's irregulars had erected around it, or to maintain the city's water and electric supplies. But with the Arab Legion's entrance into the battle, the tide shifted. Almost immediately Kfar Etzion and its satellite colonies, five miles south of Jerusalem, fell to the Legion. (At first, Haganah reported that the entire population of Kfar Etzion had been massacred after surrendering, and spoke of accusing Glubb Pasha as a war criminal; later word was received through the Red Cross from the colonists that they had been taken prisoner and were being treated in accordance with the Geneva convention.) Shortly thereafter, the Legion recaptured the strategic Sheik Jarrah quarter from Haganah, as well as extending Arab control inside the Old City.

The Nations

Meanwhile, at Lake Success, the Security Council took up where the General Assembly had left off. Its effectiveness was not notably greater than that of the lesser body. First, it submitted to all the parties in the conflict a questionnaire as to the activities of their forces in Palestine and on its borders, their justification for such activities, and the status of peace negotiations. Transjordan refused to answer on the grounds that it had not been admitted to the United Nations or recognized by the United States, which had framed the questionnaire. The Jewish Agency's representative, Major Aubrey Eban, replied on behalf of Israel that its troops were in control of most of the territory allotted to it under the partition resolution, as well as certain other parts of Palestine, but that they had not operated outside of Palestine except for occasional forays. Palestine's Arab neighbors told the Council that their troops were operating in Palestine at the request of the Arab population for the purpose of restoring order, repatriating Arab refugees, and suppressing Zionist terrorist bands. They added that they were taking this action as a regional organization under the terms of the UN Charter. The Arabs declared that they would undertake no negotiations with a Jewish state; the Agency declared that it had tried to negotiate with Transjordan but had been rebuffed. While waiting for the replies to its questions—none of which arrived by the deadline which it set for them—the Council whiled away the time by debating whether the war in Palestine constituted a threat to the peace, and if so, whether anybody was an aggressor against whom sanctions should be employed. A United States motion to declare the situation such a threat, and to order a cease-fire on penalty of the invocation of sanctions, was defeated. In its place, the Council adopted a British motion which declared that since the parties in Palestine had failed to heed the Council's previous appeals for a truce, it was issuing another one. It also directed the UN's truce commission in Jerusalem, consisting of the American, French, and Belgian consuls, to give first priority to the negotiation of a truce for that city. (Since they had presumably been doing precisely that all along, and since their latest reports indicated that

the fighting had more or less isolated them from one another—a fact which was emphasized by the killing of the American Consul-General and the occasional bombardment of all three consulates—the last request seemed somewhat gratuitous.) The willingness of Israel to accept a truce was communicated to the UN by a representative of the Jewish Agency. (The question was raised by Britain whether the Agency could commit the Irgun and Stern gangs.) The Arabs, however, requested an extension of the original deadline so that the Arab League could meet and consider the problem. It was rumored that the Arab states would refuse any general truce with a Jewish state, but were willing to agree to a truce for Jerusalem provided all armed forces of both sides were removed from that city and Jewish convoys into it were subject to inspection by the Red Cross to make sure that they contained no military supplies. Meanwhile, however, Britain exerted herself to induce the Arabs to heed the UN's cease-fire appeal, and the Foreign Ministry was reported hopeful.

One obstacle to a halt in the Palestinian war was the complete lack of coordination between British and American policy. While Britain continued to deliver military supplies already ordered by the Arabs, and to permit British officers to continue to serve with the Arab Legion, President Truman received Dr. Weizmann and permitted him to leave with the impression that Israel would receive a loan for the purchase of military supplies from the United States. Britain's action produced hysterical demands that she be deprived of all aid under the Marshall Plan; that of the United States substantially reduced the chance that the Arabs would agree to a halt in the fighting, since if a flow of American aid to Israel was in prospect, any temporary truce could only work to the relative disadvantage of the Arabs.

In Palestine as elsewhere, the key to what occurred at Lake Success lay not in the debates of Security Council or Assembly, but in the decisions of the very sovereign member states. From this point of view, the action of the United States in according *de facto* recognition to Israel, and of the Soviet Union in recognizing it *de jure*, was of major importance to the new state. To be sure, other states were hesitant to follow the example of either US or USSR in this

respect. Britain withheld recognition, and urged the Dominions to do likewise, lest recognition of Israel make it more difficult to persuade the Arabs to a truce. (South Africa, however, did recognize Israel.) France likewise failed to recognize the new state—although her Chamber of Deputies sent it a message of fraternal greetings.

Juridically, of course, the *de facto* recognition which Israel received from the United States was not of too much value. It entitled the new government to receive complaints if American interests were damaged within its jurisdiction, but it did not yet render the new state eligible for the loans it sought from governmental or inter-governmental agencies. (On the other hand, it seemed rather definitely to make the American members of the Jewish Agency subject to the Foreign Agents Registration Act.) Yet morally, there was no doubt that even *de facto* recognition offered the new state substantial encouragement. Moreover, it was generally regarded as a prelude to early recognition *de jure*.

The Arabs

However valuable recognition from the United States and the Soviet Union might be to the new state, recognition from even one of the Arab countries would be worth far more. But of this there seemed no prospect. At various times Zionists had placed their hopes on Christian Lebanon and on Abdullah's Transjordan. But Lebanon had been a principal source of volunteers and support for the Arab Liberation Army, while Abdullah had accepted the post of commander-in-chief of the forces of all the Arab states.

Zionists had counted, too, on the rivalries of the various Arab countries and their internal discontents as barriers to effective intervention. Both rivalries and discontents certainly existed. But so far, at least, they had served as a spur rather than a deterrent to intervention. There were signs of a race between the various Arab armies to occupy coveted parts of Palestine. But Israel hardly seemed likely to be the gainer, whether Egypt or Transjordan annexed the Negev. As for the internal discontents in the Arab states, these made intervention inevitable. Any Arab government which had hung back would have faced immediate replace-

ment by one more ready to carry out the desires of a nationalistic populace—just as any sign of weakness on the part of Zionist leadership might transfer the initiative to the Irgun and Stern gangs. On the other hand, an Arab government engaged in defending the rights of Palestinian Arabs had a moral argument of great value against its domestic opposition. For the latter could be accused of stabbing the Arab cause in the back. This fact, incidentally, cast some doubt on the validity of those military calculations which were based on the assumption that the Arab states would have to keep half their regular forces at home as a guarantee against internal disorders. Potential opponents could easily be mobilized for service in Palestine, just as Haganah had accepted the services of Irgunists and Sternists.

Nevertheless, a decisive Arab victory did not seem likely for some time, at least. The forces of the Arab states were almost certainly not sufficient to overrun the coastal area, which contained the bulk of Palestine's Jews. Though their equipment seemed, on the whole, to be temporarily superior to that of Haganah, this was a situation which could easily change. Israel held ports through which military supplies could come, and seemed likely to be able for some time to devote greater financial resources to their acquisition than could the Arabs—albeit at the sacrifice of other goals. It had, too, factories for the manufacture of munitions whose capacity probably exceeded that of the combined Arab states.

This situation was, of course, subject to a quick and drastic change if Pakistan should join the Arab League and commit even a significant part of its resources to the struggle. For Pakistan had more trained soldiers than the entire population of Israel, as well as quantities of modern munitions which would loom very large in a war on the scale of that in Palestine. There were some indications that this might conceivably occur. Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's delegate to the UN, was reported to have attended the session of the Arab League at which plans for the invasion of Palestine were prepared, and to have pressed for action. And Pakistan's own internal discontents might well furnish Mohammed Ali Jinnah the necessary incentive to a military adventure abroad—especially

one which gave promise of quick and not too difficult glory.

On the other hand, it was possible that Pakistan hoped to use the threat of intervention as a weapon for the achievement of a compromise settlement. In the debate at Lake Success, Zafrullah Khan at one point was reported to have suggested that he might change his mind about partition if the Jews would be content with those areas in which they were presently the majority. While the Arabs would almost certainly reject such a proposal from any other source, it was not impossible that they would accede to it if it were advanced by the world's largest Moslem state. Nor was it altogether out of the question that such Zionist leaders as Chaim Weizmann and even David Ben Gurion would prefer the peaceful possession of a smaller state to war for a larger one—especially if it were clear that the war would be a losing one.

Even if Pakistan held aloof, however, the Jewish state seemed to stand no chance of a decisive military victory. It might win many battles, but unless it could arrive at an agreement with at least part of the Arab world, such victories would simply serve to further exacerbate Arab nationalism and result in the assembling of new armies on the soil of the Arab states. Even intervention by UN or the great powers could not alter this fact. For, though a UN force might serve to prevent any particular invasion, it could not be expected—and the new state certainly would not wish it—to remain forever. But whenever it left, the Arabs would still be there.

It was probably a realization of this on the part of most Zionist leaders which led to the ambivalence with which they regarded Abdullah of Transjordan and his Arab Legion. For, much as they feared the Legion as an opponent, they had never given up hoping that Abdullah might be amenable to a deal whereby he recognized the Jewish state in return for its assistance in annexing the Arab parts of Palestine. Indeed, sources close to the Zionist leadership had even hinted at a readiness to negotiate with Abdullah on a basis of incorporation of the Jewish state in an Arab federation under his rule—provided that it retain complete autonomy in all matters, including immigration. And at the same

time as they excoriated the British for continuing their subsidy to the Arab Legion, some Zionists counted on that subsidy as an instrument for influencing Abdullah in their direction.

Whatever the prospects of such a deal at some future date, they did not seem bright at the moment. One reason for this was that there was no place in such a plan for the Egyptian occupation of the Negev, and no likelihood of an Egyptian withdrawal from that area except in the face of superior force. It was also questionable whether even Abdullah's absolute monarchy would stand the strain of a deal with the Zionists on any basis not approved by the other Arab states. Certainly the rather unstable throne of his relatives in Iraq would be in serious danger in such an event.

The Children of Israel

Not all the obstacles to an agreement were on the Arab side of the fence, however. For the moment, to be sure, the more extreme elements in Israel appeared to be held more or less in check. This was indicated by the election of Chaim Weizmann, always a spokesman for moderation, as President, with the support of all parties except the Revisionists. (The Zionist Organization of America, which had a few weeks earlier sent out a press release gloating over the lack of attention received by Weizmann's "defeatist" views, was of course not represented in the Jewish National Council which named him President.) But the Irgun and Sternists, if now part of the national forces of Israel, remained none the less Irgunists and Sternists. This was made clear by the Irgun's leader, Menahem Beigin, in a radio address in which he declared that his forces would cease from terrorist activity within the confines of the state of Israel, but would continue to fight until they had conquered all of Palestine and Transjordan. And ten days before their leader was made a major in the forces of Israel, the Sternists had assassinated seven British soldiers in what the Haganah described as a "cowardly, murderous attack." Since such words and deeds were not only permitted in the Jewish state, but those responsible for them were recognized as part of its army, even the best disposed Arab had reason to wonder whether Israel would actually be able to

carry out any undertaking to keep the peace.

A continued state of war would almost certainly result in a strengthening of the extremists and a weakening of democratic tendencies in Israel. Other disastrous consequences could also be expected to flow from it. Total mobilization of Haganah meant that the economy of Jewish Palestine would come to an almost complete halt, the more so since the Arabs who furnished an important part of its labor had already fled. Nor could this lack be made up by the entrance of new immigrants, since preparation for the reception of immigrants also required large quantities of labor. (Indeed, housing had fallen far behind in the face of even the limited immigration permitted in recent years. Thus Louis Kraft, secretary of the Jewish Welfare Board's national council, reported that a large part of Jerusalem's Jews lacked "even the simplest amenities of decent living" and that this fact had led to a high delinquency rate. Nor had the housing situation been improved by the destruction consequent on civil war.) And it went without saying that as long as the war lasted Palestine would have room only for the young and healthy.

At the same time, war meant that Israel would be cut off from a large part of the resources essential to its economic development. It was all very well to talk about TVA's on the Jordan, but only one side of one part of the Jordan was in the Jewish state—and in one of its most exposed sections, at that. There could be no development of the Jordan, either for power or for irrigation, without the cooperation of not only Arab Palestine but the Arab states as well. And without such development, there could be little hope of significantly expanding Israel's absorptive capacity, or even making it economically viable. Again, one of the first results of the war had been the forced abandonment of the Palestine Potash Company's plants on the Dead Sea, since these were in Arab territory. And the chemicals of the Dead Sea were, next to the water of the Jordan, Palestine's most important natural resource. Similarly, the war had put out of action one of Palestine's chief industrial assets, the oil refineries of Haifa. These had been closed down after the massacre of Jewish employees which followed Irgun's murder of a number of Arab workers. Now, of

course, the Arab workers had fled Haifa, so that it would have been difficult to reopen the refineries even if the oil were available. But the pipelines to Haifa originated in and passed for almost their entire length through Arab territory, so that it was obvious that no oil would flow through them as long as the war continued.

The effects of the war on Jewish culture in Palestine were less immediately obvious but no less tragic from the point of view of those Zionists who had dreamed of that country as the center of a Jewish cultural renaissance. (Palestine was not the only place where Jewish culture seemed likely to suffer. In the United States, the Jewish Education Association reported that it had been unable to raise its \$175,000 budget because of the financial demands of the Jewish state.) No people existing in a permanent state of mobilization had ever developed a significant culture. And a Jewish Sparta hardly seemed a consummation to be wished.

Nevertheless, there were few Zionists either in the Yishuv or the Diaspora who were today ready to settle for less than a state, even if that state were condemned to the permanent role of a nation in arms. Some of them—particularly at a distance—even seemed rather to relish the picture of Israel as a David surrounded by Goliaths whom it would perpetually beat off. Most—particularly in Palestine—seemed ready to accept it with resignation.

Talk of Peace

IT WAS not only in respect to Palestine that the UN's role appeared to be that of the chorus in Greek tragedy, able only to bewail the approach of a foreordained doom but never to act to avert it. In the midst of the Palestine discussion the decision of the UN's Atomic Energy Commission to abandon its attempt to reach agreement passed almost unnoticed. Yet it represented surrender on a front where surrender was disastrous. The primary blame for the failure to arrive at an agreement for the international control of the atom was, of course, Soviet Russia's. The United States had advanced the Baruch Plan, under which we would surrender our monopoly of atomic weapons and our right to make them in return for the establishment of an adequate system of international control and inspec-

tion. The Soviet Union had steadfastly refused to submit to any such system. Yet it was also true that American enthusiasm for the Baruch Plan had noticeably waned since its introduction, and that there were many in the service departments who were only too glad to use Russian intransigence as an excuse to let the whole thing drop and retain the bomb for future reference.

A similar situation emerged in connection with the exchange of notes between the United States and Russia relative to their outstanding differences. A statement by the US ambassador in Moscow, to the effect that American foreign policy would remain the same whatever the election results but that we were always ready to discuss points of difference with the Soviet Union, was seized on by the latter as a bid to a conference and promptly "accepted." In the ensuing discussion, a number of facts became quite clear. One of them was that the State Department had not meant to propose any conference, and that the Russians knew it. Another was that the Russians had showed no recent signs of retreating from the adamant positions they had taken in a number of current negotiations, such as those over the Austrian treaty, so that there was little reason to believe that any conference would be fruitful of anything except recrimination. Unfortunately, however, it also became fairly clear that the State Department was by no means ready to offer a program for the peaceful settlement of outstanding issues, and was therefore very much afraid of a conference, lest the Soviet Union put it on the spot. And there

was at least a suspicion that some elements in Washington would have been exceedingly annoyed at any Soviet-American agreement, even if it were possible, at a time when the military budget and peacetime conscription were before Congress.

Yet the people of the world desperately wanted peace. Hence a peace offensive, however motivated, remained an effective political instrument. The advantage in the diplomatic exchange therefore appeared to rest, for the moment, with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the possibility existed that Russia was actually ready to make some concessions in return for a settlement at this point. Obviously, she had no chance to win a war for many years to come. And the increasingly firm policy of the Western powers seemed likely to have convinced her at last that she had reached the limits of peaceful expansion.

True, the Russian approaches had scarcely seemed calculated to produce a favorable response. Yet this might merely indicate that the Russian foreign office had so little experience with diplomatic amenities that it was unable to be polite even when it wished to.

Perhaps a key to the extent and sincerity of Russia's current desire for peace would emerge from the situation in Finland. There, the Communist Minister of the Interior had been dismissed from his post, which involved control of the police, after a parliamentary vote of censure. If the Soviet Union stood aside while he was replaced by a non-Communist, it would indicate a definitely conciliatory mood. But if Russian pressure precipitated a crisis in Finland, then the hope for peace in our time would be dim.

FROM THE AMERICAN SCENE

SPRUCETON JEWRY ADJUSTS ITSELF

Portrait Sketch of a New England Community

IRVING HOWE

FOR some time I had heard fragmentary reports from several friends whose childhood was spent in Spruceton. Strange reports. . . . A Jewish community, some years ago on the verge of disintegration, now thriving, self-confident, "modernized." Yet a community not quite at peace with itself. Certainly, Spruceton's Jewish old-timers, the parents of my friends, were far from happy over the boasted "modernization." What clash of values, perhaps a local version of large problems, was taking place in this isolated Jewish community?

I took the train to Spruceton. The idea of such a trip was itself an adventure; a New Yorker going "to the country" . . . and not for a vacation!

SPRUCETON is a sprawling city of 28,000 people. Its long Main Street is dreary

IN "New Haven: The Jewish Community" (COMMENTARY, November 1947) Charles Reznikoff drew a portrait of the Jewry of a middle-sized New England city. Here is a picture, by another pen and in a different key, of a smaller New England community. (The town described is a real one, but the author has thought it well not to give its identity here.) IRVING HOWE's somewhat acrid appraisal may evoke disagreement, but also, we think, it offers material for sober reflection. Mr. Howe wrote "The Lost Young Intellectual" (COMMENTARY, October 1946) and has written articles and reviews for *Politics*, *Partisan Review*, and the *Nation*. He was born in New York City in 1920, and attended Brooklyn College and the College of the City of New York. He now lives in Princeton, New Jersey.

and ugly, but in its residential sections one does find that relaxed graciousness one likes to think characteristic of New England.

Spruceton has not taken any special pains to attract industry and rather prides itself on retaining something of the quality and aroma of pre-industrial New England. While Spruceton's few industries—a tannery, a railroad installation, a large printing plant, and several granite quarries—are becoming increasingly important to its economic life, they are still peripheral in the Spruceton society. The labor movement, for all its impressive membership of some two thousand in the AFL and several hundred in the CIO, exerts no major influence in the city.

The starkly visible extremes of status that cleave most American industrial cities are not evident in Spruceton. It has few mansions; the "aristocracy" of "Mortgage Hill" is small and without inordinate social power. Nor are there any slum areas: Spruceton has few unskilled workers and no Negro sub-proletariat. Most of its residents are "middle-class," in status and outlook.

This economic homogeneity is matched by an almost equally considerable racial homogeneity. Small Greek and Italian pockets, some French Canadians, and about sixty Jewish families comprise its "foreign" element. All the others are "native stock"—Protestant, Anglo-Saxon, solid, conservative.

Politically, Spruceton is of course Republican, and that without any of the scandalous concessions to the two-party system found in the southern parts of New England. One of the Spruceton Jews to whom I spoke told me that he was a Democrat (and a PM

reader!) but that he registered Republican. "In this town, if you don't register Republican, you might as well close shop." Probably that statement is an exaggeration. A number of Spruceton Jews had been sympathetic to the Democratic party, especially when it was headed by Roosevelt, but they did not take any pains to publicize this opinion.

Spruceton is overwhelmingly Protestant, though I did hear and overhear expressions of concern about the rapid multiplication of "mackerel-snappers," as Catholics are called. The local paper, edited by a conservative eccentric, has often sniped at the Catholics and, more recently, at the Jews, for their failure to assimilate themselves to the ways of Spruceton life—that is, to accept the mores of the majority group.

The New England equalitarian tradition, so industriously advertised by our nationalist historians, is here largely a memory of the past. What one encounters in both conversations and the local press is a rigid, heavy, almost eccentric conservatism. To be sure, this attitude is decent and polite—a demagogue like G.L.K. Smith would not find favor in Spruceton. But it soon becomes painfully evident that this is a New England with a withered and crotchety social imagination, a New England in which Sam Adams, Emerson, or Thoreau would not feel at home. Perhaps it is only the naivety of the New Yorker standing in involuntary awe of the great places of early American history, but I felt a certain disappointment at the invariably provincial and almost bigoted attitude of the many Spruceton people with whom I spoke. I found only one sign of intellectual ferment: a small chapter of the American Veterans Committee.

For all its gracious atmosphere, its aura of good living, and its lack of overt conflicts, Spruceton is full of subterranean tensions.

THERE are about 160 Jews in Spruceton, of whom the overwhelming majority are middle-class. (In this respect they are Spruceton's most representative group!) A few are rich—but most of the storekeepers and businessmen are just comfortably well off. There is a handful of Jewish workers but they exert no independent influence; Spruceton's temple is a congregation of solid businessmen. As I drove down Main Street one afternoon, my cab driver, after observing

that my nose pointed in the right direction (upward), remarked on the number of stores owned by Jews. He thought that "bad for the town."

In its own estimate, Spruceton's Jewish community is thriving as never before. Its members live in peace, undisturbed by any open enmities, and those given to reflection feel protected by the "New England tradition." They are prosperous and live in "nice homes." (I shall not here describe "nice homes.") And they are proud of their handsome temple, a religious and social center.

In recent years the Jewish community has come together under the leadership of an intelligent "modern" rabbi, who, I was proudly informed, is "a respected figure in the city." More Jews attend his services, more contribute to relief funds than ever before. Formerly a disintegrating remnant of Orthodoxy, Spruceton's Jewish community is now a lively center of Reform or "liberal" Judaism. True, a few old-timers grumble: they don't like the rabbi's modern ways, they look down upon the Americanized businessmen who have taken over leadership. But these old-timers are numerically insignificant; in a few years their voices will be stilled by death.

The Jewish community, at first blush, shows every sign of growth and vitality; it is even becoming an accepted part of Spruceton's social life. For most of Spruceton's Jews, this is the whole story; and from their point of view I could well end here. But let us probe a little deeper.

I PAID my first visit to the Old Man. His son, a friend of mine in New York, had told me that the Old Man knew more about Spruceton than anyone else.

When I first arrived at his dirty and littered junk shop, the Old Man hesitated to talk; he could not understand why anyone should find Spruceton interesting. He was more concerned with politics: Taft, a *trikener herring*; Dewey, a *leideger kop*; Churchill, an *imperialistisher banditt*; Attlee, a *sozialistischer schlemiel*. After I smiled my assent to these characterizations, he relaxed and began to reminisce. When I told him I brought greetings from his son, rapport was soon established. "A smart boy, my son, a *bissel tzu fiel gegen Stalin*, but a smart boy."

The Old Man was small, gentle, quite

shy. His face was not crinkled, but was blocked into a series of flat surfaces separated by sharp ridges. It is the kind of face one finds in pictures of 18th-century Jews.

The Old Man came to Spruceton in 1899, when the town had perhaps six or seven Jews living in self-imposed isolation. As more Jewish immigrants drifted in, most of them went "into business" as rag pickers and junk peddlers. They were neither integrated members of Spruceton's community nor a distinct group on its margin; they crept around in its interstices. Most, the Old Man smilingly recalled, were as poor as when "*di mame hat unz gehat*."

During those early years between the turn of the century and the First World War, the Old Man would hitch up his wagon and, together with the other peddlers, ride to Millberg, a large city nearby, for the High Holidays. As soon as there were enough Jews in Spruceton, they began holding their own services. But "*yiden zenen doch yiden*"—Jews being Jews—conflicts broke out within Spruceton's Jewish community. "Altogether we had maybe twenty men. So when we split into two *minyans*, each one used to fight for the tenth man." What was the reason for the split? That amused the Old Man: as if there had to be a reason! "Well"—he continued in his odd combination of Yiddish accent and Harvard broad "a"—"some of us were junk peddlers and others worked in a rag-sorting place; that's why there was a split. When they closed down the rag-sorting place, we had peace again."

For the high holidays, they would hire a prayer leader (*baltvilah*) and would play host to Jews from surrounding villages. Services were held on the ground floor of the house of the ritual slaughterer (*shoi-chet*). Once, the Old Man remembered, "a whole gang of Litvaks, noisy and hungry," descended on his house two days before Rosh Hashana: they were so isolated they didn't know the date of the holiday. "So we fed them. *A yid iz a yid*."

During the years before the First World War, the Jews usually lived on Spruceton's outskirts so that they might have space to store their junk. A few more adventurous souls became door-to-door drygoods peddlers and even opened up stores. Since they were viewed primarily as a curiosity, they met with little overt anti-Semitism. The Old

Man did recall one incident when his junk wagon was chased by boys shouting "Christ-killer!" "So I got down, waved my horse whip at them, and they ran away." Only those Jews forced to by their business arrangements mingled with the townspeople; the rest kept to themselves in the south end.

Shortly before the First World War a Jew, Jake Cohen, ran for mayor. He was of course defeated, but there was less of an anti-Semitic reaction than the more fearful Jews had expected and some of them, as the Old Man put it, felt they might now "come out of their holes and look up at the sun." Jake was apparently something of a character: a captain in the National Guard, always "one of the boys," and later a producer and actor in silent Western films. "An interesting life for a Jew," the Old Man said.

In the early 20's the placid life of Spruceton's Jews was disturbed by the first overt and, thus far, the most severe outbreak of anti-Semitism in the place. Locally, they were digging into business life and provoking resentment among Gentile competitors; nationally, the Ku Klux Klan was spreading race hatred, of which some even reached Spruceton. A branch of the KKK ("hoodledoods," the Old Man called them) was formed in the town and for a while it began to stir up anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish prejudice. The Jews became fearful, but the whole thing blew over in the halcyon prosperity of the middle 20's.

When the depression came, Spruceton was not so badly hit as most other New England towns. A nearby textile center became a ghost town, but Spruceton still had the state capital. However, New England's economic paralysis gradually spread there too, and many Jewish storekeepers had to go into bankruptcy and move away. Business failures, sharpening clashes between the old-timers and their modernized children, and internal religious disintegration all converged to make the depression the lowest point of Spruceton Jewry's history.

It is somewhat surprising that the radical political tendencies of that era did not particularly influence Spruceton's Jews. As a matter of fact, a branch of the Communist party, composed of Scandinavian granite workers, was formed in West Spruceton, but it had slight impact on the Jewish community. The older generation viewed all

politics with scepticism; the younger ones, who might have been more receptive to radical ideas, had largely left Spruceton.

THUS far the Old Man had a thorough grasp of his story, but now he was clearly at a loss to explain what had happened to the second generation of Spruceton's Jews, those born and reared there. To maintain chronological sequence, I will here interpolate what I learned from other sources.

Though reared in their parents' orthodoxy, many of these second-generation Jews rejected it when they reached maturity in the late 20's or early 30's. Those who had professional or intellectual ambitions were forced to leave Spruceton entirely, since it offered few opportunities for Jews in these fields. Some of their contemporaries who did remain in Spruceton married Gentiles. The rate of intermarriage for Spruceton's Jews is nineteen per cent and remains one of the community's irksome problems.

But even those members of the second generation who rejected religion still retained—if only because of their own uneasy status—a certain community with their parents. For instance, between the Old Man's remarks on Spruceton's Jews and those of his intellectual son there was a fairly close similarity of critical perception: both viewed history from the *outside*. It is remarkable that even those old-timers' sons who married Gentiles and were therefore driven from the fold still identify Jewishness with the ways of their parents; and to the degree that they identify themselves with both their parents and Jewishness, they concur in the old-timers' criticisms of "newcomers" and of the temple's Reform innovations. That, in some instances, their own children are being raised in non-Jewish faiths does not seem to affect this attitude.

It is not difficult to see why the Old Man, as he hesitantly and painfully talked about this second generation, should have found it perplexing. For all his worldliness and basic scepticism, he could not stretch his imagination enough to understand sympathetically either those who had drifted into cosmopolitan intellectuality or those who had intermarried. But when he rather hurriedly shifted the conversation to the next major stage in Spruceton Jewry's history, he was again secure and keen in his judgment.

IN THE middle and late 30's a new group of Jews, soon to become the dominant one, came to Spruceton. They were businessmen from various New England towns who set up stores and businesses in Spruceton. Most were successful and became what the Old Man laughingly called "*alrightnicks*." (Throughout his narrative there was an undercurrent of amused scepticism towards events, his own account of them, and my reception of his account. What did it mean, and what did it matter? And suppose one knew, what could be done about it? Perhaps this was to be expected from a man nearing his seventies, but perhaps—I will not be so bold as to say—it was an attitude that might be described as characteristically "Jewish.")

This group of *alrightnicks* soon became the pillar of the town's Jewish community. Why? How explain the fact that the group that knew least about and cared least for Judaism became the most active and sustaining section of the Jewish community? I posed these questions to the Old Man. Again his face creased with the irritation which inability to formulate his impressions into leading ideas seemed to cause him. He could not answer me, as he frankly admitted.

Above all else, the Old Man was a thoroughly honest human being. When I pressed him about the old-timers with whom he most readily identified himself (were they really so wonderful?), he admitted that for many of them religion was a mere routine, a rigid and meaningless formality. Though they now complained about the "liberal" rabbi's innovations, their own religious services were falling apart and were quite unable to attract younger elements.

Why then, since he was himself of such lively temperament and not really Orthodox, did the Old Man still consider himself closer to the old-timers than to any one else?

This seemed to be a crucial point; he thought very carefully before answering. His answer was not well formulated, but I think it came to something like this: The old-timers, mostly East European immigrants, continued to live within the emotional and intellectual shadow of the Pale; in that sense, for good or bad, they remained Jews, no matter what their politics, social status, or religious attitudes in America. Even, said the Old Man, when they became

"gevirim" (rich men) they continued in "yidishe vegen" (Jewish ways). But what did that mean exactly? Well, if they were money grubbers they were not the same kind as the members of the local Chamber of Commerce; if they were philistines they were not the same kind as the local Rotarians. But how were they different? "Zey hobn zich nisht gekocht in Amerikanerishe zachen." More than that I could not elicit from the Old Man, but what he seemed to be trying to suggest was that the old-timer Jews were not absorbed by Spruceton. They lived at one remove from it and were therefore able to retain, in no matter how attenuated a form, an attitude of *critical distance* towards American industrial society.

At this point the Old Man went out of his way to intimate that he himself, for all his attachment to the old ritual, was a non-believer. (He reads the *New Republic*.) His attachment to the old was to some extent a habit, but even more it was an unformulated esthetic appreciation.

Once he began to talk about the current conflict among Spruceton's Jews, the Old Man felt more sure of himself.

When the present rabbi—a cultured, intelligent man—came to Spruceton over a year ago, he began to institute certain innovations. One of them, perhaps most bitterly resented by the old-timers, was the installation of an organ in the temple. When the Old Man first heard about this, he passed it off with a joke: would the temple feature "hootchie-kootchie" dancers next? A crony of his, when asked about the organ, scornfully murmured, "Eh . . . es skripit." Others of the older generation, however, were neither so humorous nor so polite.

The conflict came to a head during the recent holidays when the rabbi read parts of the service in English and omitted other parts. This occasioned the Old Man's biting remark: "This is the first time I have ever seen a herring that has only a head and a tail." When I asked him if the *shofar* was blown on Yom Kippur, he replied that it was but that it sounded like a Boy Scout bugle: "Es hat nisht kein tam"—no flavor.

A handful of the old-timers embarked on a rather pathetic hegira: since they no longer could tolerate such heterodoxy, they abandoned the temple and went to Boston and other towns where they could pray in Ortho-

dox synagogues for the high holidays. But the Old Man remained in Spruceton. Why? "Vos vill ich loifen?" I think he meant to suggest by that cryptic remark that the gesture of protest was basically futile. One couldn't run away from the situation. In a larger city, Orthodox and Reform could split; here they had to coexist. In practice that meant giving way to Reform. He personally preferred the old ways (prayers in English are "dry like crackers") but he seemed to grasp that the old ways were doomed.

IT WOULD be pointless to report on other conversations I subsequently had with Spruceton's Jews, most of which merely substantiated what the Old Man had told me. But I do want to relate an interview with one of the *alrightnicks*, for in the contrast between him and the Old Man is dramatized the social conflict inside Spruceton's Jewish community.

Mr. X received me in his expensively furnished house, a "nice home." He wore a dressing gown and tried to suggest an air of comfortable worldliness; he looked somewhat like Jean Hersholt.

Mr. X had been in Spruceton for about a dozen years, and was now a very well-established businessman. He began by deprecating the importance of the religious differences within Spruceton's Jewish community; but nonetheless, like almost every other Spruceton Jew to whom I spoke, he seemed unable to leave the subject.

He told me about the old *shul* in Spruceton. "It was dirty, it stank; when you went in, there were old men in their stockings and with long beards. Then they had that gargle music. . . . Well, you know, it wasn't the kind of place you'd want to bring your wife and kids to. Then some of us got together and pushed through the temple. Sometimes we did things first and asked permission afterwards, but we got things done." I ventured to remark that this was in the tradition of American business, but my feeble sarcasm did not seem to disturb him.

Mr. X felt that the Old Man was "something of a trouble-maker, a little un-American. Now we have the finest type of Jew."

"What is the finest type of Jew?"

"Well, you know, the kind that's clean, doesn't push himself or make noise; the kind

that's respected and doesn't fool around with the Reds. Now we're part of the Community Chest, the *goyim* respect us. We're part of the town. Everyone respects the rabbi."

Then came the clincher, "I'll tell you something else. Before, when the old ones ran the show, there was a lot of intermarriage by the young people. Now there isn't. Now we are learning about being Jews, we send our children to Sunday school and we know what is going on when we hear the prayers in English."

My last question was: "Is there anti-Semitism in Spruceton?"

"No, it's not that sort of town."

THE same evening I talked to Mr. X, I also met a number of Jewish women who were discussing a Zionist dinner that had been held at the town's leading hotel, at which I was staying. At this dinner there had been an unexpectedly large number of guests, some of whom had got merry and so far forgotten themselves as to sing Zionist songs. Others of the Jewish ladies felt that was "bad behavior—it makes a bad impression on the Gentiles." As one of them put it, "We have to show we're good Jews, not bad Jews." I asked her, as I had asked Mr. X, what she meant by "good Jews." She murmured, "You know. . . ."

The next morning, while sitting in the lobby of the hotel, I could not help but overhear its owner loudly discussing the Zionist dinner: "Jews . . . grabbers . . . noisy, crazy songs . . . what can you expect from them?"

I spoke to a number of other Mr. X's. Some were cruder, some more subtle, but they were all cut from the same pattern.

There is no denying that Mr. X and his fellow *alrightnicks* are fundamentally decent enough as individuals. They are, or can be, individually kind; some are rather more imaginative; and a few even have a smattering of culture, though a very thin one. Yet their basic socio-economic situation propels them as a group to a system of beliefs and attitudes that is highly unattractive and that has helped bring about their disagreements with the old-timers.

Mr. X and his fellows have had one severe shock in the past two decades: Hitler. From this shock they learned that, no matter how they may wish to, they cannot as-

similate themselves (they really mean obliterate themselves). Yet they have become successful businessmen; their daily life brings them into repeated contact with Gentile businessmen whose values they eagerly seek to adopt. They wish, almost more than anything else, not to be identified with "bad" Jews—those who are "dirty," wear beards, make "gargle music," or are always "knocking things."

Experience has further taught them, as one Jewish businessman ruefully told me, that they can't integrate themselves in the town's middle-class Gentile social life. "We tried now and then to join the animal-cracker lodges but somehow most of us never got in. There was no law against admitting Jews, you understand, but. . . ." This Jewish businessman said this without any irony; to him it was a matter of deep regret.

Mr. X and his friends faced a tremendous problem, and here we can readily sympathize with them. They had to make a social and cultural niche for themselves. The old ways were out. They were not rebels or intellectuals who could generalize from their own condition. And now they had learned that even if they wished to, they couldn't become *goyim*. In a sense, they were more of a "lost generation" than anyone else in the world. The temple was their answer, their hope, and their solution.

THE "Americanization" and "modernization" of Spruceton's Jewish community cannot be understood exclusively in terms of conflicting religious doctrines. No doubt many of Spruceton's Jews sincerely think of it that way; no doubt many of the old-timers deeply feel that the new ways are an abomination while some Jewish businessmen feel as deeply that they make religion more meaningful. But if there were only a religious dispute—Orthodox versus Reform or Conservative versus Liberal—the problem would be comparatively minor. The developments in Spruceton are a portent of trends to come—*social* trends.

The old-timers' group was disintegrating of itself. Despite such an exception as the Old Man, their most conscious member, they were for the most part people, as Kafka puts it, "who are Jews in an especially pure form because they live only in the religion, but live in it without effort, understanding, or

distress." Nothing could be more absurd than for one so completely irreligious as the present writer to sentimentalize these old-timers. Their day is over and their most intelligent member, the Old Man, knows it.

Their sons likewise could not perpetuate Spruceton's Jewish community. The sons left Spruceton entirely or they intermarried, or, while formally retaining the faith, in actuality abandoned all interest in it.

That left only the third group: the *alrightnicks*. They won the Jewish community by default. Thereupon they faced the problem: how reinvigorate this Jewish community so that its members could find identity and prestige while simultaneously ridding themselves of the old stigma?

I think they have solved their problem with admirable skill. The present rabbi is indeed a respected figure in Spruceton, an excellent spokesman at community affairs. A whole new social life is offered by the temple; hence, the decline in intermarriage. In the temple the Jewish businessmen can find a status and security available nowhere else. And the neatly decorous, bilingual services—an incongruous mixture of the traditional and the imposed modern—are not calculated to disturb anyone.

SECOND only to the temple as a focus of Spruceton's Jewish life is Zionism. The old-timers, never joiners, belonged perhaps to a fraternal organization that assured them proper burial. But the *alrightnicks* find in Zionism a not too irksome means of expressing politically their new awareness of their status as Jews. This awareness is seen primarily as a financial obligation more than faithfully assumed (they are proud of fulfilling "quotas"); it is also a means of vicarious participation in international affairs and still another occasion for social life, in this instance sanctified by the mild personal commitment and thin cultural veneer of present-day American Zionism. I visited Spruceton before the recent Palestine crisis, but I am quite certain that it aroused strong feelings among its Jews. Yet it would be a wild exaggeration to suggest that Zionism impinges directly on, or in any significant way breaks the quiescent *kleinbuergerlich* pattern of their lives. No pioneer hearts beat here.

The present Jewish community of Spruceton is a perfect expression of the needs

of the *nouveau riche* Jewish businessmen. It permits them to be Jews with "peace of mind"; it permits them to achieve the spiritual identity provided by religious affiliation without paying the price in differentiation of behavior and custom that Judaism once demanded of its followers. Their turn to the temple does not mean that Judaism is making them over in its image; it means that they are making Judaism over in theirs.

THAT is why the representative attitude of Spruceton's *alrightnicks* is so middle-class: unquestioning, complacent acceptance of American society; slight interest in cultural or intellectual problems; complete absence of that deep, troubled, perhaps even agonized feeling that can result from religiosity; and, above all, a complete lack of self-doubt and self-criticism.

In the values of this group "respectability" and decorum play an oppressively dominant role. They have taken as their goal one of the least attractive traits of the American middle class: its genteel inhibition and fear of public emotional expression, its rejection of spontaneity. Hence, their uneasy feeling when they see Zionists sing at a hotel, their suspicion that such things should either not be done at all or should be confined to the intimacy of the temple.

The rabbi, an intelligent man, is aware of this state of affairs. He seems to work on the principle that once he has snared the Jewish Babbitts he should then be able to create new attitudes in them. I think he is wrong. All of Spruceton life, all of the deeply entrenched and powerfully motivated values of the business world in which most of his congregation lives and works—values that most of them unquestioningly accept—are arrayed against him. If he were to try to imbue the *alrightnicks* with those critical habits of mind and ethical biases that to one extent or another are part of the old Jewish *Weltanschauung*, he would meet only with stubborn resistance.

The *alrightnicks* have won. They are the bulk of Spruceton's Jewish community; they control the temple and have molded it in their own image. Their turn to Judaism is fundamentally a means of organized adaptation towards American middle-class businessman values. But what social or ethical promise can one find in it?

CEDARS OF LEBANON

GRANDFATHER SAILS TO ODESSA

An Idyll

SAUL TSCHERNICHOWSKY

SAUL TSCHERNICHOWSKY was born in 1875 in the village of Michailovka, in the Russian Crimea, a birthplace that set him apart from most Hebrew writers of his generation, who grew up in the towns and larger cities of the Pale, in an atmosphere saturated with urbanism and pious orthodoxy. His family had lived in the village for three generations, and Tschernichowsky was on friendly and intimate terms with his Gentile playmates, the children of peasants. It was here that he became imbued with a love of nature that was to bring a new note into Hebrew poetry, a note reflective of "golden fields, clear skies, and days of childhood full of charm and bright colors."

At the age of seven, he received his first instruction in Hebrew from a traveling teacher. His Jewish education was not extensive or profound, but it implanted in him a love of the Hebrew language that was to last his lifetime, and it made of him a militant Zionist. In 1899, he went to Heidelberg, where he studied medicine. As a doctor, he returned to Russia and remained there until 1922. After traveling extensively in Germany, Palestine, and the United States, he settled in Tel-Aviv in 1931, and died there in 1943.

Coming on to the literary scene at the same time as Bialik, Tschernichowsky sounded a literary counterpoint. Whereas Bialik gave expression to the sufferings of a generation and

its yearning for salvation, Tschernichowsky was the poet of strength and the celebrator of an almost pagan love of life. Tschernichowsky took it as his aim to mediate between Apollo and the God of ancient Israel—or, if possible, to prove their identity. As a corollary to this, he made an enormous contribution to modern Hebrew literature by his translations of Homer, Horace, Plato, Goethe, and others.

Tschernichowsky is best known for his love poetry, his songs of nature, and his historical poems on Jewish martyrdom—these latter are as militant as they are commiserative. His *Idylls* generally possess a mellowness not to be found in the writings of his more turbulent years—though even in them, as can be observed in the conclusion to the one here presented, Tschernichowsky's native pitch of defiance is often to be heard. A fuller discussion of Tschernichowsky's life and work can be found in an article by Eisig Silberschlag, "Tschernichowsky: Poet of Myths," in the January 1947 COMMENTARY.

"Grandfather Sails to Odessa" was written in 1941 and is contained in a collection of his poetry, *Kochvai Shomeiyim Rehochim* (Distant Stars in the Sky), published by Schocken Books in Jerusalem in 1944. It appears here by the publisher's permission.

The translation from the Hebrew is by Jacob Sloan.—ED.

KOHELET the son of David, king in Jerusalem, expounded:
"As you cannot know the essential way of the wind,
So you cannot know where in time it comes from;
Yet nevertheless, at moments, at intervals rare and infrequent,
You snatch a whisper of it, and then perhaps perceive
Somewhat, the mystery of life."

Grandfather claimed kinship
 With the house of Karpiyon, known throughout the country,
 And, born in the month of Adar, which is Pisces as everyone knows,
 He fixed into his signet, which served for a seal as well,
 The figures of two small fish—that is to say, two carps.
 Now Grandfather in those days had settled himself down
 In a small Gentile village near Kherson called "Empty Harbor"
 (*Golaya Pristan* in Russian)—and the place "lived up to its name":
 All year round—as stated—a desolate soil and sandy,
 Save for green harvest time, and after wheat harvest in winter,
 When there stood piled in stacks tall heaps upon heaps of
 The choice of country cucumbers, gherkins of the marsh,
 Piled hills upon hills, all species of watermelon,
 And of the melons, the sweet and the fragrant, each after its kind,
 And the whole family of gourds, the large, the small, and the darling,
 The camel gourd and the jug gourd and the tiny gourd delightful,
 Stalks twisting and twining, putting forth flowers of enchantment,
 Lovers of the sun of the steppes, glory of the orchards of Ukraine.

So Grandfather dwelt in that village, in that very Empty Harbor.
 "From which you may learn"—why it was he was so fond of water!
 Now, Grandfather had dealings with the head of the mills of Weinstein,
 Which was in "Mother Odessa" on the Peresip—as everyone knows;
 And once, being his own master—it so happened in summer—
 Grandfather made up his mind to journey forth to Odessa,
 And not in any steamship either, and not by any overland
 Route in any palanquin or any horse-drawn carriage,
 But in a tiny boat, the sloop of his comrade Havrila.

This Havrila, Grandfather's chum and one of his Hasidim,
 Was a local farmer, from a line of farmers. Slowmoving,
 A great one for holding his tongue, for steering far away from
 Too much chatter at home, in the street, in the village council.
 First and foremost—the chatter of his so and so, the shrew;
 Next from the talk and business of commune summoned to council;
 Third from every wagging tongue of every smart-aleck "barker."
 Being so fond of silence, he was naturally fond of solitude
 On the sands of the clear stream, Dnieper; once he was there,
 He went further and further: the very first step being
 He began to sail on the river; then, once having sailed there,
 He went on to make a boat with his own hands—a sloop,
 One of the very smallest, the kind they used to call "killers."
 Havrila grew wise in the river beds, where the schools of fish play,
 There he would cast his line and haul out from Boristhènes
 Whatever the hook pulled up: carps, breams or roaches.
 Always deep in thought, he never sat just fishing.
 Sometimes Havrila would hazard to sail far out on the Limon
 Even to the tongue of Kinburn, till the desolate Isle of Berezan.
 Once in a very great while Havrila and Grandfather'd meet
 In a long silent session. And when the latter decided
 To sail forth to Odessa, he went to Havrila's white house;
 He went on the Sabbath day, and the day after Sabbath they sailed,
 With the lifting of the pale dawn over the chilled river,
 To take fullest advantage of the wind blowing seaward.

Provisions they took for the voyage were: one small canteen of water.
For Grandfather, two thebók well smoked, and one dozen hard-
Boiled eggs, and a loaf of bread, and a jar of jam, and
A quarter liter of olives, with a French bread on the side,
And one roast chicken—and prayer-shawl, book, and phylacteries.
Havrila's supplies consisted of: two whole wheaten loaves
And the bitterest of cuts from the smoked fat of a bull,
And a mess of golden teran, and several white cheeses,
And a fringed pouch of Majorca, and a small jug of wine.
Till they moved off the shore and the sloop swung out into
The middle of the current, Havrila plied both oars;
The moment they reached the current, he pulled them into the boat,
Then opened the lead rope of the mainsail, which unfurling,
And the wind blowing flush, and the good current aiding,
The boat moved straight ahead, at an easy glide.
So they sailed on the drowsy Dnieper by way of "the throat of Belogradov,"
And entered the wide Limon's waters, and continued on, passing
Garibalchaya on the left, and passing Prognoyok on the right,
River banks red in the north, and river banks white in the south,
The sandy tongue of Kinburn, and Bublikov looming far off.
Then the cliff of Stanislav neared, and as they went sailing along
By way of the Stanislav straits, the boat began to dance.
Farewell, farewell to you, O Isles of Verbkah and Yanushev!

Grandfather and Havrila sat pleasantly eating and drinking,
They were near to Berezan, when a wind blew out of the north-
West and began to sport with the vast expanse of water,
Beating up ripples into waves and waves into breakers.
Suddenly white combs appeared on the crests of the waves,
And a tempest burst upon the wide sea out of nowhere.
There was nothing on all the water but the meager boat,
And so the tempest fell upon it with all its ammunition.
Now it would race at top speed, and now it would freeze and linger,
Now lift up a tremendous wave to overwhelm "the killer,"
And now dig a deep pit at its side to bury the sloop under;
Suddenly drag it by main force, and as suddenly seal its
Way with a wave; first fling it, then pull it back again;
Powerfully snatch it from one wave to hand it to another.
The men were pummeled so hard their ribs were near to breaking,
But the mast lowered its head before every coming wave,
And came out of the tempest skipping—without oar or sail.
Three days the tempest wreaked its vengeance on "the killer"
And then was pacified. But where were they now?
Where had the storm wind borne them? Neither of them knew:
Perhaps they were in the heart of the sea, or perhaps near land. . . .
Another three days becalmed—they ran out of food and water.
Weakened they lay in the boat, straining their eyes—in silence.
When behold in the south a small cloud rising and growing
Into a Turkish felucca, bearing their way with all sails.
Grandfather seized his prayer-shawl and lifted it up and down,
Havrila his white kerchief, stood up and began to wave it.
The sailors caught sight of the signals and veered toward their direction,
Took them aboard and fed them—and brought them safe to Odessa.

And it shall come to pass at the end of these troubled days,
 That you shall live to be worthy of better times, and hear
 Of Jewish admirals serving in the navy of Argentina
 Under the white and blue flag! Meir, maybe, or Saul
 Of the Karpiyon stock. Then be advised: for sure,
 They are blood cousins of mine. And if amazed you inquire:
 "Sons and grandsons of merchants—what's a navy to them, and what water?
 And how came their father to leave them admiral's epaulets?"
 This is the reason why: Because he was born in a small
 Harbor—Empty Harbor, that is, at the mouth of the Dnieper,
 And his grandfather voyaged himself—from near Kherson to Odessa—
 Not in a vessel under steam, and not in a ship under sails,
 But in a very small sloop—to be accurate, a "killer"—
 "Through the wet path of the waters," in the words of Homer the Greek.
 And maybe—God only knows!—in the veins of his father's fathers
 There beat one drop in sixty of the same spirit that was
 With the sons of your people of old on the shore of Etzion Geber,
 Chanters of sea chanteys in the beach huts of Zebulon
 Who went down to the sea in ships—Phoenician galleys to Ophir—
 A very long voyage it was, very very long indeed. . . .
 Who knows the way of the wind, and what she brings in her wings?
 For those same marvelous sparks from the ancient powerful days,
 Shepherds and herdsmen and smiths who were scribes, and physicians,
 Who became in the course of time, and in altered surroundings,
 Judges, kings, and prophets, teachers and pillars of the law,
 Straying Messiahs and poets and kabbalist visionaries,
 Exegists irate-eyed, and founders of the great academies,
 Hasidic luminaries and all who suffered the pain of their people,
 Men of wisdom and men of virtue and the great intercessors—
 "Generation of Samuel—Samuel; generation of Jephtha—Jephtha"—
 And all those holy sparks whose light was never found worthy
 To shine in the great world, and so expired from lack of
 Air in the ghetto straits and in the great pitchblackness—
 Those marvelous sparks are yet to be revealed again,
 Shall again take fire, be lights to this poor people,
 To all men—great lights! "By Israel's Eternal!"

THE STUDY OF MAN

DESTINY IN THE NURSERY

Child-Rearing Techniques and Adult Personality

HAROLD ORLANSKY

IN RECENT years there has grown up a new theory of human behavior, based principally on certain aspects of psycho-analytic theory. The "oral-anal" view of personality and culture, as it may be called, holds that the infant's early experiences in feeding and toilet training determine his adult character, and that this character, in turn, determines the nature of his culture, since most adults in any culture have received similar training during childhood. On the basis of this theory, an increasing number of pediatricians have been instructing mothers in methods of infant care, and some anthropologists have been conducting investigations of foreign cultures.

The tenor of these investigations may, perhaps, be suggested by an earlier study—Geoffrey Gorer's analysis of Japanese culture. It attributes the "overwhelming brutality and sadism of the Japanese at war," their type of

ethics, their famous Tea Ceremony, and their landscape gardening to the early bowel training of Japanese infants. Gorer has also analyzed the "national character" of Andean Indians, Russians, Burmese, and Americans in terms of their mechanisms of infant rearing—how long and how often infants are breast-fed, when toilet training is instituted, and whether or not the infant is swaddled or cradled after birth. Some social scientists, following in his footsteps, seem engaged in the creation of a new science of history in which war, Nazism, Stalinism, free enterprise, and other manifestations of "national character" are explained by such infant disciplines.

Considering the theory's popularity and importance, one must regret that it has so far been subjected to little intensive criticism. My own analysis is here restricted to the effect upon personality of nursing and sphincter disciplines in *infancy*—i.e., the first year or two of life, excluding other aspects of infant experience and the entire world of later childhood. It should also be stressed at the outset that the oral-anal theory in its extreme form (which attributes personality formation to a few mechanical features of infant care) is held only by a small group of writers most of whom are mentioned in this article. (Other students of personality and culture—Harry Stack Sullivan and Erich Fromm, for example—explain the formation of character in terms of the total social situation in which children are reared; with this approach the writer is in agreement.)

LET us first present the core of the theory in somewhat greater detail, by quoting one of its proponents, Lawrence Frank:

"...it appears that the infant who has had

Not long ago, the tendency was to explain the individual as completely the product of society. More recently, this tendency has been reversed: the individual is seen as creating society in his own image, and many social scientists have been led to explain both the individual and his society on the basis of specific infant disciplines—in particular, methods of feeding and toilet training. HAROLD ORLANSKY here analyzes the claims of this new method of explaining both individual personality patterns and national characters. Mr. Orlansky was born in New York in 1921, was graduated from the College of the City of New York, and has been completing work for his doctorate in anthropology at Yale. He will shortly leave for England under a Social Science Research Council fellowship.

generous breast feeding and a benevolent weaning will face life with a benign, generous and optimistic attitude or disposition, while the infant who has been denied adequate nursing and mothering, and has been abruptly weaned will feel deprived, suspicious and fearful and bear resentment that may be crystallized into active hostility and aggression.

"Again it appears that the child who has been trained in continence of urine and faeces slowly and without pressure or punishment will yield control over his elimination without anxiety or resentment, learning to release without conflict; but a precocious or harshly coercive training . . . will set up resistance . . . and focus the child's behavior upon acquisitive or compensatory outlets for the denial of possession of his own eliminations." (*Psychiatry*, 1939, 2: page 22.)

It will be clear to anyone acquainted with psychoanalysis that this view stems directly from the "oral-anal-genital" characterology initially formulated by Freud and later elaborated by Karl Abraham, Edward Glover, and Ernest Jones. According to this analysis, the infant whose oral eroticism (pleasure in feeding, especially through satisfaction of the sucking function) is gratified by adequate nursing tends to develop an optimistic, confident adult personality; whereas inadequate nursing produces a sadistic or pessimistic adult who remains basically dependent upon others, attempting in all his important relationships, by force or supplication, to obtain again the love of which he was deprived during infancy. The infant whose anal eroticism (pleasure in free bowel movement) is frustrated by early and severe sphincter training will tend in his adult life to exhibit exaggerated and compulsive traits of cleanliness, orderliness, obstinacy, frugality, punctuality, etc. Where the infant is permitted to complete his "natural" cycle of growth, he develops beyond the stages of oral and anal eroticism into a normal or "genital" character.

Now psychoanalytic literature affords considerable documentation as to the existence of these three character types among adults—though there is a good deal of ambiguity in definition, especially with the "oral" and "genital" characters. But it offers almost no empirical evidence on the origin of these character-types in infancy; clearly, adult reconstructions of infantile experience derived from the analytic couch do not constitute empirical find-

ings on the *infantile* situation. Melanie Klein and Anna Freud have added something to our direct knowledge of infant psychology, but they have generally been more interested in applying psychoanalytic theory than in testing it. We must turn to the literature of medicine, psychology, and anthropology for scientific data which, though deficient in many ways, can provide at least a partial test.

According to the theory, infants nursed at the breast for a long time and weaned late should be less frustrated than infants weaned early or those bottle-fed on a strict feeding schedule, and early bowel training should be more frustrating than late. Do the objective facts verify these hypotheses?

Two London physicians, B. C. F. and C. H. Rogerson, studied 109 children who had been infants in their clinic seven years previously; those children who had been artificially fed in infancy showed a higher frequency of feeding and sleeping problems, bed-wetting, fear, nervousness, etc., than those who had been breast-fed. (*Journal of Mental Science*, 1939, 85: pages 1163-82.) This investigation made no effort to equate the groups studied for factors other than method of feeding during infancy. The physical and psychological difficulties found among the artificially fed children can be accepted as accurate for these children, but the inference that artificial feeding was the cause of these difficulties is not warranted; indeed, the authors themselves expressly point this out. (To the social scientist, who almost daily encounters hypotheses of fundamental and universal import "verified" by the investigation of anywhere from ten to a hundred accidentally assembled "cases," there is always something refreshing about a study that makes no final claims.)

Our suggestion that the difficulties of the bottle-fed children in the above study were probably due to factors other than the manner of feeding is supported by another study which comes somewhat closer to the scientific ideal of controlled experiment. At the Stanford University clinic, Drs. Harold Faber and Leonard Sutton compared forty-two babies who had been breast-fed less than six weeks and thereafter fed from bottles, with an equal number of babies who had been breast-fed for an average of forty weeks. In other respects than the type of milk, the diets of both groups were alike; twenty-six members of each group were

paired for weight at birth, and all babies received excellent care. It was found that the breast-fed babies gained more weight than the bottle-fed babies during the first quarter-year, but that this relationship was reversed during the rest of the year. (*American Journal of Diseases of Children*, 1930, 40: pages 1163-76.) The significance of these findings lies in the fact that weight, physical maturation, and bodily health are generally accepted as indices of psychological development in early infancy.

In the light of present data, it does not appear possible to establish the desirability of breast or bottle feeding without consideration of the entire home environment and the psychological condition of the mother. Where nursing conditions are hectic and the mother's health poor, as is frequently the situation in the lower-class home, bottle-feeding is certainly preferable, though the norm for lower-class families in England and America probably entails breast feeding in a greater proportion of cases than among middle-class families. Similarly, a middle-class mother who disliked breast-feeding would be ill-advised to institute it, or the child might pay the psychological penalty for the pediatrician's obstinacy. I have seen no evidence that breast-feeding is inevitably more advantageous to the child's emotional development than artificial feeding.

AT LEAST five studies have examined the possibility of a correlation between the duration of breast feeding in infancy and the psychological characteristics of the child or adult. All findings I have read agree that no direct correlation can be observed between the duration of breast feeding and any major aspect of personality; this is the only definitive conclusion that present evidence seems to permit. On the basis of two studies (*Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1929, 92: pages 615-19; and *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1931, 1: pages 284-91), one might presume that a medial duration of breast feeding is more likely than either brief or prolonged nursing to be associated with "normal" personality development in our society, but this hypothesis is flatly contradicted by another study which found the highest degree of emotional security in adults "who were breast-fed little or not at all and... [in] those who were fed at the breast for over a year" (*Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1946, 41: page 84). Leaving aside questions as to the

validity of the personality tests and the methodological procedures employed, it is clear that extreme caution is necessary in making any generalization applying to large populations from the very inadequate samples upon which all of these studies were based.

THE widespread opinion in modern pediatric and psychiatric circles is that "self-demand" feeding—in which the infant is nursed whenever it cries—is more likely to produce a confident and unneurotic personality than is scheduled feeding. As O. H. Mowrer and Clyde Kluckhohn have expressed this thesis, "The parent who responds to a clock rather than to the behavior of the child is, from the child's point of view, not responsive at all.... An apathetic or an anxious or a hostile individual is likely to result [from scheduled feeding]." (Mc V. Hunt, ed., *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, I, page 90.)

Clearly, such statements must be regarded as mere hypotheses, and there is evident in them a great deal of reading-in of adult emotion into the infant situation. Only a few years ago the "best scientific opinion" favored scheduled feeding to promote healthy personality development in the child. Certainly, even very young infants quickly learn to adjust their sleeping and eating habits to a schedule of regular feeding, and it would seem that this imposed regularity might contribute to a sense of security and confidence just as much as to a feeling of apathy or hostility.

I know of only two studies that have subjected the self-demand hypothesis to empirical test, and the published account of these studies is such a specimen of social science inadequacies that it is worth quoting at some length:

"Miss Trainham . . . reported on a study begun at the Merrill-Palmer school. Two groups of children were chosen, one group on self-regulating feeding regimes, and the other not self-regulated. The parents of both groups were quite similar.... One group consisted of ten subjects and the other twelve.... The results suggested in a very striking way that the self-regulated children are in all categories of the tests more advanced in their development....

"Dr. Escalona had conducted similar studies... and had arrived at opposite results. She, too, had only worked with small groups. One group consisted of babies on self-regulated feeding regimes, and the other group consisted

of babies who were on the conventional rigid feeding schedules. The group of babies who were more frustrated [i.e., those fed on time schedules]... showed more rapid maturation [read, "were more advanced in their development"—H. O.] by test scores. Until she had heard Miss Trainham's report, she had explained her findings by the theory that the frustrated babies are forced to recognize the environment earlier." (M. J. Senn, ed., *Problems of Early Infancy*, page 33.)

It is easy to manufacture a theory to "explain" a particular empirical finding. To explain *all* the relevant findings is not so easy, and I have no simple solution to offer here.

Means of measuring personality at present available are not very adequate; our knowledge of its genesis is even less adequate. But surely we may ask of the social scientist that minimum of historical and cultural sophistication which would enable him to give thought to the position that the human groups he studies occupy in the *real* social world to which they—and the social scientist—belong (as contrasted to the position the social scientist ascribes to them in the artificial world of his "control" laboratory). The scientist's observations might then at least have the validity of descriptive statements about a designated portion of the real world; ultimately, after enough such statements had been accumulated, a fairly complete description of the real social world might be obtained. To generalize about psychological or social laws on the basis of limited observations of small, unrepresentative groups, can lead only to such predicaments as that of the unfortunate Miss Trainham and Dr. Escalona.

IN SUMMARY, it must be conceded that social scientists—because of a general lack of historical sophistication, the difficulty of isolating single factors for study, and the difficulty of establishing the validity of the personality measurements employed—have failed to produce a definitive answer to the question of the relation between nursing disciplines and character development. Accepting the sparse experimental findings as tentative markers, however, it appears reasonable to reject the thesis that specific nursing disciplines have a specific and unvarying psychological effect upon the child. Instead, the hypothesis may be proposed that the emotional effect of a particular discipline will vary in accordance with the parental attitudes associated with its ad-

ministration, the organic constitution of the child, and the entire social situation of which the discipline is a part. Erich Fromm has made a similar formulation: "For an infant who has confidence in the unconditional love of his mother, the sudden interruption of breastfeeding will not have any grave characterological consequences; the infant who experiences a lack of reliability in the mother's love may acquire 'oral' traits even though the feeding process went on without any particular disturbances" (*Escape from Freedom*, page 293). In short, personality is to be viewed not as the product of instinctual infantile erotic drives mechanically channeled by parental disciplines, but rather as the product of a complex interaction of a unique organism undergoing maturation and a unique socio-cultural environment.

THE anal erotic, anal sadistic, or compulsive character is the most clearly-drawn picture in Freud's album of characterology. So widespread is the anal character in Western society that Geza Róheim has argued that the entire culture is "based on sublimations or reaction formations of anal trends" (*Essays Presented to C. G. Seligman*, page 283). However, when one looks for empirical verification of the influence of sphincter training upon personality, the data are not very imposing.

Mabel Hushka, after studying 213 problem children at a New York hospital, concludes that children who were subjected to "coercive" bowel training manifested "undesirable" responses—such as constipation, fear, and rage—more frequently than children who were "adequately" trained; but no attempt is made to correlate these responses with any permanent effects upon personality, and no normal children were used for comparison with the problem children (*Psychosomatic Medicine*, 1942, 4: pages 301-8). In a similar study, the same author secured comparable data on the reaction of 215 problem children to the institution of bladder training (*ibid.*, 1943, 5: pp. 254-65). G. V. Hamilton, comparing a group of adults who recalled constipation or other anal traits in childhood with a group who did not, found some evidence in favor of Freud's theory of the anal origin of such adult personality traits as stinginess, sadism, masochism, and concern for clothes (*A Research in Marriage*, pages 467-72).

These inadequate studies are all that I have been able to discover in the psychological

literature. Ardent believers in psychoanalysis have shown a tendency to regard these and even less substantial data as confirmatory of their hypotheses, but a reading of the original studies does not incline an impartial student to such optimism. Thus one writer, reviewing a series of studies by Margaret Fries, states that the direct influence of bowel training on personality "was proved beyond doubt." Dr. Fries herself, however, had explicitly drawn a contrary inference from her work, stating that "any attempt to correlate age at which habit training was started with later personality traits, without consideration of the mother's personality type, would involve a large factor of error." (*Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, 1946, 2: page 92.)

In opposition to the orthodox Freudian's emphasis upon rigid bowel training as the cause of the anal character, it is possible to explain all elements of the anal character—obedience, punctuality, cleanliness, hoarding, etc.—and early bowel training as well—as traits inculcated in the child by middle-class parents in capitalist society: we recognize this pattern of character traits as being historically associated with the Protestant virtues that were economically so well rewarded during the rise of capitalism. The origin of the "anal" character can be understood as an adjustment of the individual, on the level of personality, to specific economic and social conditions. The contrary contention, advanced by Róheim, that these very economic and social conditions are the results of severe anal training, is historically and logically unsatisfactory: was money invented so that we might hoard it, or clocks so that we might be compulsively punctual? (One is reminded of the dialectic of Voltaire's Dr. Pangloss: the nose was made to hold spectacles; therefore we have spectacles.)

Otto Fenichel, outstanding among psychoanalysts for his recognition of the importance of social conditions in the development of personality, argues persuasively against Róheim's position on just this point. But even Fenichel holds that "anal eroticism produces the desire to collect something," although he adds that "what is collected is determined by reality" (*Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1938, 7: page 89). To speak of a libidinal "desire to collect something" as existing apart from the demands of a specific cultural situation is, however, to invoke a factor for which no independent evidence can be advanced. The

more economical theory would appear to be to explain "anal" traits solely in terms of the cultural situation which gives rise to them.

IF THE confirmatory evidence is so weak, what are the reasons for the popularity of the oral-anal theory?

The pediatrician cannot change the nature of the child's home environment or the personality of its parents, but he can modify the type of discipline to which it is subjected. As Arnold Gesell and Frances Ilg have remarked, "In America the adoption and duration of breast feeding depends to a surprising degree on more or less fortuitous cultural influences. We know of a pediatrician with a wide metropolitan practice who . . . has induced three-fourths of his maternal clients to adopt breast feeding in preference to bottle feeding. In many other instances this ratio is reversed" (*Infant and Child in the Culture of Today*, page 86). One may surmise that acceptance of the oral-anal theory gives some pediatricians a gratifying, if illusory, sense of power.

Again, the liberal psychiatrist, keenly aware of the prevalence of psychological difficulties in our society, may seize upon the oral-anal theory as offering a simple mechanism for the prevention of neurosis and a "safe" program of social reform—safe in the sense that it does not involve difficult and controversial political action. (And what efficacious program of reform is ever personally safe?) Illustrative of this tendency is the Cornelian Corner, a national organization of psychiatrists which energetically propagates the view that "a psychologically healthy race of Americans could be produced by . . . consistently loving care to the pre-conscious child," and that "through the scientific application of correct mothering . . . a new form of mature collectivization could be established." (See *Psychiatric Quarterly*, 1946, 20: pages 603-9.)

In anthropology, similarly, the oral-anal theory offers an attractively simple solution to complex cultural problems. In the work of writers like Róheim, Gorer, Weston La Barre, and Erik Erikson, the psychology of infant discipline performs the role of monistic simplification once filled by racial or geographical explanations of culture. Thus we find a long list of cultural phenomena—trade, gardening, the plow, domestication of cattle, money, etc.—explained by one or another of these authors as originating in infantile erotic experience.

The psychological interpreters of culture would profit by reading Leslie White's article on "Culturological vs. Psychological Interpretations of Human Behavior" (*American Sociological Review*, Dec. 1947). White points out that psychological "explanations" of cultural phenomena—such as that war results from man's "warlike" propensities, mother-in-law avoidance from a "horror of incest," or a taboo on eating pork from an innate "loathing" of pigs—are virtually meaningless, since they do not explain why the phenomena occur in some times and places but not in others. If the psychological factor is "innate" or "universal," it can obviously not account for variable events; an adequate explanation can only be given in cultural or historical terms; indeed, analysis of the cultural situation often shows that presumed psychological "causes" are rather the effects of this very situation—thus it is closer to the truth to say that war produces "warlike" qualities, and that Jews loathe pork because their culture places a taboo upon it, rather than the reverse.

THE main strength of the oral-anal theory, however, as has been indicated, derives from its psychoanalytic roots, and before passing ultimate judgment on the theory one must evaluate these roots. It is obviously beyond my province to attempt any criticism of psychoanalytic theory as a whole, but it should be useful to summarize, all too briefly, certain aspects of the psychoanalytic view of infancy upon which the oral-anal theory of personality rests, and to criticize this view in the light of the empirical evidence.

1. The infant is generally regarded as a *miniature adult* who experiences adult emotions of anger, fear, anxiety, and love in response to maternal treatment. "When a child comes into this world, he comes in lonely and he is afraid," one psychoanalyst writes. The psychoanalyst interprets infant experience in terms of what it would mean *to him* if he were an infant. But this view is intensely colored by the cultural bias of the adult and fails to acknowledge the fact that no infant shares this bias—i.e., infants are culturally "neutral." Thus, when Freud states that little children "cannot help conceiving the sexual act as a kind of maltreating or overpowering, that is, it impresses them in a sadistic sense," he may be giving us insight into the Viennese, but not the infantile mind; and when Otto

Rank writes of the "trauma of birth" he is anthropomorphizing and not observing the animal-fetal state. Direct observation reveals only that the newborn infant is an immature organism, mainly capable of generalized responses, in which a stable conditioned reflex cannot readily be established; indeed, many child psychologists have abandoned use of the word "emotion" to describe the physical states of this organism during its first three months.

2. What is frustrating to the adult is conceived to be frustrating to the infant, and aggression (direct or disguised) is considered the automatic and invariable consequence of frustration. But both halves of this formula are very questionable. The evidence indicates that what is frustrating to a person is determined by his previous experience, and the infant has not had the adult's experience. Thus, restraint of motion is frustrating to an adult, but it is not necessarily frustrating to an infant who has been strapped into a cradle from birth and has never experienced freedom of motion. Nor is aggression a necessary consequence of infantile frustration, as David M. Levy has observed: "There are any number of frustrations that do not evoke aggressive response in the sense of discharging hostility against a social object or its surrogates. There are, for example, a number of experiments in which animals are frustrated and in which such aggression does not occur. The sucking frustrations in infancy cause finger sucking or sucking other objects . . . rather than increased aggression. There is no proof that the so-called weaning traumas of infancy cause more aggression or even more phantasies of hostility . . . than in other children. The same may be said of all those frustrations that have to do with bowel and bladder control." (Newcomb and Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology*, page 264.)

3. Infancy (the first year or two of life) is considered the period in which personality is irrevocably structured; the initial mold into which the infant libido is cast cannot be recast by later experience. This conclusion derives from Freud's biological and instinctual orientation, and one may say it represents a mechanical rather than a dialectical view of personality development. But the personality of the adult cannot legitimately be regarded as a mere projection of the infant's personality. Although the experience of later years often reinforces the character structure laid down in infancy, this is not invariably the case. Thus,

Navaho infants receive ideally indulgent and unfrustrating care according to the oral-anal theory, with unlimited breast feeding and no interference with free bowel movements; nevertheless, they grow into anxiety-ridden adults because of the nature of their post-infant experience. As Lois Murphy has written, "a satisfying infancy does not necessarily compensate for economic deprivation in the next ten years, and there is increasing evidence that later gratification may go far toward offsetting the effects of early frustration" (Hunt, ed., *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, Vol. II: page 657).

ARE we, then, to assert that infant disciplines bear no relation whatsoever to the development of personality? Obviously not. I can do no better here than quote an admirable statement by Gerald Pearson, summarizing his conclusions from a study of personality development in seventy-two children: "There is no question that the physical situations of a child's life bear a definite relation to the formulation of his personality, but the number of associated etiological factors renders it impossible to consider any single situation as causative. This study does indicate, however, the marked importance of parental attitudes. . . . The child forms most of his ideas about the world of humanity from his impressions of his parents, and their attitude to him . . . must affect the formation of his personality to a far greater degree than the length of [labor at] his birth or the duration of his breast feeding. The events of a child's life enhance and crystallize the parental attitude toward him . . . and the child reacts to the parental attitude through its association with the events of his life rather than to the events themselves." (*American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1931, 1: pages 289-90.)

But how are "attitudes" communicated to the infant if not by physical behavior?

Obviously, emotion must be communicated to the child by bodily actions—but this does not mean that some simple prescription for parental behavior can automatically create a beneficent atmosphere for child rearing. In the last analysis, the oral-anal theory is an attempt to make things simple, reducing the complex problem of infant care to a few clear "duties" easily defined by pediatricians and easily carried out by parents. But simplification distorts reality. The infant's awareness of those who

care for him is surely far more complex than the oral-anal theory would have it.

Some students write of the infant's sensing the mother's attitude to it by a process of "empathy." This concept is dangerously similar to Margarethe Ribble's semi-mystical concept of "mothering," but it may have objective validity when reduced to certain motor indicators by which the infant learns to distinguish emotions which the mother feels as anxiety, anger, or love. After the first six months of life, the infant becomes increasingly sensitive to forms of parental emotional expression—as Margaret Fries has expressed it, he is bathed in "a twenty-four hour emotional atmosphere." And it is by this atmosphere—the entire mother-family-society environment of infancy and childhood—that the personality is presumably shaped, rather than by the mechanical disciplines of infancy. Thus, the consistency with which a discipline is enforced by the mother may be a more important factor than the nature of the particular discipline itself; for example, the infant may be able to adjust contentedly to a wide range of feeding regimes, but a stable emotional adjustment would be difficult if his regime were repeatedly altered.

From this point of view, the efforts of an organization like the Cornelian Corner to reform American society by having mothers breast-feed their infants are misguided. And similar efforts to produce decisive alterations in German and Japanese society by changing certain techniques of infant discipline would be equally ineffective. A much wider range of childhood experience—not to mention the surrounding adult environment—would have to be changed before any significant change in "national character" or culture could be effected.

No theory of personality formation can be simple and yet fit all the facts. Lest we slip into another oversimplified theory that would explain the genesis of personality solely in terms of the personality of parents or the social environment of the home, it would be well to bear in mind the following genealogy which Thomas Fuller has derived from a well-known journal:

"Roboan begat Abia; that is a bad father begat a bad son; Abia begat Asa; that is a bad father begat a good son; Asa begat Josephat; that is a good father begat a good son; Josephat begat Joam; that is a good father begat a bad son."

LETTERS FROM READERS

Palestine Legalities

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In Hannah Arendt's article in the May COMMENTARY, "To Save the Jewish Homeland," the statement which is the basic one on the attitudes of the two parties reads as follows: "... The Jews claimed the moral right to adhere to the original United Nations decision; the Arabs claimed an equally moral right to adhere to the League of Nations principle of self-determination, according to which Palestine would be ruled by its present Arab majority and the Jews be granted minority rights."

The attitude of the two parties is stated most inaccurately and must be corrected. Insofar as the Jews were concerned, they did not claim "the moral right to adhere to the original United Nations decision" but they claimed and continue to claim that the Resolution of November 29, 1947 has definitely solved the problem of Palestine and that the Jews accepted this decision and stick to it. This is something different from the "moral right to adhere to a decision," a phrase which makes no sense at all.

The statement on the Arab doctrine is equally wrong. First of all, there is no such a thing as a "League of Nations principle of self-determination." The Covenant of the League of Nations contains no reference to self-determination. Whether self-determination is a principle of law or a political slogan is still undecided, but it certainly did not constitute part of the League of Nations law, as evidenced by the famous opinion of the League of Nations jurists on the future of the Åland Islands of September 5, 1920: "Although the principle that a people should have the power to rule itself occupies an important place in modern political thinking, especially since the World War, it should be noted that this principle is not written into the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the expression of this principle in a certain number of international treaties cannot be regarded as a sufficient ground for considering it one of the positive rules of the law of nations. On the contrary, except when expressly stipulated in international treaties, the right to a national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of each state."

Since this premise is wrong, the conclusion, according to which "Palestine would be ruled by its present Arab majority and the Jews be granted minority rights," is equally wrong. In fact, the Arabs based their claim for a unitary Arab state on Article 28 of the mandate and Article 22, paragraph 4, of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Both texts are irrelevant to this problem.

JACOB ROBINSON
Counsel

The Jewish Agency for Palestine
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Mr. Robinson's letter has left me a bit bewildered.

As an active member of a political body (the Jewish Agency), Mr. Robinson might have been aware that the "basic statement" of any article aimed at describing a political situation in political terms is never a merely legalistic one.

As a man well versed in recent Zionist politics, Mr. Robinson could have been expected to understand that the Jews could only claim a "moral right to adhere to the original United Nations decision," because the United States' reversal of its adherence to this decision could not possibly be considered illegal, but only—as the Jews implied that it was—immoral.

As a well-known expert on the defunct League of Nations and national minority rights, Mr. Robinson certainly knows that the mandate system was part of the League of Nations, embodied in the latter's Permanent Mandate Commission and based on Article 22 of the Covenant. This article expressly states that the mandate system applies only to "territories . . . which are inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves." This clearly implies self-determination of peoples as the underlying principle of the mandate system, as guaranteed by the League of Nations. One might remind Mr. Robinson also of the historical fact that the mandate system came into being as a compromise between annexation policies as desired by the great powers and proclamations of the allied statesmen made during the war which barred annexation as a war aim. The Per-

manent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations institutionalized this compromise, thus satisfying the principle of independence and self-determination of all peoples.

In the words of Quincy Wright: "The position of the mandatory state resembled that of a tutor or guardian, since . . . eventual self-determination is the goal for all the mandated areas" (Article on "Mandates" in the *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*).

HANNAH ARENDT

New York City

Barbs from the Greeks

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I am writing you in reference to the recent article entitled "Equality or Fraternities?" in the May COMMENTARY. . . .

The article is a very well written statement in support of an idea. The only thing that seems faulty is the original basis or thesis for the statement. I do not believe that fraternities and sororities generally merit the insinuations and accusations of snobbishness and lack of democracy which your magazine has published. At least my close experience of some fifteen years does not bear out the observations which have been made presumably without too much information on developments. Like everything else, fraternities and sororities have not always been perfect and are not now perfect, but it is my observation that they are improving rapidly, largely through the efforts of those who believe in them and who see a real mission for them. . . .

I think the author betrays his ignorance of the subject when he refers to fraternities as secret societies when in reality there are few if any secrets and certainly not as many secrets as there are in any business such as publishing, etc. . . .

I think it is a mistake to assume that any cultural goal can be forced upon a person by the law. It is a long educational process. When the parents and communities from which young men and young women come to college accept certain social attitudes, it will not be necessary to force them upon the college student. In my experience with colleges and college administrators I have found that where the most liberal and democratic conditions prevail on the campus, fraternities are permitted to operate generally. I believe that you will find where fraternities and sororities are not permitted to operate, it is often because the administrators of the college do not wish to see any strong student organizations which could crystallize student opinion.

Recently one of our chapters of Sigma Tau Gamma initiated the son of a college janitor in the same class in which they initiated the son of the president of the college. We, of course, have no Jewish clause. . . .

D. KENNETH WINEBRENNER,
Executive Secretary

Sigma Tau Gamma
Buffalo, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Obviously, I would not be in the field of furthering the interests of the Greek Letter World if I did not subscribe to the plan of having those people who have common interests and background join together to their mutual interests and enjoyment. I fear that I consider Mr. McWilliams' comments and theories more critical and destructive than constructive.

There is one point upon which I feel quite keenly. This point I have in common with Mr. McWilliams. I am heartily in favor of permitting Catholic fraternities, Jewish fraternities, or Negro fraternities to take their rightful places alongside general college fraternities in the fraternity world. They have the same right and privileges to organize fraternities as do we and should be accorded the same pleasure in so doing that we enjoy.

W. BERNARD JONES, JR.
Executive Secretary

Phi Kappa Phi
Richmond, Virginia

Civil Liberties and the Communists

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I was interested to read that excellent article on "Civil Liberties and the Communists" by Robert Bendiner in the May number of COMMENTARY. I have seen nowhere a better statement of the issue.

I cannot concur in Mr. Bendiner's enthusiasm for disclosure law. I have seen too much of the workings of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and the post office second class registrations to have any confidence in their effectiveness if applied to mass propaganda agencies. The information is simply filed and is not of a character to reveal anything sufficiently significant to attract inquiry. Nor is the evil of anonymity so great as to justify disclosure.

I know of no legislative proposal which would curb Communist manipulation or chicanery without doing grave damage to civil rights in general.

ROGER BALDWIN

New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

It seems to me that in his interesting article on "The Communists and Civil Rights" Mr. Bendiner has neglected to consider some of the important historical aspects of the situation. A review of anti-Communist expressions in the press and public life for more than two decades would make it clear that most of this criticism has been directed, not at legitimate Communists, but at liberals and reformers. Remarkably little attention was paid in the Hearst newspapers, for example, to Earl Browder and other official Communists. On the other hand, the appellation "Communist" was applied to all sorts of movements to which conservatives were opposed. . . .

It is hardly necessary to point out that the Communist party's position at this moment is not so threatening that it must be met by drastic legislation. Anti-subversive legislation like the Mundt-Nixon Bill is not directed at avowed Communists, but at others who can be represented as Communists. This may very well include all who join with Communists on such issues as racial prejudice, labor legislation, foreign policy, and civil rights. It may include unions which have been called communistic. Such legislation may indeed be bad for real Communists, but it may also be very bad for Henry Wallace, for example, who is not a Communist.

In his discussion of "the right of anonymity" Mr. Bendiner attempts to score a point on those who object to having genuine Communists labelled. There are very few who would object to this. What liberals do and should object to is the practice of branding anyone left of center a Communist. No one would be stirred up if Eugene Dennis were described as a Communist. Liberals, on the whole, approve of having people like him clearly distinguished from themselves. When the term is applied to supporters of Wallace, to New Dealers, and, by implication, to David Lilienthal, however, it is used as a method of political assassination. . . .

To entertain the concept that we can justly punish people for their thoughts and intentions under the law is extremely dangerous. We are protected at present by treason and sedition laws which provide punishment for statements and activities. . . . It is obviously unjust to punish anyone for holding an opinion. We can only punish him for an action. To penalize a man for thinking is as unjust as to penalize him for not thinking at all. If that could be made a crime, interesting results might ensue.

JACOB KORG

New York City

German Re-Education

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

J. Glenn Gray's article, "Munich University: Class of '50" in the May issue is one of the most informing and realistic that has come to my attention.

It should teach Americans two great lessons: first, the utter inadequacy of any military government to cope with the complicated social issues consequent on a devastating war, and second, the need of a more humane and rational policy in dealing with the situation. No one can read Dr. Gray's interview with the "serious, sad-eyed medical student" without being more than dissatisfied with the formal treatment that such cases must suffer under present conditions.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

Boston University
Boston, Massachusetts

The Other Cheek

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I greatly appreciate seeing the review of *Albert Sears* in the April issue, and in terms of the high standards Mr. Baldwin sets for novels (and quite rightly so), I don't seem to have fared too badly. I wrote four complete drafts of the book, and was only too aware of the difficulties Mr. Baldwin points out. You might mention to Mr. Baldwin that I'm not interested personally in doing "distinguished" novels, but in doing the old task of imaginative recreation as cleanly, simply, and honestly as I can.

It's a good deal, these days, to write a novel which can even be read.

MILLEN BRAND

Barto, Pennsylvania

"Protest Novels"

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I find myself very much in sympathy with James Baldwin's approach to the five "protest novels" reviewed in the April issue of COMMENTARY.

His formulation of the problem in terms of two questions—Are these novels satisfying as art? or, failing that, Do they represent accurate sociology?—is valid, and, one would suppose, obvious enough. But the importance of these questions becomes clearer when we remember that the criteria they advance were somewhat less than universally applied to such novels as *Kingsblood Royal* and *Gentleman's Agreement*. . . .

EMILE CAPOUYA

Forest Hills, New York

BOOKS IN REVIEW

The World of Fabianism

OUR PARTNERSHIP. By BEATRICE WEBB.
New York-London-Toronto, Longmans
Green, 1948. 491 pp. \$6.00.

Reviewed by GEORGE LICHTHEIM

BEATRICE WEBB died in 1943 without having completed the record of her historic partnership with her husband. The present volume, a sequel to an earlier account of her formative years, has been edited with considerable skill from her manuscript, which carries the reader from her marriage in 1892 almost down to the eve of the First World War, but although largely based on her diaries the story has a somewhat impersonal flavor. Perhaps this is what Beatrice would have wished. Like Sidney—the “Other One,” to use the surprising pet name she invented for him—she preferred blue-books to novels. Apart from detailed character analyses of relatives like the Crippses, through whom the original Fabian mantle has now descended on the British Treasury, and friends like the Bertrand Russells, there is scarcely a personal note in the whole book.

The Webbs began by ignoring Marx and ended by taking him literally—at a time, too, when many Marxists of long standing had become less doctrinaire. At the beginning of their long and fruitful partnership in social investigation they thought Marx outmoded. In 1938, Beatrice—in a brief chapter appended to the present volume—not only made amends (“where we went hopelessly wrong was in ignoring Karl Marx’ forecast of the eventual breakdown of the capitalist system”), but even credited him with opinions actually uttered by Lenin many years later, and indicated that she shared the Communist expectation of a sensational capitalist collapse. Like Sidney (who became Baron Passfield in 1929 but lost interest in the British Labor party after the failure of the second MacDonald Government in 1931), she developed a romantic attachment to the “new civilization” of Soviet Com-

munist, to which they devoted a comprehensive if uncritical study published in 1935. Beatrice’s autobiography helps to explain the ease with which this transfer of loyalties was accomplished.

THE little world of Fabianism, of which Sidney Webb had become a member a few years before his marriage to Beatrice Potter in 1892, differed from Continental socialism in two important respects: it was exclusively middle-class, and it had no use for “Marxian” Social-Democracy, i.e. for the employment of the labor movement as a means of establishing political freedom. This, in Britain, was the business of the Liberal party, with whose leaders the Webbs worked in the closest partnership. Fabianism was there to advise the more advanced Liberals, to wean the more conservative trade unionists away from their blind allegiance to the Tory party, to advocate limited reforms in the field of municipal government, education, health insurance, etc., and to prevent socialists from straying into politics of a pseudo-revolutionary kind. For a long time even the term “socialism” was carefully avoided. The Webbs described their doctrine as “collectivism,” and Beatrice’s diary forms a record of their sustained effort to “permeate” both the Conservative and the Liberal parties with the conviction that the new age called for a break with laissez-faire individualism.

To an amazingly large extent they were successful; they even obtained the financial support of the Rothschilds and of various South African millionaires for their greatest single achievement: the foundation of the London School of Economics. Nor was there any reason why Balfour, Haldane, Grey, Asquith, Rosebery, and the rest of them should have regarded the Fabians in general, and the Webbs in particular, with aversion: they were for the most part staunch supporters of the South African War against the Boers (Beatrice’s chief worry was that the military defeats made Britain look silly), and their indefatigable work in sifting evidence before royal

commissions, drafting memoranda, sitting on committees, and advising cabinet ministers on social insurance schemes, was a heaven-sent aid to overworked, ignorant, or lazy party chiefs. Their zeal for research never flagged: the same period saw the publication of their voluminous studies in the history of trade unionism, the development of British local government since 1688, and similar dull subjects that no one else had had the energy to study. It is not surprising that in the end half the political work came to rest on them.

BUT there was more to it than hard work (Beatrice bitterly despised the ruling oligarchy for its mental laziness, and never forgave Asquith for marrying "a silly wife" who took him to country-houses and taught him to ride on horseback) and intellectual competence: the Fabians believed in the rule of the expert, and especially of the trained sociologist. In this respect they were truly prophetic of the future. They had grasped that government was becoming a complicated affair demanding expert knowledge and constant attention to detail. In a country governed by aristocratic idlers like Balfour and busy lawyers like Asquith, this gave them more influence than the size of their political following warranted, for the Labor party only became a factor in the years immediately preceding the First World War, and it was only in 1918 that it dared to adopt a socialist program (drafted by the Webbs). During the entire period covered by this volume, Sidney and Beatrice had to work through the Liberal oligarchy, and occasionally the Conservatives. The diary is replete with detailed accounts of dinner parties uniting the elite of political London. Very few of the guests were labor leaders, and the few proved disappointing to the Webbs. Indeed, throughout the book the organized workers remain shadowy figures, although there is a good account of trade union congresses, with their inevitable intrigues. Some of the outstanding labor leaders of the period—Tom Mann, John Burns, Keir Hardie—make a fleeting appearance, but it is clear that none of them liked or trusted the Webbs, and that the latter thought them hopelessly incompetent. Their personal rivalries irritated Beatrice, and the gaseous rhetoric of British and Continental socialists outraged her hard-headed common sense.

The Webbs stood for "collectivism," but for the greater part of their career their only allies

were Liberal politicians and officials. The mass of the workers were "sottish," and their leaders thought only of their own careers. The book therefore is chiefly the record of the Webbs' research work and of their unending efforts at "permeation." Caught between the parliamentary oligarchy, which they despised, and the labor movement, which they thought immature, they were thrown back on their unwavering faith in the final triumph of knowledge—eventually to be realized in the Soviet Union, where Beatrice was also able to satisfy her life-long craving for a hierarchical organization replacing the Church. (She was very proud of her discovery that the Communist party was organized like a religious order.)

As a partnership, it was a brilliant success. "The union of two commonplace minds," as Beatrice once defined it, produced standard works in a field as yet untrod, gave London a new university, turned the Fabian Society into a powerful instrument of propaganda for socialism, and ultimately made the Labor party possible.

It was also a happy union of two human beings who were singularly devoted to each other. If there was a domineering streak in Beatrice, there was a passive quality in Sidney which responded to her un-self-conscious assumption of authority. For Beatrice emerges from this record as the stronger character, though intellectually she was content to play second fiddle. Her confidence in their joint mission never wavered. One thought worried her: what would become of religion in a world in which doctrinal Christianity was losing its hold? People, she thought, needed some form of organized religious attachment. It was the only organization for which she and Sidney never succeeded in providing a draft.

The Maccabees as Moderates

THE MACCABEES. BY ELIAS BICKERMAN.
Translated by Moses Hadas. New York,
Schocken Books, 1947. (Schocken Li-
brary, No. 6.) 125 pp. \$1.50.

Reviewed by MILTON HIMMELFARB

THE Maccabees, and especially Judah the Maccabee, have stimulated the Jewish imagination from the beginning. It is entirely natural that this should be so, since they were the protagonists of a drama not only significant in

itself, but also highly charged with symbolic value. For what is the conventional Jewish view of their career? Implicitly it is that the lives and deeds of the Maccabean dynasty constituted an edifying and dramatic cycle in the grand unfolding of Israel's relation to God and God's concern with Israel. The moral of their story is the explicit one written into the sacred history of the former, greater times: God causes Israel to vanquish its more powerful enemies, because Israel is God's people; prosperity brings with it luxury and backsliding, the whoring after strange gods; a just and terrible punishment is then visited upon Israel, the instrument of God's wrath being a powerful and impious foreign nation, itself doomed to prompt destruction. This is the stated design repeated over and over in the historical books of Scripture, especially Judges; and this is the fundamental theme of the political analysis of those prophets with a gift for statesmanship: Amos, Isaiah, and Jeremiah.

The Maccabees have also fired the Christian imagination. In the late Middle Ages it was commonly understood that nine warriors merited celebration in song and story: three Jewish: Joshua, David, and Judas Maccabaeus; three pagan: Hector, Alexander, and Julius Caesar; and three Christian: Arthur, Charlemagne, and Godfrey of Bouillon. The linking of David and Judah the Maccabee is to be explained by admiration for the triumph of the weak and dedicated over the strong and boastful, with Judah's victory over the host of Antiochus Epiphanes being regarded as a later version of David's defeat of Goliath.

In his preface, Bickerman reminds us that the example of the Maccabees was cited during the Protestant Reformation as justification for resistance to an evil religion imposed by the state, during the rise of representative government as religious authority for rebellion against tyrants, and during the Enlightenment as an argument for religious freedom. He agrees that every age must rewrite history for its own uses, but he feels that a historical sequence that has been unusually subject to shifting interpretation—as succeeding generations have required changing historical warrant for their new ideologies—is in particular need of restatement. Having issued this excellent little work in German, more than ten years ago, Schocken Books has now republished it in a first-rate translation by the Hellenist Moses Hadas, a professor at Columbia University. It would be difficult to judge

how near *The Maccabees* comes to the unattainable ideal of writing history *wie es wirklich war*, but of its thoughtfulness and wisdom there can be little doubt.

THE common impression is that the Maccabees shared with the Pharisees, as their chief conscious purpose, the defense of the Jewish tradition against corruption or dilution by the dominant Hellenistic culture of the age. Bickerman, however, makes the astute point that their major contribution was not so much a complete avoidance of Hellenistic influence as the skillful course they steered between total surrender and total resistance.

Total surrender was the policy of those contemporaries of Mattathias who offered oblations to the Syro-Greek Baal-Zeus, painfully removed the evidence of circumcision, and systematically sought to emulate the conduct of Greek gentlemen in Syria. Total resistance to Hellenistic thinking was implied in the religious philosophy, if not in the actual way of life, of the Saducees. In contrast, Bickerman shows that respect for an evolving tradition had been established by the Greeks' deference to what they called the unwritten law, and that it was under their influence that the Pharisees developed the doctrine of the oral Torah. Similarly, life after death was a Hellenistic belief, which the Pharisees took over and adapted, whether or not they were aware of its origin. Bickerman writes:

"The Saducees rejected the new doctrine and ridiculed the Pharisaic teaching of resurrection. If they had been the only authoritative representatives of Judaism, Judaism would either have lagged behind the times and grown rigid, as was the case with the Samaritans, who also rejected the new belief, or the course of history would have submerged Judaism and undermined the Torah. . . . For [the Pythagorean doctrine] the Pharisees substituted the single event of the Last Judgment, whose day and scope God would determine, and so dovetailed the new Hellenistic idea into the structure of biblical ideas. In its new form the adopted doctrine of resurrection developed into a characteristic element of Jewish belief; it became, with biblical monotheism, its central doctrine."

The moral seems to be that Judaism won through because the Maccabees, and more especially the Pharisees, were able to defeat the extremists of both left and right among the people. This, perhaps, is the lesson of the Maccabees for our age; a Bickerman of the next

century may list it in his preface as the meaning that we and our contemporaries chose to read into the lastingly relevant story of Mattathias, Judah, and their successors.

"Socialist Realism"

SOVIET LITERATURE TODAY. By GEORGE REAVEY. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947. 187 pp. \$3.50.

Reviewed by MARTIN THOMAS

GEORGE REAVEY, an Englishman born in Russia, was for three years a deputy press attaché at the British Embassy in Moscow; he knows the Russian language, he had excellent contacts with the Soviet writers, and he certainly had a golden opportunity to write a genuinely informative book about Soviet literature. But the very least one can report is that Mr. Reavey took no advantage whatsoever of his opportunity. He has written a poor book, taking at face value everything told to him by the government officials who supervise the literary output of the Soviet Union.

In the opinion of these officials, Soviet literature today has reached the peak of its development. Its dominant note is "the moral greatness of the Soviet people and its uninterrupted ties with the glorious past, the heroic present, and the great future." The Soviet bureaucrats also told Mr. Reavey that "socialist realism" was the fundamental method of contemporary Soviet fiction. Mr. Reavey has written a long chapter on this subject, with copious quotations of rather involved statements by Soviet critics. These statements, however, have very little to do with the actual state of affairs: in order to understand "socialist realism," one must read Soviet literature, not official articles on Soviet literature.

In Konstantin Simonov's play, *The Russian Question*, for example, an American journalist is persecuted for daring to write a sympathetic book about the Soviet Union. He loses his job and his girl, and no publisher in the whole United States has the courage to print his work. Simonov's play is now being produced in more than one hundred theatres throughout the Soviet Union and has been praised to the skies as an example of "socialist realism."

Some chapters in Mr. Reavey's book deal with the organizations of Soviet writers. Mr. Reavey informs us that a few years ago there

were several of these organizations in the Soviet Union, but now there is only one, the Writers' Union of the USSR. Now, it is obvious to all who have followed cultural events in Russia that the liquidation of the various writers' organizations was carried out in order to achieve a more complete bureaucratization of literature and a more efficient means of assuring its domination by the Communist party. But Mr. Reavey was told that the formation of a single writers' union was a progressive move and he accepts this unquestioningly. He even relates with some pride that the first general secretary of the union was one Sherbakov, "who was later to rise very high in the party hierarchy. . . . By the time of his death in 1945, he also held the rank of lieutenant general in the army." A few facts concerning Mr. Sherbakov can be added. He was the same Sherbakov who, according to such dependable journalists as Cyrus Sulzberger of the *New York Times* and David Dallin, re-instigated anti-Semitism in Russia. And it is not without interest that Sherbakov never wrote anything in his life, except party resolutions and edicts.

MR. REAVEY strongly emphasizes the idea that Soviet literature today is a blend of the new and the old and that "the links with the past [in the field of literature] were now being reforged again in a careful and deliberate manner." To prove this, he refers to the large number of novels and plays now being written on historical themes. This idea that the present-day historical Soviet novels and plays have something in common with the pre-revolutionary literature of Russia is widespread in the United States, but it is utterly false. Mr. Reavey cites several plays praising Ivan the Terrible. Ivan the Terrible, probably the most reactionary of all the Russian czars, was indeed the subject of many pre-revolutionary books and plays—but in pre-revolutionary literature of all political hues he was always depicted as the infamous despot that he was. It was not until Stalin ordered it, that the lunatic czar who murdered his own son and who created the famous secret police (*opritschnik*) that wrung out "confessions" by means of refined torture, became a hero of Russian history.

Pre-revolutionary literature, as well as the literature of the first few post-revolutionary years, was strongly tuned to the key of humanism. One would look in vain for any traces of chauvinism or a glib worship of national history

in the works of all the great Russian writers, with the possible exception of Dostoevsky; and even Dostoevsky wrote *The House of the Dead*. Today, however, all Soviet writers must express unequivocal support of Soviet nationalism and its "beloved" leader, Joseph Stalin—or remain silent. Can one speak of "realism" in literature produced under such conditions?

MR. REAVEY supplies us with abundant information about the comfortable rewards of Soviet literary life: the cottages, villas, and automobiles; a writer may even have "a house constructed for himself and install open fires if he likes them." This is true—but it is only part of the truth. The whole truth is that only those writers who strictly adhere to party orders, even the most reactionary and infamous orders, can afford such luxuries. Boris Pilniak, Ivan Katayev, the poet Mandelstamm—to name only a few—will never again enjoy "open fires," for the simple reason that they were murdered by the Soviet police. And one doesn't hear very much lately of many highly talented writers—Venyamin Kaverin, Leonid Leonov, Valentin Katayev, Yuri Olyesha, F. Panferov, etc.—who prefer to remain silent. Again, it is certainly not accidental that Mr. Reavey does not mention such a gifted and important writer as Isaak Babel—since 1936 official Soviet sources have not *once* mentioned him, and Mr. Reavey is careful to follow only the official version. No wonder that, for lack of really important creative writing, bureaucratic critics must laud the efforts of third-rate writers. But why does Mr. Reavey feel constrained to follow their lead and the Yale University Press to publish so third-rate and unreliable a book?

The Southern Temper

THE CIRCUS IN THE ATTIC AND OTHER STORIES. By ROBERT PENN WARREN. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1948. 276 pp. \$3.00.

Reviewed by NATHAN GLICK

IF, AS one critic of his poetry would have it, "Warren's big distinctions, terms, and point of view . . . are out of Judaism," then surely his stories are, at least in part, a lament for the loss of a promised land. Back in 1930, Warren, along with a number of other Southern writers, took his stand for the tangible farming com-

munity as against the machine-city juggernaut. "The theory of agrarianism," they wrote, "is that the culture of the soil is the best and most sensitive of vocations." They adopted as their model the ante-bellum South which, despite the stigma of Negro slavery (perhaps, for some, because of it), had developed a code of morals and manners rooted in tradition and an integrated way of life. Like T. S. Eliot, they saw the modern metropolis as an infection which had reached out even to the countryside, and whose influence was everywhere causing the sources of dignity and faith to dry up.

The imagery of the title story is weighted with the contrast between cultures. The highway, "a ribbon of celluloid film carelessly unspooled across green baize," leads to the "steel bridge over the creek," where we see the "new raw-brick structures of the war plant set in the gashed and still red-wounded clay." The vulgarity of Hollywood, the disproportion of structure to site, the violent rape of the soil—these are the atrocities now reflected in the Southern landscape: "you cannot see the stone ruin of the old mill that stands at the other end of the bridge."

Only two of the fourteen stories included in the present volume deal with academic life, in spite of the fact that Warren has been teaching in universities throughout the period of their writing (1930-1946). In "The Life and Work of Professor Roy Millen" and "The Unvexed Isles," the academy is seen as a nursery world, irresponsible and unproductive. Both professors are cut of a piece: dominated by frigid wives, working desultorily on vague books, resentful of the careless, possessive manner of their wealthy students. More pointedly, both seized on the university as a means of escaping a background of hard farm labor, which they regarded as shameful and bitter. The feeling seems to be that the university is something apart from "life" (except when the writer wishes to show that the university is precisely a market place) and that fiction cannot reasonably employ its full energies there.

With very few exceptions (e.g., Willa Cather's *The Professor's House* and Lionel Trilling's story "Of This Time, of That Place"), American fiction as a matter of fact has not attempted to deal, in any serious way, with the university. The contempt displayed by Warren for his Professors Millen and Dalrymple represents a kind of sacrificial offering, to atone, on one hand, for his own academician's

removal from the real arenas of modern society and, on the other, for his purely verbal allegiance to an ideal community. (Although the university campus is a community of a sort and human in scale, it lacks for the agrarian the productive physical roots of the true provincial community.)

Two themes pervade Warren's fiction and poetry: original sin and the inexorability of fate. As in Aldous Huxley, sin and guilt haunt the bedside of sex. Warren's lovers are continually uneasy and fearful of the parental footstep, as Adam and Eve were shamed by the appearance of their God-father. When relations are physically comfortable, as between the hero and his first wife in *All The King's Men*, they are described, inevitably, in animal-machine terms; as persons, they are intolerable to each other and "adjustment" ends. Sin is ineradicable, not only in love, but in politics, where corruption dogs power (*At Heaven's Gate*, *All The King's Men*); in economics, where means and ends cancel each other ("Prime Leaf," and the novel *Night Rider*, based on that story); and in race relations, where the conflict of cultures destroys the human community ("Her Own People" and "Cass Mastern's Wedding Ring"). Original sin, Warren wrote in his poem of that title, "has nothing to do/ with your public experience or private reformation:/ but it thought no bed too narrow—it stood with lips askew/ and shook its great head sadly like the abstract Jew."

The demon within is abetted by the demon without, that is, the blind determinism of history. Man, living in the "agony of will," finds himself caught between the two, incapable of breaking the ordained pattern of his life, even through imagination: "people always believe what truth they have to believe to go on being the way they are." This view leads Warren, in most of the shorter stories included here, to treat the failure of outcasts either as a wry mirthless joke (e.g., the Lardnerian "A Christian Education" and "Goodwood Comes Back") or as a vague sentimental elegy in the manner of Sherwood Anderson (the main characters of "Circus in the Attic" and "The Love of Elsie Barton" are both unworldly "grotesques").

Warren writes best of wilful men like Willie Stark who butt their heads against history, or of possessed men like the backwoods evangelist, Ashby Wyndham, of *At Heaven's Gate*, and

Cass Mastern, whose pre-Civil War diary of guilt takes on an impressive solemnity. When his characters lack will or intensity, Warren's language becomes compensatorily violent and banal, full of bleeding metaphors, self-propelled prose-poetry, and pretentious truisms. Being imitative by design and nature, his prose style partakes of the corruption it tries to represent. For all his susceptibility to the modern temper, Warren is at home only in the provincial world and in the indigenous rhetoric of that world: Southern oratory, biblical folk speech, and cultivated formality.

Ritual and Nature

MAN AND TEMPLE IN ANCIENT JEWISH MYTH AND RITUAL. By RAPHAEL PATAI. London, Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1947. 227 pp. 8s. 6d.

Reviewed by THEODOR H. GASTER

THE study of folklore is, strictly speaking, the exploration of those elements of culture which are survivals, in word or deed, from previous epochs or earlier stages of thought. Through these survivals—sometimes retained as bare superstitions, sometimes transmuted, sublimated, and refined—it is possible, in large measure, to trace the course of man's mental and spiritual development. Such a study is, of course, fundamental to any proper appreciation of history or literature; and one might suppose that by this time it would have come to be recognized as the bedrock of what are commonly called the humanities or liberal arts. The fact is, however, that, because of its admittedly subjective character and imprecision, folklore is still regarded, by and large, as a mere stepchild of science—a mere pastime of antiquarians which may be indulged but not encouraged in the established curriculum of education.

More credit, then, to Dr. Raphael Patai of Jerusalem, who has long been pioneering in this field and who, by the creation of the Palestine Institute of Folklore and Ethnology and the publication of several useful monographs, has contributed much towards introducing the subject, on a scientific level, into contemporary Jewish studies, especially in the Holy Land.

In the present volume, Dr. Patai explores, in the wake of several eminent predecessors, the folklore of the Temple in Jerusalem and of

various rites performed within it; and he endeavors to show that both edifice and rituals reflected a certain basic conception of the world and of the processes of nature.

THE basis of this conception—shared by most primitive religions—was that man and nature were of the same essence, so that the actions and states of man could influence, indeed largely determine, the natural. For all practical purposes, therefore, organized religion consisted in the routine performance of such actions and the routine induction of such states as were believed capable of producing a beneficial operation of nature.

The temple—center of the cult—represented the world in miniature. It was a reproduction of the cosmic mountain. Its ceiling was the sky, its floor the earth; and in its courtyard was a "brazen sea" representing the primeval ocean. Moreover, it was the meeting point of the upper and lower waters. At its entrance stood two pillars—Jachin and Boaz—which symbolized, according to Dr. Patai, the sun and moon, and according to other scholars (including the reviewer) the columns on which the sky was believed to rest. The various appurtenances of the temple likewise possessed a cosmic significance—a fact confirmed by later rabbinic exegeses. The ten lavers ensured abundant rainfall, and the ten tables the growth of abundant crops. The seventy lamps—so the rabbis asserted—stood for the seventy nations of the world, the stability of which was consequent upon the temple ritual.

The most important of the rituals performed in ancient Near Eastern religions was that whereby life was thought to be regenerated from year to year at the beginning of the rainy season. The ritual fell into a standard pattern. There was a mimetic combat against the forces of chaos or death (usually portrayed as a dragon), a ceremony of mass-mating to produce fecundity, the lighting of fires to relume the sun, the performance of charms to produce rain, and a deposition and subsequent reinstatement of the king as the symbol of the dying and reviving life of the community. This pattern may be traced in the traditional ceremonies of the Feast of Tabernacles. The mimetic combat is represented by the footraces described in the Mishnah. The mass-mating survived in what the same source calls euphemistically the "lightheadedness" of the attendant males and females. The reluming of the sun is the basis of the lighting of the great candelabrum, while

the rain-making survived in the picturesque ceremony of water-drawing when water was brought into the temple from a neighboring spring. For each of these details Dr. Patai adduces parallels from ancient and primitive practice.

Nor is it only in ritual that Dr. Patai would recognize survivals of the primitive pattern. He finds them also in literature—in the figures and tropes employed by the rabbis in expounding these ceremonies and institutions. The battle of God against the primeval dragon is mentioned not only in the Bible (e.g. Psalms 74, 89) but also in Talmudic references to the fight against Leviathan—a point already developed, some twenty-five years ago, by Samuel Daiches. Similarly, the conception of the temple as the center of fertility—expressed in ritual by a "sacred marriage" between king and priestess—finds its counterpart in literature in the rabbinic comparison of it to a nuptial couch.

As previously observed, not all of Dr. Patai's thesis is original. The basis of it, and a good many of the details, have been anticipated by several other scholars—notably, by the late E. J. Burrows in his essay "Some Cosmological Patterns in Babylonian Religion," published in S. H. Hooke's *The Labyrinth* (London 1935). The present reviewer has also presented a summary of the same theme in *Folk-Lore* xlix (1938), 341—without any claim to originality. But what is original in Dr. Patai's treatment, and what gives particular value to his book, is his detection of the primitive pattern in rabbinic literature. Unfortunately, however, it is just here that Dr. Patai seems to expose himself to the most serious criticism. In the first place, he does not sufficiently emphasize the point that the literary and ritual expressions of the rude and primitive ideological pattern are *parallel* phenomena. Instead, he conveys the impression that he regards the former as dependent upon the latter. If, for instance, the rabbis regard the temple and its ritual as the factor par excellence which stabilizes the world, this does not mean that they are consciously reproducing the ritual ideology in literature; it means only that the conception which informed the ritual was likewise present independently in their minds. Accordingly, the rabbinic sources are parallels or coincidences, but not direct survivals. Second, Dr. Patai introduces his main discussion with a general disquisition on primitive reactions to the supernatural which is, to say the least, highly questionable. In it he

tends arbitrarily to define as supernatural that which was merely mysterious, and he implies—what is certainly very doubtful—that primitive man recognized nothing as natural which he did not fully know or control. It is true that Dr. Patai attempts later to qualify this somewhat sweeping generalization, but nowhere does he face the problem, so basic for his argument, of defining nature in terms of primitive thinking. Lastly, it is to be feared that Dr. Patai tends to rely unduly upon secondary quotations—especially in references to Greek and Latin authors. If these were systematically checked in their contexts, it would be found that they do not always bear out the interpretations here placed upon them. A similar strain is sometimes imposed also on passages from rabbinic literature. Thus, the statement quoted (page 90) from Midrash Tanhuma to the effect that the Temple is like a nuptial couch, a source of fertility, is no independent expression of the primitive ideology, but rests simply on a fanciful exegesis of Song of Songs 3:9. In accordance with the then prevalent allegorical interpretation, the “litter” which King Solomon is there said to have made was taken to denote the First Temple in Jerusalem, while the peculiar word *appiryon* used in the original was etymologized from the verb *p-r-h*, “be fruitful!” In such cases, where the immediate origin of an interpretation can be traced, it is a little hazardous to detect survivals of primitive ideologies. The most we can claim is an interesting parallel.

All pioneer work is open to such minor points of criticism, and they should not be allowed to detract from the positive merit of Dr. Patai's volume. It is to be hoped that it will find many readers in this country, and that the Palestine Institute of Folklore and Ethnology will be encouraged.

An Emasculated Abram

ABRAM SON OF TERAH. By FLORENCE MARVYNE BAUER. New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1948. 406 pp. \$3.00.

Reviewed by ISA KAPP

MISS BAUER's housewifely archaeology has somehow concealed the fact that the story of Abram is a Jewish story. Abram as ancestral Jew, or as a particular Jew mysteriously selected to bear the burden of leadership, has been subverted to an average if hypersensitive young

urbanite with a nostalgia for the farm. His adolescence is represented as the time of trial, and family bickering as the source of his strength and weakness; his alienation is understood to mean that his mother had no time for him. At the moment of the Covenant, when the myth begins to take on meaning for Jews, when ritual, law, and a sense of community in exile become part of a general fate, the novel is finished.

The Oedipal nature of Abram's monotheism (which Miss Bauer traces in a thin straight line, with small benefit from the complication of Freud's method) might have been a center from which to examine his reaction to all kinds of authority. Instead, his rebellion is treated as an irritable, monotonous wail against the indifference of the pagan gods and a prolonged coy resistance to Jah (Jehovah), but with the delicious eventual surrender always in sight.

The writer has a strong taste for submission, and in a dozen places obliterates the purpose of the submission in the aura of titillation that surrounds it. Her book is in many ways a melodrama of subordination: the king subjugates the royal guard, the priests the idolaters, the master his slaves, the legal wife the concubines, and so forth, and the impression sneaks in that there was something glamorous in these hierarchies.

Whatever was in fact important in the culture of Ur of the Chaldees gets no real consideration here. The profusion of shawls, dunghills, inheritances, taxes, and squabbles—all the paraphernalia that irrelevantly prove the “chemisms” of one period of history to be much like those of another—create a space in time neither ancient nor modern, but neutral, ready to bear the stamp of a subjective post-Christian piety. Thus, urban commerce, which is the only phenomenon that *Abram Son of Terah* describes with a certain vitality and pleasure, actually replaces the lechery of the usual historical novel. Shrewdness, usury, business sense, are not seen as elements of adaptability, but as the mark of corruption. Is there then some deliberate general implication in the fact that this corruption is attributed in one way or another to every member of Abram's house?

Abram's preference of Jah to the idols is itself on a partly commercial basis: Jah demanded no tithes, and reliably answered some very practical prayers. And this is as far as Miss Bauer goes in imagining Abram's conception of a God who was for the first time

social, an instrument for introducing new values and rituals, a new life. In her novel, Abram's relation with this God is expressed in vapid trust. But the biblical Abram bargained with his God like a diplomat to spare Sodom for the sake of ten just men. Where is the scepticism of this extraordinary monotheist? We must remember how anxious Miss Bauer is to hide the fact that her Abram *was* extraordinary. A thousand naturalistic trappings are used to bring him closer, and in these minutiae is dissipated the power of the spare language of Genesis.

Truth, Freedom, and Authority

COMMUNITY OF THE FREE. By YVES SIMON. New York, Henry Holt, 1947. 172 pp. \$3.00.

Reviewed by GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB

PRESENTED with John Dewey's *A Common Faith*—a faith independent of sect, class, or creed—Santayana is supposed to have remarked, "a very common faith indeed." Yves Simon's *Community of the Free* may be described as a very exclusive faith—one that requires rigid unanimity in dogma and philosophy to be persuasive or even intelligible.

Mr. Simon is a professor of philosophy at Notre Dame, and his present volume is a study in political ethics in the tradition of Jacques Maritain and contemporary Catholic philosophy. It is concerned with the pervasive immorality of recent times and the "confusion of conscience" by which ordinary men have been debased. This type of inquest over the remains of "modern man" has become a familiar literary device, but Simon alters its character slightly. Instead of following the customary procedure of implicating himself in the deplorable conditions he describes, and identifying himself with the accused, Simon maintains his remoteness. He never forgets that he is the judge, not the culprit.

Moreover he is a judge who judges harshly. For the laws of nature and philosophy have clearly laid down the conditions of man's existence, and if they are violated, retribution is immediate. The liberalism of modern times, he claims, violated at least two of these laws: the union of truth and freedom, and the union of freedom and authority.

Liberalism, says Simon, suggests that absolute

truth is neither a necessary nor a desirable adjunct of freedom. For if absolute truth were available to men, "freedom" could consist only in perversely willing the false. Simon repudiates this view. Freedom, he says, is the power to choose among the *true* means proposed to us—the means that genuinely lead to the desired end. "Freedom to choose illusory means is itself only an illusion of freedom, for a means which does not lead to the end is not a means."

One could hardly dispute this. As a tautology it is impeccable—but not very instructive. If the liberal is anxious to divorce freedom from absolute truth, it is because absolute truth tends to be associated with an infallible institutional repository of that truth. He is not motivated by metaphysical timidity, but by political caution. He does not want to expose men to "false means," but to protect them against those who would assume the right to prescribe and impose the "true means."

Truth is "total and indivisible," Simon repeatedly assures us—at the same time describing the circumstances when certain truths must be concealed. When the Armenians were being massacred, for example, it would have been evil to publicize their wrongdoings, for to do so would have distracted attention from the more urgent truth of the wrongdoings of the Turks. This is a subtle problem in political ethics, worthy of serious and honest treatment. Instead the steam-roller is set in motion and the problem disappears, crushed beneath the weight of a ponderous virtuousness. When may the truth be concealed? Not, as our vulgar utilitarian philosophy would have it, when our interests dictate it. "The authentic criterion," Simon pronounces, "is relative to that which outweighs all utility—the truth. . . . Serve truth—by silence as well as by speech. This maxim does not lend itself to automatic application, like an algebraic formula. It is meaningless except to souls devoured by love of truth." Unfortunately it is also meaningless to those who do not find the problem solved by a juggling of words in which "the truth" becomes identical with "the concealment of the truth."

FREEDOM and authority are reconciled with the same rhetorical ease. Freedom requires a submission to the truth, to the law of our nature. And the law of our nature, in turn, is reflected in the laws of society. This locates freedom at the opposite pole from rebellion and from the individualistic habit of regarding authority as

a necessary evil. The real despot, for Simon, is the rebel. He admits that there are unjust laws—laws that conflict with the general welfare. But we must often obey even these rather than encourage a spirit of disobedience. And we must always love and respect legitimate authorities “to the point of giving any superior the benefit of the doubt when we believe, without being certain, that he is overstepping his true powers.”

By metaphysical fiat freedom has become authority and authority freedom, and the problems that have haunted political philosophers for thousands of years are exposed as frauds. Perhaps, however, observing the course of recent history, we may be permitted to persist

in our prejudices. For the fact remains that the prevalent form of tyranny is not the tyranny of recalcitrant individualism, but the tyranny of authority, aggrandized and corrupted.

Authority, writes Simon, “is neither a necessary evil nor a lesser good. It is a thing good purely and simply—as wisdom, reason and order are good. . . . It is a matter of pure accident—however frequently the accident may occur—that authority develops into arbitrariness.” It takes a very special kind of metaphysics to see pure good in anything which is just as often pure evil. The reviewer, who confesses to misgivings about pragmatism, was sent scurrying back to John Stuart Mill and John Dewey.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

GEORGE LICHTHEIM wrote “England: The Citizen on Trial” in the January 1948 COMMENTARY.

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